If the security type specified using a mount option is not supported,
the SMB2 session setup code changes the security type to RawNTLMSSP. We
should instead fail the mount and return an error.

The patch changes the code for SMB2 to make it similar to the code used
for SMB1. Like in SMB1, we now use the global security flags to select
the security method to be used when no security method is specified and
to return an error when the requested auth method is not available.

For SMB2, we also use ntlmv2 as a synonym for nltmssp.
Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

Now SendReceive2 frees the first iov and returns a response buffer
in it that increases a code complexity. Simplify this by making
a caller responsible for freeing request buffer itself and returning
a response buffer in a separate iov.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

calc_lanman_hash() could return -ENOMEM or other errors, we should check
that everything went fine before using the calculated key.
Signed-off-by: NLuis de Bethencourt <luisbg@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

In sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate(), the ntlmssp blob is allocated
statically and its size is an "empirical" 5*sizeof(struct
_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE) (320B on x86_64). I don't know where this value
comes from or if it was ever appropriate, but it is currently
insufficient: the user and domain name in UTF16 could take 1kB by
themselves. Because of that, build_ntlmssp_auth_blob() might corrupt
memory (out-of-bounds write). The size of ntlmssp_blob in
SMB2_sess_setup() is too small too (sizeof(struct _NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE)
+ 500).

This patch allocates the blob dynamically in
build_ntlmssp_auth_blob().
Signed-off-by: NJerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>

Currently in build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(), when converting the domain
name to UTF16, CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN limit is used. It should be
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN. This patch fixes this.
Signed-off-by: NJerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Only server which map unknown users to guest will allow
access using a non-null NTLMv2_Response.

For Samba it's the "map to guest = bad user" option.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11913Signed-off-by: NStefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Only server which map unknown users to guest will allow
access using a non-null NTChallengeResponse.

For Samba it's the "map to guest = bad user" option.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11913Signed-off-by: NStefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Only server which map unknown users to guest will allow
access using a non-null LMChallengeResponse.

For Samba it's the "map to guest = bad user" option.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11913Signed-off-by: NStefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

See [MS-NLMP] 3.2.5.1.2 Server Receives an AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE from the Client:

   ...
   Set NullSession to FALSE
   If (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.UserNameLen == 0 AND
      AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.NtChallengeResponse.Length == 0 AND
      (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.LmChallengeResponse == Z(1)
       OR
       AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.LmChallengeResponse.Length == 0))
       -- Special case: client requested anonymous authentication
       Set NullSession to TRUE
   ...

Only server which map unknown users to guest will allow
access using a non-null NTChallengeResponse.

For Samba it's the "map to guest = bad user" option.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11913

CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NStefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.

Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net

Replace all __constant_foo to foo() except in smb2status.h (1700 lines to
update).
Signed-off-by: NFabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

A user complained that they were unable to login to their cifs share
after a kernel update. From the wiretrace we can see that the server
returns different UIDs as response to NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE and NTLMSSP_AUTH
phases.

With changes in the authentication code, we no longer set the
cifs_sess->Suid returned in response to the NTLM_AUTH phase and continue
to use the UID sent in response to the NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE phase. This
results in the server denying access to the user when the user attempts
to do a tcon connect.

See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1163927

A test kernel containing patch was tested successfully by the user.
Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>

cifs provides two dummy functions 'sess_auth_lanman' and
'sess_auth_kerberos' for the case in which the respective
features are not defined. However, the caller is also under
an #ifdef, so we just get warnings about unused code:

fs/cifs/sess.c:1109:1: warning: 'sess_auth_kerberos' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
 sess_auth_kerberos(struct sess_data *sess_data)

Removing the dead functions gets rid of the warnings without
any downsides that I can see.

(Yalin Wang reported the identical problem and fix so added him)
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NYalin Wang <yalin.wang@sonymobile.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

When kzalloc fails, we will end up doing NULL pointer derefrence
Signed-off-by: NNamjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NAshish Sangwan <a.sangwan@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

The recent session setup patch set
(cifs-Separate-rawntlmssp-auth-from-CIFS_SessSetup.patch)
had introduced a trivial sparse build warning.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Cc: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>

Separate rawntlmssp authentication from CIFS_SessSetup(). Also cleanup
CIFS_SessSetup() since we no longer do any auth within it.
Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

In preparation for splitting CIFS_SessSetup() into smaller more
manageable chunks, we first add helper functions.

We then proceed to split out lanman auth out of CIFS_SessSetup()
Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

This allows users to use LANMAN authentication on servers which support
unencapsulated authentication.

The patch fixes a regression where users using plaintext authentication
were no longer able to do so because of changed bought in by patch
3f618223

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1011621Reported-by: NPanos Kavalagios <Panagiotis.Kavalagios@eurodyn.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Currently, we try to ensure that we use vcnum of 0 on the first
established session on a connection and then try to use a different
vcnum on each session after that.

This is a little odd, since there's no real reason to use a different
vcnum for each SMB session. I can only assume there was some confusion
between SMB sessions and VCs. That's somewhat understandable since they
both get created during SESSION_SETUP, but the documentation indicates
that they are really orthogonal. The comment on max_vcs in particular
looks quite misguided. An SMB session is already uniquely identified
by the SMB UID value -- there's no need to again uniquely ID with a
VC.

Furthermore, a vcnum of 0 is a cue to the server that it should release
any resources that were previously held by the client. This sounds like
a good thing, until you consider that:

a) it totally ignores the fact that other programs on the box (e.g.
smbclient) might have connections established to the server. Using a
vcnum of 0 causes them to get kicked off.

b) it causes problems with NAT. If several clients are connected to the
same server via the same NAT'ed address, whenever one connects to the
server it kicks off all the others, which then reconnect and kick off
the first one...ad nauseum.

I don't see any reason to ignore the advice in "Implementing CIFS" which
has a comprehensive treatment of virtual circuits. In there, it states
"...and contrary to the specs the client should always use a VcNumber of
one, never zero."

Have the client just use a hardcoded vcnum of 1, and stop abusing the
special behavior of vcnum 0.
Reported-by: NSauron99@gmx.de <sauron99@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NVolker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Add a variable specific to NTLMSSP authentication to determine
whether to exchange keys during negotiation and authentication phases.

Since session key for smb1 is per smb connection, once a very first
sesion is established, there is no need for key exchange during
subsequent session setups. As a result, smb1 session setup code sets this
variable as false.

Since session key for smb2 and smb3 is per smb connection, we need to
exchange keys to generate session key for every sesion being established.
As a result, smb2/3 session setup code sets this variable as true.
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Move the post (successful) session setup code to respective dialect routines.

For smb1, session key is per smb connection.
For smb2/smb3, session key is per smb session.

If client and server do not require signing, free session key for smb1/2/3.

If client and server require signing
  smb1 - Copy (kmemdup) session key for the first session to connection.
         Free session key of that and subsequent sessions on this connection.
  smb2 - For every session, keep the session key and free it when the
         session is being shutdown.
  smb3 - For every session, generate the smb3 signing key using the session key
         and then free the session key.

There are two unrelated line formatting changes as well.
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

The max string length definitions for user name, domain name, password,
and share name have been moved into their own header file in uapi so the
mount helper can use autoconf to define them instead of keeping the
kernel side and userland side definitions in sync manually.  The names
have also been standardized with a "CIFS" prefix and "LEN" suffix.
Signed-off-by: NScott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NChen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

For cifs_set_cifscreds() in "fs/cifs/connect.c", 'desc' buffer length
is 'CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE' (56 is less than 256), and 'ses->domainName'
length may be "255 + '\0'".

The related sprintf() may cause memory overflow, so need extend related
buffer enough to hold all things.

It is also necessary to be sure of 'ses->domainName' must be less than
256, and define the related macro instead of hard code number '256'.
Signed-off-by: NChen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NScott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Now that we track what sort of NEGOTIATE response was received, stop
mandating that every session on a socket use the same type of auth.

Push that decision out into the session setup code, and make the sectype
a per-session property. This should allow us to mix multiple sectypes on
a socket as long as they are compatible with the NEGOTIATE response.

With this too, we can now eliminate the ses->secFlg field since that
info is redundant and harder to work with than a securityEnum.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Currently, we determine this according to flags in the sec_mode, flags
in the global_secflags and via other methods. That makes the semantics
very hard to follow and there are corner cases where we don't handle
this correctly.

Add a new bool to the TCP_Server_Info that acts as a simple flag to tell
us whether signing is enabled on this connection or not, and fix up the
places that need to determine this to use that flag.

This is a bit weird for the SMB2 case, where signing is per-session.
SMB2 needs work in this area already though. The existing SMB2 code has
similar logic to what we're using here, so there should be no real
change in behavior. These changes should make it easier to implement
per-session signing in the future though.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

This field is completely unused:

CIFS_SES_W9X is completely unused. CIFS_SES_LANMAN and CIFS_SES_OS2
are set but never checked. CIFS_SES_NT4 is checked, but never set.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

These look pretty cargo-culty to me, but let's be certain. Leave
them in place for now. Pop a WARN if it ever does happen. Also,
move to a more standard idiom for setting the "server" pointer.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

...rc is always set to 0.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

It's not obvious from reading the macro names that these macros
are for debugging.  Convert the names to a single more typical
kernel style cifs_dbg macro.

	cERROR(1, ...)   -> cifs_dbg(VFS, ...)
	cFYI(1, ...)     -> cifs_dbg(FYI, ...)
	cFYI(DBG2, ...)  -> cifs_dbg(NOISY, ...)

Move the terminating format newline from the macro to the call site.

Add CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG function cifs_vfs_err to emit the
"CIFS VFS: " prefix for VFS messages.

Size is reduced ~ 1% when CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG is set (default y)

$ size fs/cifs/cifs.ko*
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
 265245	   2525	    132	 267902	  4167e	fs/cifs/cifs.ko.new
 268359    2525     132  271016   422a8 fs/cifs/cifs.ko.old

Other miscellaneous changes around these conversions:

o Miscellaneous typo fixes
o Add terminating \n's to almost all formats and remove them
  from the macros to be more kernel style like.  A few formats
  previously had defective \n's
o Remove unnecessary OOM messages as kmalloc() calls dump_stack
o Coalesce formats to make grep easier,
  added missing spaces when coalescing formats
o Use %s, __func__ instead of embedded function name
o Removed unnecessary "cifs: " prefixes
o Convert kzalloc with multiply to kcalloc
o Remove unused cifswarn macro
Signed-off-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

This replaces calls to kmalloc followed by memcpy with a single call to
kmemdup. This was found via make coccicheck.
Signed-off-by: NSilviu-Mihai Popescu <silviupopescu1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Calling key_revoke here isn't ideal as further requests for the key will
end up returning -EKEYREVOKED until it gets purged from the cache. What we
really intend here is to force a new upcall on the next request_key.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

For null user mounts, do not invoke string length function
during session setup.

Cc: <stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: NChris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

We should check that we're not copying memory from beyond the end of the
blob.
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>