Add an OSSL_ prefix onto STATEM
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Change various state machine functions to use the prefix ossl_statem
instead.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Fixed some issues in the logic for determining whether an SKE should be
expected or not. In particular only allow an SKE for RSA if its export and
the key size is not allowed. Also fix the ephemeral ciphersuite checks and
add in a missing call to ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm().
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Move some function definitions around within the state machine to make sure
they are in the correct files. Also create a statem_locl.h header for stuff
entirely local to the state machine code and move various definitions into
it.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Pull out the state machine into a separate sub directory. Also moved some
functions which were nothing to do with the state machine but were in state
machine files. Pulled all the SSL_METHOD definitions into one place...most
of those files had very little left in them any more.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Previously each message specific process function would create its own
PACKET structure. Rather than duplicate all of this code lots of times we
should create it in the state machine itself.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Remove all the functions and dead code that is now no longer required as
a result of the DTLS client move into the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Move all DTLS client side processing into the new state machine code. A
subsequent commit will clean up the old dead code.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Remove redundant code following moving client side TLS handling to the new
state machine implementation.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This swaps the implementation of the client TLS state machine to use the
new state machine code instead.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The new state machine code will split up the reading and writing of
hanshake messages into discrete phases. In order to facilitate that the
existing "get" type functions will be split into two halves: one to get
the message and one to process it. The "send" type functions will also have
all work relating to constructing the message split out into a separate
function just for that. For some functions there will also be separate
pre and post "work" phases to prepare or update state.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

RT#4081
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

RFC 5077 section 3.3 says:
If the server determines that it does not want to include a
ticket after it has included the SessionTicket extension in the
ServerHello, then it sends a zero-length ticket in the
NewSessionTicket handshake message.

Previously the client would fail upon attempting to allocate a
zero-length buffer. Now, we have the client ignore the empty ticket and
keep the existing session.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Since SSLv3, a CipherSuite is always 2 bytes. The only place where we
need 3-byte ciphers is SSLv2-compatible ClientHello processing.

So, remove the ssl_put_cipher_by_char indirection.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The bookmark API results in a lot of boilerplate error checking that can
be much more easily achieved with a simple struct copy. It also lays the
path for removing the third PACKET field.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Process the ServerKeyExchange message using the PACKET API
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Process ServerHello messages using the PACKET API
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Process CertificateRequest messages using the PACKET API
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Process NewSessionTicket messages using the new PACKET API
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Process the Certificate Status message using the PACKET API
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Use the PACKET API to process an incoming server Certificate message.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

This was obsolete in 2001.  This is not the same as Gost94 digest.
Thanks to Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> for review and advice.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

If a client receives a ServerKeyExchange for an anon DH ciphersuite with the
value of p set to 0 then a seg fault can occur. This commits adds a test to
reject p, g and pub key parameters that have a 0 value (in accordance with
RFC 5246)

The security vulnerability only affects master and 1.0.2, but the fix is
additionally applied to 1.0.1 for additional confidence.

CVE-2015-1794
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not
a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages.
Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality
is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake.
Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In
order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state
a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS.

Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should
only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not
visible to the state machine.

Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine.

This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit
will handle DTLS.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Add support for RSAPSK, DHEPSK and ECDHEPSK client side.

Update various checks to ensure certificate and server key exchange messages
are only expected when required.

Update message handling. PSK server key exchange parsing now expects an
identity hint prefix for all PSK server key exchange messages. PSK
client key exchange message requests PSK identity and key for all PSK
key exchange ciphersuites and includes identity in message.

Update flags for RSA, DH and ECDH so they are also used in PSK.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This flag was not set anywhere within the codebase (only read). It could
only be set by an app reaching directly into s->s3->flags and setting it
directly. However that method became impossible when libssl was opaquified.

Even in 1.0.2/1.0.1 if an app set the flag directly it is only relevant to
ssl3_connect(), which calls SSL_clear() during initialisation that clears
any flag settings. Therefore it could take effect if the app set the flag
after the handshake has started but before it completed. It seems quite
unlikely that any apps really do this (especially as it is completely
undocumented).

The purpose of the flag is suppress flushing of the write bio on the client
side at the end of the handshake after the client has written the Finished
message whilst resuming a session. This enables the client to send
application data as part of the same flight as the Finished message.

This flag also controls the setting of a second flag SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
There is an interesting comment in the code about this second flag in the
implementation of ssl3_write:

	/* This is an experimental flag that sends the
	 * last handshake message in the same packet as the first
	 * use data - used to see if it helps the TCP protocol during
	 * session-id reuse */

It seems the experiment did not work because as far as I can tell nothing
is using this code. The above comment has been in the code since SSLeay.

This commit removes support for SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED, as well
as the associated SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure
and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used
by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX).
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Rewrite ssl3_digest_cached_records handling. Only digest cached records
if digest array is NULL: this means it is safe to call
ssl3_digest_cached_records multiple times (subsequent calls are no op).

Remove flag TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE instead only update handshake buffer
if digest array is NULL.

Add additional "keep" parameter to ssl3_digest_cached_records to indicate
if the handshake buffer should be retained after digesting cached records
(needed for TLS 1.2 client authentication).
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

If RSA or DSA is disabled we will never use a ciphersuite with
RSA/DSA authentication as it is already filtered out by the cipher
list logic.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

As numerous comments indicate the certificate and key array is not an
appopriate structure to store the peers certificate: so remove it and
just the s->session->peer instead.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #588