The ERR_remove_thread_state() API is restored to take a pointer
argument, but does nothing more.  ERR_remove_state() is also made into
a no-op.  Both functions are deprecated and users are recommended to
use OPENSSL_thread_stop() instead.

Documentation is changed to reflect this.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Originally submitted by Kurt Cancemi <kurt@x64architecture.com>

Closes RT#4533
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

BIO_eof() was always returning true when using a BIO pair. It should only
be true if the peer BIO is empty and has been shutdown.

RT#1215
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

No code change
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

- Missing checks for allocation failure.
- releasing memory in few missing error paths
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

PR#4449
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

PR#4466
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

We don't need it, but external users might find it handy.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The default ASN.1 handling can be used for SEED. This also makes
CMS work with SEED.

PR#4504
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Try to set the ASN.1 parameters for CMS encryption even if the IV
length is zero as the underlying cipher should still set the type.

This will correctly result in errors if an attempt is made to use
an unsupported cipher type.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This demystifies two for-loops that do nothing. They were used to write
the ladder in a unified way. Now that the ladder is otherwise commented,
remove the dead loops.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The name length limit check in x509_name_ex_d2i() includes
the containing structure as well as the actual X509_NAME. This will
cause large CRLs to be rejected.

Fix by limiting the length passed to ASN1_item_ex_d2i() which will
then return an error if the passed X509_NAME exceeds the length.

RT#4531
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1020)

The old BIO_accept() function can encounter errors during malloc. We need
to ensure we properly clean up if that occurs.

GH Issue #817
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

PR#4514
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

RT#4527
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The right variant is ~18 lines below.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

CVE-2016-2107

MR: #2572

Only treat an ASN1_ANY type as an integer if it has the V_ASN1_INTEGER
tag: V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER is an internal only value which is never used
for on the wire encoding.

Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for reporting this bug.

This was found using libFuzzer.

RT#4364 (part)CVE-2016-2108.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to
determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the
amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a
sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error
condition.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for
Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most
likely result in a crash.

Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the
PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes
data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be
considered vulnerable to this issue.

User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of
untrusted data may also be vulnerable.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-2105
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in
applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems.
This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-2176
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is
able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow
resulting in a heap corruption.

Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the
EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms.

The first form is like this:
EVP_EncryptInit()
EVP_EncryptUpdate()

i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called
function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call
must be safe.

The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be
seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no
possibility of an overflow.

Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can
be no overflows in internal code due to this problem.

It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate()
in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for
EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these
calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances
in internal usage where an overflow could occur.

This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls
this function directly.

CVE-2016-2106

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reported by David Benjamin
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Fix some of the variables to be (s)size_t, so that more than 1GB of
secure memory can be allocated. The arena has to be a power of 2, and
2GB fails because it ends up being a negative 32-bit signed number.

The |too_late| flag is not strictly necessary; it is easy to figure
out if something is secure memory by looking at the arena. As before,
secure memory allocations will not fail, but now they can be freed
correctly. Once initialized, secure memory can still be used, even if
allocations occured before initialization.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>