Conflicts:
	demos/tunala/tunala.h
	engines/e_padlock.c
	ssl/s2_clnt.c
	ssl/s2_lib.c
	ssl/s2_srvr.c
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.

If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.

We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

MS Server gated cryptography is obsolete and dates from the time of export
restrictions on strong encryption and is only used by ancient versions of
MSIE.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

From BoringSSL
- Send an alert when the client key exchange isn't correctly formatted.
- Reject overly short RSA ciphertexts to avoid a (benign) out-of-bounds memory access.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

the session's version (server).

See also BoringSSL's commit bdf5e72f50e25f0e45e825c156168766d8442dde.
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.

(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)

Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

When no-ssl3 is set only make SSLv3 disabled by default. Retain -ssl3
options for s_client/s_server/ssltest.

When no-ssl3-method is set SSLv3_*method() is removed and all -ssl3
options.

We should document this somewhere, e.g. wiki, FAQ or manual page.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

The supported signature algorithms extension needs to be processed before
the certificate to use is decided and before a cipher is selected (as the
set of shared signature algorithms supported may impact the choice).
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 56e8dc542bd693b2dccea8828b3d8e5fc6932d0c)

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl.h
	ssl/ssl_err.c

(Original commit adb46dbc)

Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:

A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Check SRP parameters when they are received so we can send back an
appropriate alert.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

PR#319 (reoponed version).

Remove RFC5878 code. It is no longer needed for CT and has numerous bugs

Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.

Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.
(cherry picked from commit bc8923b1ec9c467755cd86f7848c50ee8812e441)

Make sure there is an extra 4 bytes for server done message when
NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG is defined.

PR#3361

Replace manual ASN.1 decoder with ASN1_get object. This
will decode the tag and length properly and check against
it does not exceed the supplied buffer length.

PR#3335

Security callback: selects which parameters are permitted including
sensible defaults based on bits of security.

The "parameters" which can be selected include: ciphersuites,
curves, key sizes, certificate signature algorithms, supported
signature algorithms, DH parameters, SSL/TLS version, session tickets
and compression.

In some cases prohibiting the use of a parameters will mean they are
not advertised to the peer: for example cipher suites and ECC curves.
In other cases it will abort the handshake: e.g DH parameters or the
peer key size.

Documentation to follow...

Add auto DH parameter support. This is roughly equivalent to the
ECDH auto curve selection but for DH. An application can just call

SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 1);

and appropriate DH parameters will be used based on the size of the
server key.

Unlike ECDH there is no way a peer can indicate the range of DH parameters
it supports. Some peers cannot handle DH keys larger that 1024 bits for
example. In this case if you call:

SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 2);

Only 1024 bit DH parameters will be used.

If the server key is 7680 bits or more in size then 8192 bit DH parameters
will be used: these will be *very* slow.

The old export ciphersuites aren't supported but those are very
insecure anyway.

(cherry picked from commit b709f8ef54b1c9ad513878ba0213aa651a9acef8)

Whitespace fixes

If multiple TLS extensions are expected but not received, the TLS extension and supplemental data 'generate' callbacks are the only chance for the receive-side to trigger a specific TLS alert during the handshake.

Removed logic which no-op'd TLS extension generate callbacks (as the generate callbacks need to always be called in order to trigger alerts), and updated the serverinfo-specific custom TLS extension callbacks to track which custom TLS extensions were received by the client, where no-ops for 'generate' callbacks are appropriate.

PR#3244
(cherry picked from commit 9614d2c676ffe74ce0c919d9e5c0d622a011cbed)

DHE is the standard term used by the RFCs and by other TLS
implementations.  It's useful to have the internal variables use the
standard terminology.

This patch leaves a synonym SSL_kEDH in place, though, so that older
code can still be built against it, since that has been the
traditional API.  SSL_kEDH should probably be deprecated at some
point, though.

ECDHE is the standard term used by the RFCs and by other TLS
implementations.  It's useful to have the internal variables use the
standard terminology.

This patch leaves a synonym SSL_kEECDH in place, though, so that older
code can still be built against it, since that has been the
traditional API.  SSL_kEECDH should probably be deprecated at some
point, though.

When sending an invalid version number alert don't change the
version number to the client version if a session is already
established.

Thanks to Marek Majkowski for additional analysis of this issue.

PR#3191

Instead, send random bytes, unless SSL_SEND_{CLIENT,SERVER}RANDOM_MODE
is set.

This is a forward-port of commits:
  4af793036f6ef4f0a1078e5d7155426a98d50e37
  f4c93b46edb51da71f09eda99e83eaf193a33c08
  3da721dac9382c48812c8eba455528fd59af2eef
  2583270191a8b27eed303c03ece1da97b9b69fd3

While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear.  This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:

    * It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.

    * If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
      handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.