- 12 9月, 2018 6 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
This will allow to have different object files for different products, even if they share the same source code, and possibly different builds for those different object files. For example, one can have something like this: SOURCES[libfoo]=cookie.c INCLUDES[libfoo]=include/foo SOURCES[libbar]=cookie.c INCLUDES[libbar]=include/bar This would mean that the object files and libraries would be build somewhat like this: $(CC) -Iinclude/foo -o libfoo-lib-cookie.o cookie.c $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) libfoo.a libfoo-lib-cookie.o $(CC) -Iinclude/bar -o libbar-lib-cookie.o cookie.c $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) libbar.a libbar-lib-cookie.o Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7159)
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Instead, use the include settings from the products later in the process, making it possible to have different includes for two different libraries that share the same source code. Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7159)
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由 Pauli 提交于
limit is ever reached. This is a FIPS 140-2 requirement from IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness Requirements from SP 800-38D". Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7129)
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由 Pauli 提交于
Add support for HMAC over any evp supported digest. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6945)
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由 Pauli 提交于
keys. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7120)
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由 Pauli 提交于
Add a check that the two keys used for AES-XTS are different. One test case uses the same key for both of the AES-XTS keys. This causes a failure under FIP 140-2 IG A.9. Mark the test as returning a failure. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7120)
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- 11 9月, 2018 9 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
The OMC hasn't yet decided what the next release version will be, but it's at least going to 1.1.2, so we set that value for the moment. Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7180)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7176)
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Since the SSL code started using RSA_NO_PADDING, the CAPI engine became unusable. This change fixes that. Fixes #7131 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7174)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Found by Coverity Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7169)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Fixes a Coverity complaint. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7170)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
If sizeof(int) != sizeof(size_t) this may not work correctly. Fixes a Coverity issue. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7168)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7167)
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- 10 9月, 2018 6 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7164)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Hopefully this will resolve spurious travis failures. [extended tests] Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7163)
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由 Paul Yang 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7160)
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
It's actually not a real issue but caused by the absence of the default case which does not occur in reality but which makes coverity see a code path where pkey remains unassigned. Reported by Coverity Scan (CID 1423323) [extended tests] Reviewed-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7158)
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Reported by Coverity Scan (CID 1439138) [extended tests] Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7156)
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Reported by Coverity Scan (CID 1439136) [extended tests] Reviewed-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7155)
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- 09 9月, 2018 6 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
The deprecated ASN.1 type LONG / ZLONG (incorrectly) produced zero length INTEGER encoding for zeroes. For the sake of backward compatibility, we allow those to be read without fault when using the replacement types INT32 / UINT32 / INT64 / UINT64. Fixes #7134 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7144)
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Confirms #7134 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7153)
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
This was originally part of SipHash_Init. However, there are cases where there isn't any key material to initialize from when setting the hash size, and we do allow doing so with a EVP_PKEY control. The solution is to provide a separate hash_size setter and to use it in the corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD. Fixes #7143 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7145)
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Confirms #7143 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7154)
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7154)
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7154)
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- 08 9月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
PR #3783 introduce coded to reset the server side SNI state in SSL_do_handshake() to ensure any erroneous config time SNI changes are cleared. Unfortunately SSL_do_handshake() can be called mid-handshake multiple times so this is the wrong place to do this and can mean that any SNI data is cleared later on in the handshake too. Therefore move the code to a more appropriate place. Fixes #7014 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7149)
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- 07 9月, 2018 12 次提交
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由 Ben Kaduk 提交于
Ideally, SSL_get_servername() would do exactly as it is documented and return exactly what the client sent (i.e., what we currently are stashing in the SSL's ext.hostname), without needing to refer to an SSL_SESSION object. For historical reasons, including the parsed SNI value from the ClientHello originally being stored in the SSL_SESSION's ext.hostname field, we have had references to the SSL_SESSION in this function. We cannot fully excise them due to the interaction between user-supplied callbacks and TLS 1.2 resumption flows, where we call all callbacks but the client did not supply an SNI value. Existing callbacks expect to receive a valid SNI value in this case, so we must fake one up from the resumed session in order to avoid breakage. Otherwise, greatly simplify the implementation and just return the value in the SSL, as sent by the client. Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7115)
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由 Ben Kaduk 提交于
Commit 1c4aa31d modified the state machine to clean up stale ext.hostname values from SSL objects in the case when SNI was not negotiated for the current handshake. This is natural from the TLS perspective, since this information is an extension that the client offered but we ignored, and since we ignored it we do not need to keep it around for anything else. However, as documented in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/7014 , there appear to be some deployed code that relies on retrieving such an ignored SNI value from the client, after the handshake has completed. Because the 1.1.1 release is on a stable branch and should preserve the published ABI, restore the historical behavior by retaining the ext.hostname value sent by the client, in the SSL structure, for subsequent retrieval. [extended tests] Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7115)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The is_tls13_capable() function should not return 0 if no certificates are configured directly because a certificate callback is present. Fixes #7140 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7141)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
That function was removed in favour of SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(). Update the docs accordingly. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7139)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Even though we already sent close_notify the server may not have recieved it yet and could issue a CertificateRequest to us. Since we've already sent close_notify we can't send any reasonable response so we just ignore it. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7114)
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7114)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
If we've sent a close_notify then we are restricted about what we can do in response to handshake messages that we receive. However we can sensibly process NewSessionTicket messages. We can also process a KeyUpdate message as long as we also ignore any request for us to update our sending keys. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7114)
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由 Paul Yang 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
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由 Paul Yang 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
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由 Paul Yang 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
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由 Paul Yang 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
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由 Jack Lloyd 提交于
This test case is originally submitted in #6757, by Jack Lloyd. The test case has been modified to use the a different method to set the ID when computing the Z hash of SM2 signature. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NPaul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
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