This commit changes the way that we do server side protocol version
negotiation. Previously we had a whole set of code that had an "up front"
state machine dedicated to the negotiating the protocol version. This adds
significant complexity to the state machine. Historically the justification
for doing this was the support of SSLv2 which works quite differently to
SSLv3+. However, we have now removed support for SSLv2 so there is little
reason to maintain this complexity.

The one slight difficulty is that, although we no longer support SSLv2, we
do still support an SSLv3+ ClientHello in an SSLv2 backward compatible
ClientHello format. This is generally only used by legacy clients. This
commit adds support within the SSLv3 code for these legacy format
ClientHellos.

Server side version negotiation now works in much the same was as DTLS,
i.e. we introduce the concept of TLS_ANY_VERSION. If s->version is set to
that then when a ClientHello is received it will work out the most
appropriate version to respond with. Also, SSLv23_method and
SSLv23_server_method have been replaced with TLS_method and
TLS_server_method respectively. The old SSLv23* names still exist as
macros pointing at the new name, although they are deprecated.

Subsequent commits will look at client side version negotiation, as well of
removal of the old s23* code.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

There are header files in crypto/ that are used by the rest of
OpenSSL.  Move those to include/internal and adapt the affected source
code, Makefiles and scripts.

The header files that got moved are:

crypto/constant_time_locl.h
crypto/o_dir.h
crypto/o_str.h
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Remove RFC2712 Kerberos support from libssl. This code and the associated
standard is no longer considered fit-for-purpose.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Currently we set change_cipher_spec_ok to 1 before calling
ssl3_get_cert_verify(). This is because this message is optional and if it
is not sent then the next thing we would expect to get is the CCS. However,
although it is optional, we do actually know whether we should be receiving
one in advance. If we have received a client cert then we should expect
a CertificateVerify message. By the time we get to this point we will
already have bombed out if we didn't get a Certificate when we should have
done, so it is safe just to check whether |peer| is NULL or not. If it is
we won't get a CertificateVerify, otherwise we will. Therefore we should
change the logic so that we only attempt to get the CertificateVerify if
we are expecting one, and not allow a CCS in this scenario.

Whilst this is good practice for TLS it is even more important for DTLS.
In DTLS messages can be lost. Therefore we may be in a situation where a
CertificateVerify message does not arrive even though one was sent. In that
case the next message the server will receive will be the CCS. This could
also happen if messages get re-ordered in-flight. In DTLS if
|change_cipher_spec_ok| is not set and a CCS is received it is ignored.
However if |change_cipher_spec_ok| *is* set then a CCS arrival will
immediately move the server into the next epoch. Any messages arriving for
the previous epoch will be ignored. This means that, in this scenario, the
handshake can never complete. The client will attempt to retransmit
missing messages, but the server will ignore them because they are the wrong
epoch. The server meanwhile will still be waiting for the CertificateVerify
which is never going to arrive.

RT#2958
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Just as with the OPENSSL_malloc calls, consistently use sizeof(*ptr)
for memset and memcpy.  Remove needless casts for those functions.
For memset, replace alternative forms of zero with 0.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the server
side.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reusing an SSL object when it has encountered a fatal error can
have bad consequences. This is a bug in application code not libssl
but libssl should be more forgiving and not crash.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Incorrect name used for SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR.
Signed-off-by: Nmancha security <mancha1@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

After the finale, the "real" final part. :)  Do a recursive grep with
"-B1 -w [a-zA-Z0-9_]*_free" to see if any of the preceeding lines are
an "if NULL" check that can be removed.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

There were a dozen-plus instances of this construct:
   if (0) { label: ..... }
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Don't check for NULL before calling OPENSSL_free
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Don't check for NULL before calling a free routine.  This gets X509_.*free:
    x509_name_ex_free X509_policy_tree_free X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free
    X509_STORE_free X509_STORE_CTX_free X509_PKEY_free
    X509_OBJECT_free_contents X509_LOOKUP_free X509_INFO_free
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

A 0-length ciphers list is never permitted. The old code only used to
reject an empty ciphers list for connections with a session ID. It
would later error out on a NULL structure, so this change just moves
the alert closer to the problem source.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make
sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have
security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still
needs to be fixed.

With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

EVP_.*free; this gets:
        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_asn1_free
        EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free EVP_PKEY_free EVP_PKEY_free_it
        EVP_PKEY_meth_free; and also EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

This gets EC_GROUP_clear_free EC_GROUP_free, EC_KEY_free,
EC_POINT_clear_free, EC_POINT_free
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Ensure RAND_bytes return value is checked correctly, and that we no longer
use RAND_pseudo_bytes.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

In ssl3_send_new_session_ticket the message to be sent is constructed. We
skip adding the length of the session ticket initially, then call
ssl_set_handshake_header, and finally go back and add in the length of the
ticket. Unfortunately, in DTLS, ssl_set_handshake_header also has the side
effect of buffering the message for subsequent retransmission if required.
By adding the ticket length after the call to ssl_set_handshake_header the
message that is buffered is incomplete, causing an invalid message to be
sent on retransmission.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Also removes for it being NULL
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Change ssl_set_handshake_header from return void to returning int, and
handle error return code appropriately.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Ensure that all functions have their return values checked where
appropriate. This covers all functions defined and called from within
libssl.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE
cipher being used and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message being sent
by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack.

CVE-2015-1787
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Missed one file in the #ifdef merge; thanks Kurt.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Suggested by John Foley <foleyj@cisco.com>.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Fixed various missing return value checks in ssl3_send_newsession_ticket.
Also a mem leak on error.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG is a workaround for a browser bug from many years ago
(2000).
It predates DTLS, so certainly has no place in d1_srvr.c.
In s3_srvr.c it forces the ServerDone to appear in the same record as the
CertificateRequest when doing client auth.

BoringSSL have already made the same commit:
79ae85e4f777f94d91b7be19e8a62016cb55b3c5
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

the "-hack" option from s_server that set this option.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

This is an ancient bug workaround for Netscape clients. The documentation
talks about versions 3.x and 4.x beta.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Update master secret calculation to support extended master secret.
TLS 1.2 client authentication adds a complication because we need to
cache the handshake messages. This is simpllified however because
the point at which the handshake hashes are calculated for extended
master secret is identical to that required for TLS 1.2 client
authentication (immediately after client key exchange which is also
immediately before certificate verify).
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Remove support for SHA0 and DSS0 (they were broken), and remove
the ability to attempt to build without SHA (it didn't work).
For simplicity, remove the option of not building various SHA algorithms;
you could argue that SHA_224/256/384/512 should be kept, since they're
like crypto algorithms, but I decided to go the other way.
So these options are gone:
	GENUINE_DSA         OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
	OPENSSL_NO_SHA      OPENSSL_NO_SHA1
	OPENSSL_NO_SHA224   OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
	OPENSSL_NO_SHA384   OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the
script should not move them)
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	demos/tunala/tunala.h
	engines/e_padlock.c
	ssl/s2_clnt.c
	ssl/s2_lib.c
	ssl/s2_srvr.c
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.

If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.

We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>