Rename BUF_{strdup,strlcat,strlcpy,memdup,strndup,strnlen}
to OPENSSL_{strdup,strlcat,strlcpy,memdup,strndup,strnlen}
Add #define's for the old names.
Add CRYPTO_{memdup,strndup}, called by OPENSSL_{memdup,strndup} macros.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

If the call to OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs fails to find the relevant NID then
we should set the NID to NID_undef.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Add new flag TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS which is set when the peer sends
the extended master secret extension.

Server now sends extms if and only if the client sent extms.

Check consistency of extms extension when resuming sessions following (where
practical) RFC7627.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This change required some special treatment, as HMAC is intertwined
with EVP_MD.  For now, all local HMAC_CTX variables MUST be
initialised with HMAC_CTX_EMPTY, or whatever happens to be on the
stack will be mistaken for actual pointers to EVP_MD_CTX.  This will
change as soon as HMAC_CTX becomes opaque.

Also, since HMAC_CTX_init() can fail now, its return type changes from
void to int, and it will return 0 on failure, 1 on success.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

SSL_{CTX}_set_tmp_ecdh() allows to set 1 EC curve and then tries to use it.  On
the other hand SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves() allows you to set a list of curves, but
only when SSL_{CTX_}set_ecdh_auto() was called to turn it on.
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

This only gets used to set a specific curve without actually checking that the
peer supports it or not and can therefor result in handshake failures that can
be avoided by selecting a different cipher.
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Don't hard code EVP_sha* etc for signature algorithms: use table
indices instead. Add SHA224 and SHA512 to tables.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

This patch contains the necessary changes to provide GOST 2012
ciphersuites in TLS. It requires the use of an external GOST 2012 engine.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

There are lots of calls to EVP functions from within libssl There were
various places where we should probably check the return value but don't.
This adds these checks.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This disables some ciphersuites which aren't supported in SSL v3:
specifically PSK ciphersuites which use SHA256 or SHA384 for the MAC.

Thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for identifying this issue.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The function tls1_get_curvelist() has an explicit check to see if s->cert
is NULL or not. However the check appears *after* calling the tls1_suiteb
macro which derefs s->cert. In reality s->cert can never be NULL because
it is created in SSL_new(). If the malloc fails then the SSL_new call fails
and no SSL object is created.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

if we have a malloc |x = OPENSSL_malloc(...)| sometimes we check |x|
for NULL and sometimes we treat it as a boolean |if(!x) ...|. Standardise
the approach in libssl.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

This OPENSSL_assert in (d)tls1_hearbeat is trivially always going to be
true because it is testing the sum of values that have been set as
constants just a few lines above and nothing has changed them. Therefore
remove this.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The SSL variable |in_handshake| seems misplaced. It would be better to have
it in the STATEM structure.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

RT#4081
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The function ssl_check_for_safari fingerprints the incoming extensions
to see whether it is one of the broken versions of safari. However it was
failing to reset the PACKET back to the same position it started in, hence
causing some extensions to be skipped incorrectly.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

RT#4069
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Move all packet parsing to the beginning of the method. This limits the
SSLv2 compatibility soup to the parsing, and makes the rest of the
processing uniform.

This is also needed for simpler EMS support: EMS servers need to do an
early scan for EMS to make resumption decisions. This'll be easier when
the entire ClientHello is parsed in the beginning.

As a side effect,
1) PACKETize ssl_get_prev_session and tls1_process_ticket; and
2) Delete dead code for SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The bookmark API results in a lot of boilerplate error checking that can
be much more easily achieved with a simple struct copy. It also lays the
path for removing the third PACKET field.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Process ServerHello messages using the PACKET API
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Commit 9ceb2426 (PACKETise ClientHello) broke session tickets by failing
to detect the session ticket extension in an incoming ClientHello. This
commit fixes the bug.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Enhance the PACKET code readability, and fix a stale comment. Thanks
to Ben Kaduk (bkaduk@akamai.com) for pointing this out.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Especially since after the #ifdef cleanups this is not useful.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Uses the new PACKET code to process the incoming ClientHello including all
extensions etc.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

It is valid for an extension block to be present in a ClientHello, but to
be of zero length.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This adds additional checks to the processing of extensions in a ClientHello
to ensure that either no extensions are present, or if they are then they
take up the exact amount of space expected.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

At least in the case of SSLv3 we can't send an extention.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #811