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    Prevent indirect security attacks via changing session-local state within · e3b01bc1
    Tom Lane 提交于
    an allegedly immutable index function.  It was previously recognized that
    we had to prevent such a function from executing SET/RESET ROLE/SESSION
    AUTHORIZATION, or it could trivially obtain the privileges of the session
    user.  However, since there is in general no privilege checking for changes
    of session-local state, it is also possible for such a function to change
    settings in a way that might subvert later operations in the same session.
    Examples include changing search_path to cause an unexpected function to
    be called, or replacing an existing prepared statement with another one
    that will execute a function of the attacker's choosing.
    
    The present patch secures VACUUM, ANALYZE, and CREATE INDEX/REINDEX against
    these threats, which are the same places previously deemed to need protection
    against the SET ROLE issue.  GUC changes are still allowed, since there are
    many useful cases for that, but we prevent security problems by forcing a
    rollback of any GUC change after completing the operation.  Other cases are
    handled by throwing an error if any change is attempted; these include temp
    table creation, closing a cursor, and creating or deleting a prepared
    statement.  (In 7.4, the infrastructure to roll back GUC changes doesn't
    exist, so we settle for rejecting changes of "search_path" in these contexts.)
    
    Original report and patch by Gurjeet Singh, additional analysis by
    Tom Lane.
    
    Security: CVE-2009-4136
    e3b01bc1
vacuum.c 114.6 KB