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  1. 10 9月, 2009 8 次提交
  3. 09 9月, 2009 3 次提交
  5. 04 9月, 2009 2 次提交
  7. 03 9月, 2009 1 次提交
    • D
      sparc64: Kill spurious NMI watchdog triggers by increasing limit to 30 seconds. · e6617c6e
      由 David S. Miller 提交于 
      This is a compromise and a temporary workaround for bootup NMI
watchdog triggers some people see with qla2xxx devices present.

This happens when, for example:

CPU 0 is in the driver init and looping submitting mailbox commands to
load the firmware, then waiting for completion.

CPU 1 is receiving the device interrupts.  CPU 1 is where the NMI
watchdog triggers.

CPU 0 is submitting mailbox commands fast enough that by the time CPU
1 returns from the device interrupt handler, a new one is pending.
This sequence runs for more than 5 seconds.

The problematic case is CPU 1's timer interrupt running when the
barrage of device interrupts begin.  Then we have:

	timer interrupt
	return for softirq checking
	pending, thus enable interrupts

		 qla2xxx interrupt
		 return
		 qla2xxx interrupt
		 return
		 ... 5+ seconds pass
		 final qla2xxx interrupt for fw load
		 return

	run timer softirq
	return

At some point in the multi-second qla2xxx interrupt storm we trigger
the NMI watchdog on CPU 1 from the NMI interrupt handler.

The timer softirq, once we get back to running it, is smart enough to
run the timer work enough times to make up for the missed timer
interrupts.

However, the NMI watchdogs (both x86 and sparc) use the timer
interrupt count to notice the cpu is wedged.  But in the above
scenerio we'll receive only one such timer interrupt even if we last
all the way back to running the timer softirq.

The default watchdog trigger point is only 5 seconds, which is pretty
low (the softwatchdog triggers at 60 seconds).  So increase it to 30
seconds for now.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e6617c6e
  9. 02 9月, 2009 2 次提交
    • D
      KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6] · ee18d64c
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent.  This
replaces the parent's session keyring.  Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again.  Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.

To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.

The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.

Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.  This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.

This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership.  However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18

	#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)

	int main(int argc, char **argv)
	{
		key_serial_t keyring, key;
		long ret;

		keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
		OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");

		key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
		OSERROR(key, "add_key");

		ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
		OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");

		return 0;
	}

Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	355907932 --alswrv   4043    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.4043
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	1055658746 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: hello
	340417692 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a

Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      ee18d64c
    • A
      sparc: convert /proc/io_map, /proc/dvma_map to seq_file · e7a088f9
      由 Alexey Dobriyan 提交于 
      Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e7a088f9
  11. 01 9月, 2009 1 次提交
    • H
      locking, sparc: Rename __spin_try_lock() and friends · 9f34ceb6
      由 Heiko Carstens 提交于 
      Needed to avoid namespace conflicts when the common code
function bodies of _spin_try_lock() etc. are moved to a header
file where the function name would be __spin_try_lock().
Signed-off-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Horst Hartmann <horsth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Ehrhardt <ehrhardt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <20090831124416.306495811@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      9f34ceb6
  13. 26 8月, 2009 1 次提交
    • D
      sparc64: Validate linear D-TLB misses. · d8ed1d43
      由 David S. Miller 提交于 
      When page alloc debugging is not enabled, we essentially accept any
virtual address for linear kernel TLB misses.  But with kgdb, kernel
address probing, and other facilities we can try to access arbitrary
crap.

So, make sure the address we miss on will translate to physical memory
that actually exists.

In order to make this work we have to embed the valid address bitmap
into the kernel image.  And in order to make that less expensive we
make an adjustment, in that the max physical memory address is
decreased to "1 << 41", even on the chips that support a 42-bit
physical address space.  We can do this because bit 41 indicates
"I/O space" and thus covers non-memory ranges.

The result of this is that:

1) kpte_linear_bitmap shrinks from 2K to 1K in size

2) we need 64K more for the valid address bitmap

We can't let the valid address bitmap be dynamically allocated
once we start using it to validate TLB misses, otherwise we have
crazy issues to deal with wrt. recursive TLB misses and such.

If we're in a TLB miss it could be the deepest trap level that's legal
inside of the cpu.  So if we TLB miss referencing the bitmap, the cpu
will be out of trap levels and enter RED state.

To guard against out-of-range accesses to the bitmap, we have to check
to make sure no bits in the physical address above bit 40 are set.  We
could export and use last_valid_pfn for this check, but that's just an
unnecessary extra memory reference.

On the plus side of all this, since we load all of these translations
into the special 4MB mapping TSB, and we check the TSB first for TLB
misses, there should be absolutely no real cost for these new checks
in the TLB miss path.

Reported-by: heyongli@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d8ed1d43
  15. 19 8月, 2009 4 次提交
  17. 18 8月, 2009 5 次提交
  19. 17 8月, 2009 3 次提交
  21. 14 8月, 2009 1 次提交
    • T
      percpu, sparc64: fix sparse possible cpu map handling · 74d46d6b
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      percpu code has been assuming num_possible_cpus() == nr_cpu_ids which
is incorrect if cpu_possible_map contains holes.  This causes percpu
code to access beyond allocated memories and vmalloc areas.  On a
sparc64 machine with cpus 0 and 2 (u60), this triggers the following
warning or fails boot.

 WARNING: at /devel/tj/os/work/mm/vmalloc.c:106 vmap_page_range_noflush+0x1f0/0x240()
 Modules linked in:
 Call Trace:
  [00000000004b17d0] vmap_page_range_noflush+0x1f0/0x240
  [00000000004b1840] map_vm_area+0x20/0x60
  [00000000004b1950] __vmalloc_area_node+0xd0/0x160
  [0000000000593434] deflate_init+0x14/0xe0
  [0000000000583b94] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0xd4/0x1e0
  [00000000005844f0] crypto_alloc_base+0x50/0xa0
  [000000000058b898] alg_test_comp+0x18/0x80
  [000000000058dad4] alg_test+0x54/0x180
  [000000000058af00] cryptomgr_test+0x40/0x60
  [0000000000473098] kthread+0x58/0x80
  [000000000042b590] kernel_thread+0x30/0x60
  [0000000000472fd0] kthreadd+0xf0/0x160
 ---[ end trace 429b268a213317ba ]---

This patch fixes generic percpu functions and sparc64
setup_per_cpu_areas() so that they handle sparse cpu_possible_map
properly.

Please note that on x86, cpu_possible_map() doesn't contain holes and
thus num_possible_cpus() == nr_cpu_ids and this patch doesn't cause
any behavior difference.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      74d46d6b
  23. 10 8月, 2009 6 次提交
  25. 06 8月, 2009 2 次提交
    • J
      net: implement a SO_DOMAIN getsockoption · 0d6038ee
      由 Jan Engelhardt 提交于 
      This sockopt goes in line with SO_TYPE and SO_PROTOCOL. It makes it
possible for userspace programs to pass around file descriptors — I
am referring to arguments-to-functions, but it may even work for the
fd passing over UNIX sockets — without needing to also pass the
auxiliary information (PF_INET6/IPPROTO_TCP).
Signed-off-by: NJan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      0d6038ee
    • J
      net: implement a SO_PROTOCOL getsockoption · 49c794e9
      由 Jan Engelhardt 提交于 
      Similar to SO_TYPE returning the socket type, SO_PROTOCOL allows to
retrieve the protocol used with a given socket.

I am not quite sure why we have that-many copies of socket.h, and why
the values are not the same on all arches either, but for where hex
numbers dominate, I use 0x1029 for SO_PROTOCOL as that seems to be
the next free unused number across a bunch of operating systems, or
so Google results make me want to believe. SO_PROTOCOL for others
just uses the next free Linux number, 38.
Signed-off-by: NJan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      49c794e9
  27. 03 8月, 2009 1 次提交
    • I
      debug lockups: Improve lockup detection, fix generic arch fallback · 47cab6a7
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      As Andrew noted, my previous patch ("debug lockups: Improve lockup
detection") broke/removed SysRq-L support from architecture that do
not provide a __trigger_all_cpu_backtrace implementation.

Restore a fallback path and clean up the SysRq-L machinery a bit:

 - Rename the arch method to arch_trigger_all_cpu_backtrace()

 - Simplify the define

 - Document the method a bit - in the hope of more architectures
   adding support for it.

[ The patch touches Sparc code for the rename. ]

Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
LKML-Reference: <20090802140809.7ec4bb6b.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      47cab6a7