提交 06674679 编写于 作者: E Eric Paris 提交者: James Morris

Currently SELinux jumps through some ugly hoops to not audit a capbility

check when determining if a process has additional powers to override
memory limits or when trying to read/write illegal file labels.  Use
the new noaudit call instead.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
上级 a2f2945a
......@@ -1979,16 +1979,8 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
0,
NULL);
rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
......@@ -2820,7 +2812,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
u32 size;
int error;
char *context = NULL;
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
......@@ -2835,13 +2826,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
0,
NULL);
error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
&size);
......
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