- 24 12月, 2008 40 次提交
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由 Benny Halevy 提交于
Signed-off-by: NBenny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Andy Adamson 提交于
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson<andros@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: NBenny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Andy Adamson 提交于
Clean-up Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson<andros@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: NBenny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Benny Halevy 提交于
3 call sites look at hdr.status before returning success. hdr.status must be zero in this case so there's no point in this. Currently, hdr.status is correctly processed at decode_op_hdr time if the op status cannot be decoded. Signed-off-by: NBenny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Benny Halevy 提交于
When there are no op replies encoded in the compound reply hdr.status still contains the overall status of the compound rpc. This can happen, e.g., when the server returns a NFS4ERR_MINOR_VERS_MISMATCH error. Signed-off-by: NBenny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Benny Halevy 提交于
rq_bufsize is not used. Signed-off-by: NMike Sager <Mike.Sager@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: NBenny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Marten Gajda <marten.gajda@fernuni-hagen.de> states: I tracked the problem down to the function nfs4_do_open_expired. Within this function _nfs4_open_expired is called and may return -NFS4ERR_DELAY. When a further call to _nfs4_open_expired is executed and does not return -NFS4ERR_DELAY the "exception.retry" variable is not reset to 0, causing the loop to iterate again (and as long as err != -NFS4ERR_DELAY, probably forever) Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
There's a bit of a chicken and egg problem when it comes to destroying auth_gss credentials. When we destroy the last instance of a GSSAPI RPC credential, we should send a NULL RPC call with a GSS procedure of RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY to hint to the server that it can destroy those creds. This isn't happening because we're setting clearing the uptodate bit on the credentials and then setting the operations to the gss_nullops. When we go to do the RPC call, we try to refresh the creds. That fails with -EACCES and the call fails. Fix this by not clearing the UPTODATE bit for the credentials and adding a new crdestroy op for gss_nullops that just tears down the cred without trying to destroy the context. The only difference between this patch and the first one is the removal of some minor formatting deltas. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Peter Staubach 提交于
Hi. I've been looking at a bugzilla which describes a problem where a customer was advised to use either the "noac" or "actimeo=0" mount options to solve a consistency problem that they were seeing in the file attributes. It turned out that this solution did not work reliably for them because sometimes, the local attribute cache was believed to be valid and not timed out. (With an attribute cache timeout of 0, the cache should always appear to be timed out.) In looking at this situation, it appears to me that the problem is that the attribute cache timeout code has an off-by-one error in it. It is assuming that the cache is valid in the region, [read_cache_jiffies, read_cache_jiffies + attrtimeo]. The cache should be considered valid only in the region, [read_cache_jiffies, read_cache_jiffies + attrtimeo). With this change, the options, "noac" and "actimeo=0", work as originally expected. This problem was previously addressed by special casing the attrtimeo == 0 case. However, since the problem is only an off- by-one error, the cleaner solution is address the off-by-one error and thus, not require the special case. Thanx... ps Signed-off-by: NPeter Staubach <staubach@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
This ensures that we don't have to look up the dentry again after we return the delegation if we know that the directory didn't change. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Currently, the callback server is listening on IPv6 if it is enabled. This means that IPv4 addresses will always be mapped. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
If the client is not using a delegation, the right thing to do is to return it as soon as possible. This helps reduce the amount of state the server has to track, as well as reducing the potential for conflicts with other clients. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Reuse the state management thread in order to return delegations when we get a callback. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Let the actual delegreturn stuff be run in the state manager thread rather than allocating a separate kthread. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
We really shouldn't be resetting the sequence ids when doing state expiration recovery, since we don't know if the server still remembers our previous state owners. There are servers out there that do attempt to preserve client state even if the lease has expired. Such a server would only release that state if a conflicting OPEN request occurs. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Fix up a potential race... Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
It is really a more general purpose state management thread at this point. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Add a delegation cleanup phase to the state management loop, and do the NFS4ERR_CB_PATH_DOWN recovery there. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Add a flag to mark delegations as requiring return, then run a garbage collector. In the future, this will allow for more flexible delegation management, where delegations may be marked for return if it turns out that they are not being referenced. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
NFSv4 defines a number of state errors which the client does not currently handle. Among those we should worry about are: NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED - the server's administrator revoked our locks and/or delegations. NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID - the client and server are out of sync, possibly due to a delegation return racing with an OPEN request. NFS4ERR_OPENMODE - the client attempted to do something not sanctioned by the open mode of the stateid. Should normally just occur as a result of a delegation return race. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Now that we're using the flags to indicate state that needs to be recovered, as well as having implemented proper refcounting and spinlocking on the state and open_owners, we can get rid of nfs_client->cl_sem. The only remaining case that was dubious was the file locking, and that case is now covered by the nfsi->rwsem. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
The unlock path is currently failing to take the nfs_client->cl_sem read lock, and hence the recovery path may see locks disappear from underneath it. Also ensure that it takes the nfs_inode->rwsem read lock so that it there is no conflict with delegation recalls. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
...and move some code around in order to clear out an unnecessary forward declaration. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Instead of doing a full setclientid, try doing a RENEW call first. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
If the client for some reason is not able to recover all its state within the time allotted for the grace period, and the server reboots again, the client is not allowed to recover the state that was 'lost' using reboot recovery. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Ditto for nfs4_get_setclientid_cred(). Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Without an extra lock, we cannot just assume that the delegation->inode is valid when we're traversing the rcu-protected nfs_client lists. Use the delegation->lock to ensure that it is truly valid. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
When we can update_open_stateid(), we need to be certain that we don't race with a delegation return. While we could do this by grabbing the nfs_client->cl_lock, a dedicated spin lock in the delegation structure will scale better. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Chuck Lever 提交于
If the admin has specified the "noresvport" option for an NFS mount point, the kernel's NFS client uses an unprivileged source port for the main NFS transport. The kernel's lockd client should use an unprivileged port in this case as well. Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Chuck Lever 提交于
If the admin has specified the "noresvport" option for an NFS mount point, the kernel's NFS client uses an unprivileged source port for the main NFS transport. The kernel's mountd client should use an unprivileged port in this case as well. Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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由 Chuck Lever 提交于
The standard default security setting for NFS is AUTH_SYS. An NFS client connects to NFS servers via a privileged source port and a fixed standard destination port (2049). The client sends raw uid and gid numbers to identify users making NFS requests, and the server assumes an appropriate authority on the client has vetted these values because the source port is privileged. On Linux, by default in-kernel RPC services use a privileged port in the range between 650 and 1023 to avoid using source ports of well- known IP services. Using such a small range limits the number of NFS mount points and the number of unique NFS servers to which a client can connect concurrently. An NFS client can use unprivileged source ports to expand the range of source port numbers, allowing more concurrent server connections and more NFS mount points. Servers must explicitly allow NFS connections from unprivileged ports for this to work. In the past, bumping the value of the sunrpc.max_resvport sysctl on the client would permit the NFS client to use unprivileged ports. Bumping this setting also changes the maximum port number used by other in-kernel RPC services, some of which still required a port number less than 1023. This is exacerbated by the way source port numbers are chosen by the Linux RPC client, which starts at the top of the range and works downwards. It means that bumping the maximum means all RPC services requesting a source port will likely get an unprivileged port instead of a privileged one. Changing this setting effects all NFS mount points on a client. A sysadmin could not selectively choose which mount points would use non-privileged ports and which could not. Lastly, this mechanism of expanding the limit on the number of NFS mount points was entirely undocumented. To address the need for the NFS client to use a large range of source ports without interfering with the activity of other in-kernel RPC services, we introduce a new NFS mount option. This option explicitly tells only the NFS client to use a non-privileged source port when communicating with the NFS server for one specific mount point. This new mount option is called "resvport," like the similar NFS mount option on FreeBSD and Mac OS X. A sister patch for nfs-utils will be submitted that documents this new option in nfs(5). The default setting for this new mount option requires the NFS client to use a privileged port, as before. Explicitly specifying the "noresvport" mount option allows the NFS client to use an unprivileged source port for this mount point when connecting to the NFS server port. This mount option is supported only for text-based NFS mounts. [ Sidebar: it is widely known that security mechanisms based on the use of privileged source ports are ineffective. However, the NFS client can combine the use of unprivileged ports with the use of secure authentication mechanisms, such as Kerberos. This allows a large number of connections and mount points while ensuring a useful level of security. Eventually we may change the default setting for this option depending on the security flavor used for the mount. For example, if the mount is using only AUTH_SYS, then the default setting will be "resvport;" if the mount is using a strong security flavor such as krb5, the default setting will be "noresvport." ] Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> [Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com: Fixed a bug whereby nfs4_init_client() was being called with incorrect arguments.] Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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