This should fix 2 issues detected by Coverity and introduced with
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11807

- CID 1463577:  Memory - corruptions  (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
- CID 1463573:  Memory - corruptions  (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)

In practice the tests seem to show that they both aren't real issues,
yet I believe this small change should appease the scanner and at the
same time improve clarity for the reader.

Here is the original report:

```
** CID 1463577:  Memory - corruptions  (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)

________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 1463577:  Memory - corruptions  (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c: 1123 in EC_POINT_mul()
1117
1118         if (group->meth->mul != NULL)
1119             ret = group->meth->mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1120                                    && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1121         else
1122             /* use default */
   CID 1463577:  Memory - corruptions  (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
   Passing "&point" to function "ec_wNAF_mul" which uses it as an array. This might corrupt or misinterpret adjacent memory locations.
1123             ret = ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1124                               && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1125
1126     #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
1127         BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
1128     #endif

** CID 1463573:  Memory - corruptions  (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)

________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 1463573:  Memory - corruptions  (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c: 1123 in EC_POINT_mul()
1117
1118         if (group->meth->mul != NULL)
1119             ret = group->meth->mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1120                                    && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1121         else
1122             /* use default */
   CID 1463573:  Memory - corruptions  (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
   Passing "&p_scalar" to function "ec_wNAF_mul" which uses it as an array. This might corrupt or misinterpret adjacent memory locations.
1123             ret = ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1124                               && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1125
1126     #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
1127         BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
1128     #endif
```
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11919)

fixes #11818
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11911)

EVP_PKEYs with provider side internal keys got the key type
EVP_PKEY_NONE.  This turned out to be too disruptive, so we try
instead to find a matching EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and use whatever
EVP_PKEY type it uses.

To make internal coding easier, we introduce a few internal macros to
distinguish what can be expected from a EVP_PKEY:

- evp_pkey_is_blank(), to detect an unassigned EVP_PKEY.
- evp_pkey_is_typed(), to detect that an EVP_PKEY has been assigned a
  type, which may be an old style type number or a EVP_KEYMGMT method.
- evp_pkey_is_assigned(), to detect that an EVP_PKEY has been assigned
  an key value.
- evp_pkey_is_legacy(), to detect that the internal EVP_PKEY key is a
  legacy one, i.e. will be handled via an EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and an
  EVP_PKEY_METHOD.
- evp_pkey_is_provided(), to detect that the internal EVP_PKEY key is
  a provider side one, i.e. will be handdled via an EVP_KEYMGMT and
  other provider methods.

This also introduces EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT, to indicate that this EVP_PKEY
contains a provider side key for which there are no known
EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHODs or EVP_PKEY_METHODs, i.e. these can only be
handled via EVP_KEYMGMT and other provider methods.

Fixes #11823
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11913)

[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11792)

This fixes a strict aliasing issue in ui_dup_method_data.

The parameter type of CRYPTO_EX_dup's from_d parameter
is in fact void **, since it points to a pointer.

This function is rarely used, therefore fix the param type
although that may be considered an API breaking change.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2986)

This fixes warnings detected by -Wstringop-truncation.
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11878)

If buggy application calls engine functions after cleanup of engines
already happened the global_engine_lock will be used although
already freed.

See for example:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1831086Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11896)

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11892)

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11892)

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11892)

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11892)

CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11876)

This function only considered the built-in and application
EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHODs, and is now amended with a loop that goes
through all loaded engines, using whatever table of methods they each
have.

Fixes #11861
Reviewed-by: NDmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11872)

In the FIPS module, the code as written generate an unconditional
error.

Fixes #11865
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11869)

This splits up all the providers/common/der/*.c.in so the generated
portion is on its own and all related DER writing routines are in
their own files.  This also ensures that the DIGEST consstants aren't
reproduced in several files (resulting in symbol clashes).

Finally, the production of OID macros is moved to the generated header
files, allowing other similar macros, or DER constant arrays, to be
built on top of them.
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11868)

Reviewed-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11874)

[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11857)

Although there are platforms where int is 64 bit, 2GiB large BIGNUMs
instead of 4GiB should be "big enough for everybody".
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11857)

This is needed to avoid automatic promotion to signed int.

Fixes #11853

[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11857)

./config --with-rand-seed=egd

need to defines OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD and OPENSSL_NO_EGD
so get rid of OPENSSL_NO_EGD (compiles but I did not really test EGD)

./config --with-rand-seed=devrandom

does not work since wait_random_seeded works under the assumption
that OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM is supposed to be enabled as well,
that is usually the case, but not when only devrandom is enabled.
Skip the wait code in this special case.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11848)

This allows applications to iterate over all loaded providers.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11858)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11816)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11816)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11735)

Partially fixes #11209.

Before OpenSSL 3.0 in case when peer does not send close_notify,
the behaviour was to set SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL error with errno 0.
This behaviour has changed. The SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF restores
the old behaviour for compatibility's sake.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11735)

As the documentation points out, these fipsmodule.cnf fields are a MAC,
not a digest or checksum.  Rename them to be correct.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11369)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11369)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11369)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11369)

The missing symbol caused a linker failure on solaris x86_64.

Fixes #11796
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11798)

Reviewed-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NDmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11851)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11442)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11442)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11442)

When a desired algorithm wasn't available, we didn't register anywhere
that an attempt had been made, with the result that next time the same
attempt was made, the whole process would be done again.

To avoid this churn, we register a bit for each operation that has
been queried in the libcrypto provider object, and test it before
trying the same query and method construction loop again.

If course, if the provider has told us not to cache, we don't register
this bit.

Fixes #11814
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11842)

Fix build error on some platforms
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NDmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10757)

Add certificate validity period (v) and public key & signature algorithms (a) to the "Certificate Chain" output.

Eg:
Certificate chain
 0 s:C = US, ST = California, L = Mountain View, O = Google LLC, CN = www.google.com
   i:C = US, O = Google Trust Services, CN = GTS CA 1O1
   a:PKEY: id-ecPublicKey, 256 (bit); sigalg: RSA-SHA256
   v:NotBefore: Dec  3 14:49:26 2019 GMT; NotAfter: Feb 25 14:49:26 2020 GMT
 1 s:C = US, O = Google Trust Services, CN = GTS CA 1O1
   i:OU = GlobalSign Root CA - R2, O = GlobalSign, CN = GlobalSign
   a:PKEY: rsaEncryption, 2048 (bit); sigalg: RSA-SHA256
   v:NotBefore: Jun 15 00:00:42 2017 GMT; NotAfter: Dec 15 00:00:42 2021 GMT
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NDmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10757)

without error handling.

This takes up the ball from #11278
without trying to solve everything at once.

[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11850)

Signed-off-by: NMaxim Zakharov <5158255+Maxime2@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11767)

This was added before the changes to the sslap/ssl_new/ssl_old tests which
run those tests with a non-default library context. It no longer adds
anything that those tests don't already do, so it can be deleted.

This also fixes a number of run-checker build failures which were failing
in this test if TLSv1.2 was disabled.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11832)