提交 e0ad7b07 编写于 作者: A akpm@osdl.org 提交者: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] move xattr permission checks into the VFS

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From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

The xattr code has rather complex permission checks because the rules are very
different for different attribute namespaces.  This patch moves as much as we
can into the generic code.  Currently all the major disk based filesystems
duplicate these checks, while many minor filesystems or network filesystems
lack some or all of them.

To do this we need defines for the extended attribute names in common code, I
moved them up from JFS which had the nicest defintions.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: NDave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
上级 5be196e5
......@@ -83,21 +83,6 @@ struct ea_buffer {
#define EA_NEW 0x0004
#define EA_MALLOC 0x0008
/* Namespaces */
#define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX "system."
#define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."
#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX "os2."
#define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_OS2_PREFIX) - 1)
/* XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX is defined in include/linux/xattr.h */
#define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX "trusted."
#define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1)
/*
* These three routines are used to recognize on-disk extended attributes
......
......@@ -20,6 +20,47 @@
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
/*
* Check permissions for extended attribute access. This is a bit complicated
* because different namespaces have very different rules.
*/
static int
xattr_permission(struct inode *inode, const char *name, int mask)
{
/*
* We can never set or remove an extended attribute on a read-only
* filesystem or on an immutable / append-only inode.
*/
if (mask & MAY_WRITE) {
if (IS_RDONLY(inode))
return -EROFS;
if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
return -EPERM;
}
/*
* No restriction for security.* and system.* from the VFS. Decision
* on these is left to the underlying filesystem / security module.
*/
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) ||
!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN))
return 0;
/*
* The trusted.* namespace can only accessed by a privilegued user.
*/
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
return (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ? 0 : -EPERM);
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
(!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX))
return -EPERM;
}
return permission(inode, mask, NULL);
}
int
vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
size_t size, int flags)
......@@ -27,6 +68,10 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int error;
error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
if (error)
......@@ -40,8 +85,8 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
size, flags);
}
} else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
const char *suffix = name + sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1;
XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN)) {
const char *suffix = name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN;
error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value,
size, flags);
if (!error)
......@@ -59,6 +104,10 @@ vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int error;
error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_READ);
if (error)
return error;
error = security_inode_getxattr(dentry, name);
if (error)
return error;
......@@ -69,8 +118,8 @@ vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
const char *suffix = name + sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1;
XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN)) {
const char *suffix = name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN;
int ret = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, value,
size, error);
/*
......@@ -94,6 +143,10 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
if (!inode->i_op->removexattr)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
if (error)
return error;
......
......@@ -13,7 +13,22 @@
#define XATTR_CREATE 0x1 /* set value, fail if attr already exists */
#define XATTR_REPLACE 0x2 /* set value, fail if attr does not exist */
/* Namespaces */
#define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX "os2."
#define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_OS2_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX "security."
#define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX "system."
#define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX "trusted."
#define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."
#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
struct xattr_handler {
char *prefix;
......
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