- 14 2月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
DIR_INDEX has been introduced as a compat ext4 feature. That means that even kernels / tools that don't understand the feature may modify the filesystem. This works because for kernels not understanding indexed dir format, internal htree nodes appear just as empty directory entries. Index dir aware kernels then check the htree structure is still consistent before using the data. This all worked reasonably well until metadata checksums were introduced. The problem is that these effectively made DIR_INDEX only ro-compatible because internal htree nodes store checksums in a different place than normal directory blocks. Thus any modification ignorant to DIR_INDEX (or just clearing EXT4_INDEX_FL from the inode) will effectively cause checksum mismatch and trigger kernel errors. So we have to be more careful when dealing with indexed directories on filesystems with checksumming enabled. 1) We just disallow loading any directory inodes with EXT4_INDEX_FL when DIR_INDEX is not enabled. This is harsh but it should be very rare (it means someone disabled DIR_INDEX on existing filesystem and didn't run e2fsck), e2fsck can fix the problem, and we don't want to answer the difficult question: "Should we rather corrupt the directory more or should we ignore that DIR_INDEX feature is not set?" 2) When we find out htree structure is corrupted (but the filesystem and the directory should in support htrees), we continue just ignoring htree information for reading but we refuse to add new entries to the directory to avoid corrupting it more. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210144316.22081-1-jack@suse.cz Fixes: dbe89444 ("ext4: Calculate and verify checksums for htree nodes") Reviewed-by: NAndreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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- 25 1月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Since ->d_compare() and ->d_hash() can be called in RCU-walk mode, ->d_parent and ->d_inode can be concurrently modified, and in particular, ->d_inode may be changed to NULL. For ext4_d_hash() this resulted in a reproducible NULL dereference if a lookup is done in a directory being deleted, e.g. with: int main() { if (fork()) { for (;;) { mkdir("subdir", 0700); rmdir("subdir"); } } else { for (;;) access("subdir/file", 0); } } ... or by running the 't_encrypted_d_revalidate' program from xfstests. Both repros work in any directory on a filesystem with the encoding feature, even if the directory doesn't actually have the casefold flag. I couldn't reproduce a crash in ext4_d_compare(), but it appears that a similar crash is possible there. Fix these bugs by reading ->d_parent and ->d_inode using READ_ONCE() and falling back to the case sensitive behavior if the inode is NULL. Reported-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: b886ee3e ("ext4: Support case-insensitive file name lookups") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.2+ Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200124041234.159740-1-ebiggers@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 18 1月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Chengguang Xu 提交于
We have allocated memory using kzalloc() so don't have to set 0 again in last byte. Signed-off-by: NChengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191206054317.3107-1-cgxu519@mykernel.netSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 01 1月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
fscrypt_get_encryption_info() returns 0 if the encryption key is unavailable; it never returns ENOKEY. So remove checks for ENOKEY. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209212348.243331-1-ebiggers@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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- 15 12月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Make __ext4_check_dir_entry() a bit easier to understand, and reduce the object size of the function by over 11%. Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209004346.38526-1-tytso@mit.eduSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
ext4_check_dir_entry() currently does not catch a case when a directory entry ends so close to the block end that the header of the next directory entry would not fit in the remaining space. This can lead to directory iteration code trying to access address beyond end of current buffer head leading to oops. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191202170213.4761-3-jack@suse.czSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 03 9月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
If an directory has the a casefold flag set without the casefold feature set, s_encoding will not be initialized, and this will cause the kernel to dereference a NULL pointer. In addition to adding checks to avoid these kernel oops, attempts to load inodes with the casefold flag when the casefold feature is not enable will cause the file system to be declared corrupted. Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 22 6月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Functions such as ext4_dirent_csum_verify() and ext4_dirent_csum_set() don't actually operate on a directory entry, but a directory block. And while they take a struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent as an argument, it had better be the first directory at the beginning of the direct block, or things will go very wrong. Rename the following functions so that things make more sense, and remove a lot of confusing casts along the way: ext4_dirent_csum_verify -> ext4_dirblock_csum_verify ext4_dirent_csum_set -> ext4_dirblock_csum_set ext4_dirent_csum -> ext4_dirblock_csum ext4_handle_dirty_dirent_node -> ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 21 6月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
The largedir feature was intended to allow ext4 directories to have unmapped directory blocks (e.g., directory holes). And so the released e2fsprogs no longer enforces this for largedir file systems; however, the corresponding change to the kernel-side code was not made. This commit fixes this oversight. Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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- 20 6月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Gabriel Krisman Bertazi 提交于
Temporarily cache a casefolded version of the file name under lookup in ext4_filename, to avoid repeatedly casefolding it. I got up to 30% speedup on lookups of large directories (>100k entries), depending on the length of the string under lookup. Signed-off-by: NGabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 25 5月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Gabriel Krisman Bertazi 提交于
Found by visual inspection, this wasn't caught by my xfstest, since it's effect is ignoring positive dentries in the cache the fallback just goes to the disk. it was introduced in the last iteration of the case-insensitive patch. d_compare should return 0 when the entries match, so make sure we are correctly comparing the entire string if the encoding feature is set and we are on a case-INsensitive directory. Fixes: b886ee3e ("ext4: Support case-insensitive file name lookups") Signed-off-by: NGabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 26 4月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Gabriel Krisman Bertazi 提交于
This patch implements the actual support for case-insensitive file name lookups in ext4, based on the feature bit and the encoding stored in the superblock. A filesystem that has the casefold feature set is able to configure directories with the +F (EXT4_CASEFOLD_FL) attribute, enabling lookups to succeed in that directory in a case-insensitive fashion, i.e: match a directory entry even if the name used by userspace is not a byte per byte match with the disk name, but is an equivalent case-insensitive version of the Unicode string. This operation is called a case-insensitive file name lookup. The feature is configured as an inode attribute applied to directories and inherited by its children. This attribute can only be enabled on empty directories for filesystems that support the encoding feature, thus preventing collision of file names that only differ by case. * dcache handling: For a +F directory, Ext4 only stores the first equivalent name dentry used in the dcache. This is done to prevent unintentional duplication of dentries in the dcache, while also allowing the VFS code to quickly find the right entry in the cache despite which equivalent string was used in a previous lookup, without having to resort to ->lookup(). d_hash() of casefolded directories is implemented as the hash of the casefolded string, such that we always have a well-known bucket for all the equivalencies of the same string. d_compare() uses the utf8_strncasecmp() infrastructure, which handles the comparison of equivalent, same case, names as well. For now, negative lookups are not inserted in the dcache, since they would need to be invalidated anyway, because we can't trust missing file dentries. This is bad for performance but requires some leveraging of the vfs layer to fix. We can live without that for now, and so does everyone else. * on-disk data: Despite using a specific version of the name as the internal representation within the dcache, the name stored and fetched from the disk is a byte-per-byte match with what the user requested, making this implementation 'name-preserving'. i.e. no actual information is lost when writing to storage. DX is supported by modifying the hashes used in +F directories to make them case/encoding-aware. The new disk hashes are calculated as the hash of the full casefolded string, instead of the string directly. This allows us to efficiently search for file names in the htree without requiring the user to provide an exact name. * Dealing with invalid sequences: By default, when a invalid UTF-8 sequence is identified, ext4 will treat it as an opaque byte sequence, ignoring the encoding and reverting to the old behavior for that unique file. This means that case-insensitive file name lookup will not work only for that file. An optional bit can be set in the superblock telling the filesystem code and userspace tools to enforce the encoding. When that optional bit is set, any attempt to create a file name using an invalid UTF-8 sequence will fail and return an error to userspace. * Normalization algorithm: The UTF-8 algorithms used to compare strings in ext4 is implemented lives in fs/unicode, and is based on a previous version developed by SGI. It implements the Canonical decomposition (NFD) algorithm described by the Unicode specification 12.1, or higher, combined with the elimination of ignorable code points (NFDi) and full case-folding (CF) as documented in fs/unicode/utf8_norm.c. NFD seems to be the best normalization method for EXT4 because: - It has a lower cost than NFC/NFKC (which requires decomposing to NFD as an intermediary step) - It doesn't eliminate important semantic meaning like compatibility decompositions. Although: - This implementation is not completely linguistic accurate, because different languages have conflicting rules, which would require the specialization of the filesystem to a given locale, which brings all sorts of problems for removable media and for users who use more than one language. Signed-off-by: NGabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.co.uk> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 24 1月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Chandan Rajendra 提交于
In order to have a common code base for fscrypt "post read" processing for all filesystems which support encryption, this commit removes filesystem specific build config option (e.g. CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION) and replaces it with a build option (i.e. CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) whose value affects all the filesystems making use of fscrypt. Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NChandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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由 Chandan Rajendra 提交于
This commit removes the ext4 specific ext4_encrypted_inode() and makes use of the generic IS_ENCRYPTED() macro to check for the encryption status of an inode. Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NChandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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- 27 8月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
A specially crafted file system can trick empty_inline_dir() into reading past the last valid entry in a inline directory, and then run into the end of xattr marker. This will trigger a divide by zero fault. Fix this by using the size of the inline directory instead of dir->i_size. Also clean up error reporting in __ext4_check_dir_entry so that the message is clearer and more understandable --- and avoids the division by zero trap if the size passed in is zero. (I'm not sure why we coded it that way in the first place; printing offset % size is actually more confusing and less useful.) https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200933Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reported-by: NWen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 02 4月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
A malicious user could force the directory pointer to be in an invalid spot by using seekdir(2). Use the mechanism we already have to notice if the directory has changed since the last time we called ext4_readdir() to force a revalidation of the pointer. Reported-by: syzbot+1236ce66f79263e8a862@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 01 2月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Goffredo Baroncelli 提交于
The function inode_cmp_iversion{+raw} is counter-intuitive, because it returns true when the counters are different and false when these are equal. Rename it to inode_eq_iversion{+raw}, which will returns true when the counters are equal and false otherwise. Signed-off-by: NGoffredo Baroncelli <kreijack@inwind.it> Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
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- 29 1月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 02 11月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: NKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: NPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 25 8月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Markus Elfring 提交于
Replace the specification of data structures by pointer dereferences as the parameter for the operator "sizeof" to make the corresponding size determination a bit safer according to the Linux coding style convention. This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Signed-off-by: NMarkus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
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- 30 9月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Eric Engestrom 提交于
Signed-off-by: NEric Engestrom <eric.engestrom@imgtec.com>
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- 16 9月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Several filename crypto functions: fname_decrypt(), fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(), and fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk(), returned the output length on success or -errno on failure. However, the output length was redundant with the value written to 'oname->len'. It is also potentially error-prone to make callers have to check for '< 0' instead of '!= 0'. Therefore, make these functions return 0 instead of a length, and make the callers who cared about the return value being a length use 'oname->len' instead. For consistency also make other callers check for a nonzero result rather than a negative result. This change also fixes the inconsistency of fname_encrypt() actually already returning 0 on success, not a length like the other filename crypto functions and as documented in its function comment. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NAndreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Acked-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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- 11 7月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Jaegeuk Kim 提交于
This patch removes the most parts of internal crypto codes. And then, it modifies and adds some ext4-specific crypt codes to use the generic facility. Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 13 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Note that we need relax_dir() equivalent for directories locked shared. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 24 4月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
If a directory has a large number of empty blocks, iterating over all of them can take a long time, leading to scheduler warnings and users getting irritated when they can't kill a process in the middle of one of these long-running readdir operations. Fix this by adding checks to ext4_readdir() and ext4_htree_fill_tree(). This was reverted earlier due to a typo in the original commit where I experimented with using signal_pending() instead of fatal_signal_pending(). The test was in the wrong place if we were going to return signal_pending() since we would end up returning duplicant entries. See 9f2394c9 for a more detailed explanation. Added fix as suggested by Linus to check for signal_pending() in in the filldir() functions. Reported-by: NBenjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org> Google-Bug-Id: 27880676 Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 11 4月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Linus Torvalds 提交于
This reverts commit 1028b55b. It's broken: it makes ext4 return an error at an invalid point, causing the readdir wrappers to write the the position of the last successful directory entry into the position field, which means that the next readdir will now return that last successful entry _again_. You can only return fatal errors (that terminate the readdir directory walk) from within the filesystem readdir functions, the "normal" errors (that happen when the readdir buffer fills up, for example) happen in the iterorator where we know the position of the actual failing entry. I do have a very different patch that does the "signal_pending()" handling inside the iterator function where it is allowable, but while that one passes all the sanity checks, I screwed up something like four times while emailing it out, so I'm not going to commit it today. So my track record is not good enough, and the stars will have to align better before that one gets committed. And it would be good to get some review too, of course, since celestial alignments are always an iffy debugging model. IOW, let's just revert the commit that caused the problem for now. Reported-by: NGreg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 05 4月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Kirill A. Shutemov 提交于
PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 31 3月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
If a directory has a large number of empty blocks, iterating over all of them can take a long time, leading to scheduler warnings and users getting irritated when they can't kill a process in the middle of one of these long-running readdir operations. Fix this by adding checks to ext4_readdir() and ext4_htree_fill_tree(). Reported-by: NBenjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org> Google-Bug-Id: 27880676 Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 23 3月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
ext4 treats directory offsets differently for 32-bit and 64-bit callers. Check the caller type using in_compat_syscall, not is_compat_task. This changes behavior on SPARC slightly. Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 16 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Kirill Tkhai 提交于
When ext4_bread() fails, fname_crypto_str remains allocated after return. Fix that. Signed-off-by: NKirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> CC: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@virtuozzo.com>
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- 08 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Add a validation check for dentries for encrypted directory to make sure we're not caching stale data after a key has been added or removed. Also check to make sure that status of the encryption key is updated when readdir(2) is executed. Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 18 10月, 2015 2 次提交
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
Create separate predicate functions to test/set/clear feature flags, thereby replacing the wordy old macros. Furthermore, clean out the places where we open-coded feature tests. Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
Instead of overloading EIO for CRC errors and corrupt structures, return the same error codes that XFS returns for the same issues. Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 01 6月, 2015 2 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
As suggested by Herbert Xu, we shouldn't allocate a new tfm each time we read or write a page. Instead we can use a single tfm hanging off the inode's crypt_info structure for all of our encryption needs for that inode, since the tfm can be used by multiple crypto requests in parallel. Also use cmpxchg() to avoid races that could result in crypt_info structure getting doubly allocated or doubly freed. Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 19 5月, 2015 2 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things: 1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node. This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not using encryption. 2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode encryption structure instead. This remove an unnecessary memory allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file creations. 3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the extended attributes. 4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the per-inode key. This allows us to test to see if the key has been revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free it. 5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not left hanging around in memory. This implies that when a user logs out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it, and then finally, to use "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system caches. 6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around 100. :-) Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 02 5月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Avoid using SHA-1 when calculating the user-visible filename when the encryption key is available, and avoid decrypting lots of filenames when searching for a directory entry in a directory block. Change-Id: If4655f144784978ba0305b597bfa1c8d7bb69e63 Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 12 4月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Michael Halcrow 提交于
Signed-off-by: NUday Savagaonkar <savagaon@google.com> Signed-off-by: NIldar Muslukhov <ildarm@google.com> Signed-off-by: NMichael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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