- 22 8月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Jakub Wilk 提交于
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7021)
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由 Tomas Mraz 提交于
The TLS-1.3 ciphersuites must not be blocked by @SECLEVEL=3 even though they are not explicitly marked as using DH/ECDH. Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6959)
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由 Pauli 提交于
This commit destroys the free list pointers which would otherwise be present in the returned memory blocks. This in turn helps prevent information leakage from the secure memory area. Note: CRYPTO_secure_malloc is not guaranteed to return zeroed memory: before the secure memory system is initialised or if it isn't implemented. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7011)
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- 21 8月, 2018 4 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7019)
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由 Nicola Tuveri 提交于
The EFD database does not state that the "ladd-2002-it-3" algorithm assumes X1 != 0. Consequently the current implementation, based on it, fails to compute correctly if the affine x coordinate of the scalar multiplication input point is 0. We replace this implementation using the alternative algorithm based on Eq. (9) and (10) from the same paper, which being derived from the additive relation of (6) does not incur in this problem, but costs one extra field multiplication. The EFD entry for this algorithm is at https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-4 and the code to implement it was generated with tooling. Regression tests add one positive test for each named curve that has such a point. The `SharedSecret` was generated independently from the OpenSSL codebase with sage. This bug was originally reported by Dmitry Belyavsky on the openssl-users maling list: https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/2018-August/008540.htmlCo-authored-by: NBilly Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7000)
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- 20 8月, 2018 5 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
We already have SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(). This just adds the SSL_CTX equivalent. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit function call is required for a client to indicate support for post-handshake auth. Fixes #6933. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
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由 Pauli 提交于
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6993)
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由 parasssh 提交于
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7005)
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由 Pauli 提交于
spurious output when checking for error conditions. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6899)
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- 19 8月, 2018 4 次提交
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Don't discard partial reads from /dev/*random and retry instead. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6990)
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Fixes #6978 Don't discard partial reads from syscall_random() and retry instead. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6990)
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Change return value type to ssize_t and ensure that a negative value is returned only if a corresponding errno is set. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6990)
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
The option has no meaning on Darwin, but it can bail out in combination with -fembed-bitcode or -no-integrated-as... Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 18 8月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7001)
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由 Benjamin Kaduk 提交于
gcc 4.6 (arguably erroneously) warns about our use of 'free' as the name of a function parameter, when --strict-warnings is enabled: crypto/x509/x509_meth.c: In function 'X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_free': crypto/x509/x509_meth.c:61:12: error: declaration of 'free' shadows a global declaration [-Werror=shadow] cc1: all warnings being treated as errors make[1]: *** [crypto/x509/x509_meth.o] Error 1 (gcc 4.8 is fine with this code, as are newer compilers.) Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6991)
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- 17 8月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
CRYPTO_atomic_read was added with intention to read statistics counters, but readings are effectively indistinguishable from regular load (even in non-lock-free case). This is because you can get out-dated value in both cases. CRYPTO_atomic_write was added for symmetry and was never used. Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6883)
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Fixes #6980 Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6981)
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- 16 8月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Relax memory_order on counter decrement itself, because mutable members of the reference-counted structure should be visible on all processors independently on counter. [Even re-format and minimize dependency on other headers.] Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6900)
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- 15 8月, 2018 6 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The TLSv1.4 tolerance test wasn't testing what we thought it was. Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6741)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6741)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6741)
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由 Pauli 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6963)
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由 Tomas Mraz 提交于
If application explicitly calls CONF_modules_load_file() the SSL conf module will be initialized twice and the module data would leak. We need to free it before initializing it again. Fixes #6835 Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6948)
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由 Philip Prindeville 提交于
The logs are usually not looked at, and when they are it's almost always after they've completed and returned a status. That being the case, "progress" output is useless if it's always seen after the fact. Signed-off-by: NPhilip Prindeville <philipp@redfish-solutions.com> Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6928)
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- 14 8月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Dmitry Yakovlev 提交于
To avoid crash (same as #5138 fixed in 44f23cd2) CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6937)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6949)
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Originally fopen(3) was called from bio/bss_file.c, which performed the aliasing. Then fopen(3) was moved to o_fopen.c, while "magic" definition was left behind. It's still useful on 32-bit platforms, so pull it to o_fopen.c. Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6596)
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- 12 8月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
This allows the original path to be displayed when it's shown to be invalid, so the user can relate without question. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6925)
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Extra slashes in paths are permissible in Unix-like platforms... however, when compared with the result from 'which', which returns canonical paths, the comparison might fail even though the compared paths may be equivalent. We make the NDK path canonical internally to ensure the equivalence compares as equal, at least for the most trivial cases. Fixes #6917 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6924)
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- 11 8月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Since 0.9.7, all i2d_ functions were documented to allocate an output buffer if the user didn't provide one, under these conditions (from the 1.0.2 documentation): For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if B<*out> is B<NULL> memory will be allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the data just written. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was found not to do this, and would crash if a NULL output buffer was provided. Fixes #6914 Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6918)
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- 10 8月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Pauli 提交于
to the now released RFC 8410. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6910)
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- 09 8月, 2018 4 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Commit 88393244 removed some NULL checks from the stack code. This caused a no-comp build to fail in the client and server fuzzers. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6893)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
This reverts commit 88393244. Removing these checks changes the behaviour of the API which is not appropriate for a minor release. This also fixes a failure in the fuzz tests when building with no-comp. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6895)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6894)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
A client that has fallen back could detect an inappropriate fallback if the TLSv1.3 downgrade protection sentinels are present. Fixes #6756 Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6894)
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- 08 8月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Test that a server can handle an unecrypted alert when normally the next message is encrypted. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6887)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
At certain points in the handshake we could receive either a plaintext or an encrypted alert from the client. We should tolerate both where appropriate. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6887)
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