- 20 9月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 13 9月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
No need to declare an explicit sub-packet. Just start one. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
To avoid confusion with the read PACKET structure. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 22 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS). That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled. The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the point that we need to use it. However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented) message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get removed. Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number (starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future. However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything greater than that in the queue is just left there. So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At that point all the queues are flushed. An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion. I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be an issue. A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0 to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future. Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send that could get orphaned would typically be 15. The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of "orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k. Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be orphaned per connection. As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed. Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have to open many simultaneous connections. Issue reported by Quan Luo. CVE-2016-2179 Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 18 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Emilia Kasper 提交于
Run util/openssl-format-source on ssl/ Some comments and hand-formatted tables were fixed up manually by disabling auto-formatting. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 17 8月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 16 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
Now we support (u)int64_t this can be very much simpler. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 15 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Fix no-ec builds by having separate functions to create keys based on an existing EVP_PKEY and a curve id. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 13 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
When handling ECDH check to see if the curve is "custom" (X25519 is currently the only curve of this type) and instead of setting a curve NID just allocate a key of appropriate type. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 06 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 klemens 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1413)
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- 05 8月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
DTLSv1_client_method() is deprecated, but it was the only way to obtain DTLS1_BAD_VER support. The SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT hack doesn't work with DTLS_client_method(), and it's relatively non-trivial to make it work without expanding the hack into lots of places. So deprecate SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT with DTLSv1_client_method(), and make it work with SSL_CTX_set_{min,max}_proto_version(DTLS1_BAD_VER) instead. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
DTLS version numbers are strange and backwards, except DTLS1_BAD_VER so we have to make a special case for it. This does leave us with a set of macros which will evaluate their arguments more than once, but it's not a public-facing API and it's not like this is the kind of thing where people will be using DTLS_VERSION_LE(x++, y) anyway. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 19 7月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Emilia Kasper 提交于
- Always process ALPN (previously there was an early return in the certificate status handling) - Don't send a duplicate alert. Previously, both ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late and its caller would send an alert. Consolidate alert sending code in the caller. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The parameters should have parens around them when used. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 15 7月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 04 6月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The ssl3_init_finished_mac() function can fail, in which case we need to propagate the error up through the stack. RT#3198 Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 24 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 20 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The write BIO for handshake messages is bufferred so that we only write out to the network when we have a complete flight. There was some complexity in the buffering logic so that we switched buffering on and off at various points through out the handshake. The only real reason to do this was historically it complicated the state machine when you wanted to flush because you had to traverse through the "flush" state (in order to cope with NBIO). Where we knew up front that there was only going to be one message in the flight we switched off buffering to avoid that. In the new state machine there is no longer a need for a flush state so it is simpler just to have buffering on for the whole handshake. This also gives us the added benefit that we can simply call flush after every flight even if it only has one message in it. This means that BIO authors can implement their own buffering strategies and not have to be aware of the state of the SSL object (previously they would have to switch off their own buffering during the handshake because they could not rely on a flush being received when they really needed to write data out). This last point addresses GitHub Issue #322. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- 18 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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- 17 5月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> MR: #2153
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由 TJ Saunders 提交于
This involves providing more session ticket key data, for both the cipher and the digest Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> GH: #515, MR: #2153
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- 16 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 jfigus 提交于
To allow OCSP stapling to work with libcurl. Github PR #200 Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 10 5月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 David Benjamin 提交于
Per RFC 5246, Note: this extension is not meaningful for TLS versions prior to 1.2. Clients MUST NOT offer it if they are offering prior versions. However, even if clients do offer it, the rules specified in [TLSEXT] require servers to ignore extensions they do not understand. Although second sentence would suggest that there would be no interop problems in always offering the extension, WebRTC has reported issues with Bouncy Castle on < TLS 1.2 ClientHellos that still include signature_algorithms. See also https://bugs.chromium.org/p/webrtc/issues/detail?id=4223 RT#4390 Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- 13 4月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
There is a preference for suffixes to indicate that a function is internal rather than prefixes. Note: the suffix is only required to disambiguate internal functions and public symbols with the same name (but different case) Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
There was a lot of naming inconsistency, so we try and standardise on one form. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() should not be called expicitly - we should leave auto-deinit to clean this up instead. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 11 4月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The function pqueue_print is not exported and is never called. Therefore we should delete it. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 08 4月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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由 Viktor Dukhovni 提交于
Suppress CT callbacks with aNULL or PSK ciphersuites that involve no certificates. Ditto when the certificate chain is validated via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3) TLSA records. Also skip SCT processing when the chain is fails verification. Move and consolidate CT callbacks from libcrypto to libssl. We also simplify the interface to SSL_{,CTX_}_enable_ct() which can specify either a permissive mode that just collects information or a strict mode that requires at least one valid SCT or else asks to abort the connection. Simplified SCT processing and options in s_client(1) which now has just a simple pair of "-noct" vs. "-ct" options, the latter enables the permissive callback so that we can complete the handshake and report all relevant information. When printing SCTs, print the validation status if set and not valid. Signed-off-by: NRob Percival <robpercival@google.com> Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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- 28 3月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Fedor Indutny 提交于
We now send the highest supported version by the client, even if the session uses an older version. This fixes 2 problems: - When you try to reuse a session but the other side doesn't reuse it and uses a different protocol version the connection will fail. - When you're trying to reuse a session with an old version you might be stuck trying to reuse the old version while both sides support a newer version Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> GH: #852, MR: #2452
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- 23 3月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
algo_strength contains 2 parts that need to be checked by their own. Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> MR: #2082
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- 21 3月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Don't have #error statements in header files, but instead wrap the contents of that file in #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx This means it is now always safe to include the header file. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 17 3月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reduces #ifdef complexity. Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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- 10 3月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> MR: #1824
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> MR: #1595
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> MR: #1595
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