Support for parsing of certificate extensions in PKCS#10 requests: these are

used by things like Xenroll. Also include documentation for extendedKeyUsage
extension.

CHANGES

@@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
 
  Changes between 0.9.4 and 0.9.5  [xx XXX 1999]
 
+  *) Initial support for certificate extension requests, these are included
+     in things like Xenroll certificate requests. They will later be used to
+     allow PKCS#10 requests to include a list of "requested extensions" which
+     can be added.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) -crlf option to s_client and s_server for sending newlines as
      CRLF (as required by many protocols).
      [Bodo Moeller]

STATUS

 
   OpenSSL STATUS                           Last modified at
-  ______________                           $Date: 1999/08/09 11:14:06 $
+  ______________                           $Date: 1999/08/09 22:37:59 $
 
   DEVELOPMENT STATE
 
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
 
   AVAILABLE PATCHES
 
-    o OCSP (titchenert@certco.com) 
     o getenv in ca.c and x509_def.c (jaltman@watsun.cc.columbia.edu)
 
   IN PROGRESS
@@ -24,6 +23,7 @@
         Proper (or at least usable) certificate chain verification.
 	Private key, certificate and CRL API and implementation.
 	Checking and bugfixing PKCS#7 (S/MIME code).
+        Various X509 issues: character sets, certificate request extensions.
 
     o Mark is currently working on:
         Folding in any changes that are in the C2Net code base that were

crypto/asn1/t_req.c

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 
 #ifndef NO_FP_API
 int X509_REQ_print_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *x)
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ int X509_REQ_print(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x)
 	X509_REQ_INFO *ri;
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
 	STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk;
+	STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
 	char str[128];
 
 	ri=x->req_info;
@@ -161,6 +163,8 @@ int X509_REQ_print(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x)
 			int j,type=0,count=1,ii=0;
 
 			a=sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(sk,i);
+			if(X509_REQ_extension_nid(OBJ_obj2nid(a->object)))
+								continue;
 			sprintf(str,"%12s","");
 			if (BIO_puts(bp,str) <= 0) goto err;
 			if ((j=i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp,a->object)) > 0)
@@ -201,6 +205,29 @@ get_next:
 			}
 		}
 
+	exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(x);
+	if(exts) {
+		BIO_printf(bp,"%8sRequested Extensions:\n","");
+		for (i=0; i<sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+			ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+			X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+			int j;
+			ex=sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+			if (BIO_printf(bp,"%12s","") <= 0) goto err;
+			obj=X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex);
+			i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp,obj);
+			j=X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex);
+			if (BIO_printf(bp,": %s\n",j?"critical":"","") <= 0)
+				goto err;
+			if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bp, ex, 0, 16)) {
+				BIO_printf(bp, "%16s", "");
+				ASN1_OCTET_STRING_print(bp,ex->value);
+			}
+			if (BIO_write(bp,"\n",1) <= 0) goto err;
+		}
+		sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+	}
+
 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
 	sprintf(str,"%4sSignature Algorithm: %s","",
 		(i == NID_undef)?"UNKNOWN":OBJ_nid2ln(i));

crypto/asn1/t_x509.c

@@ -188,11 +188,7 @@ int X509_print(BIO *bp, X509 *x)
 		BIO_printf(bp,"%8sX509v3 extensions:\n","");
 		for (i=0; i<n; i++)
 			{
-#if 0
-			int data_type,pack_type;
-#endif
 			ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
-
 			ex=X509_get_ext(x,i);
 			if (BIO_printf(bp,"%12s","") <= 0) goto err;
 			obj=X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex);

crypto/objects/objects.h

@@ -890,6 +890,18 @@ extern "C" {
 #define NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC	170
 #define OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC	OBJ_pkcs,5L,10L
 
+/* Extension request OIDs */
+
+#define LN_ms_ext_req			"Microsoft Extension Request"
+#define SN_ms_ext_req			"msExtReq"
+#define NID_ms_ext_req			171
+#define OBJ_ms_ext_req			1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,14L
+
+#define LN_ext_req			"Extension Request"
+#define SN_ext_req			"extReq"
+#define NID_ext_req			172
+#define OBJ_ext_req			OBJ_pkcs9,14L
+
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
 

crypto/x509/x509.h

@@ -787,6 +787,10 @@ int		X509_REQ_set_version(X509_REQ *x,long version);
 int		X509_REQ_set_subject_name(X509_REQ *req,X509_NAME *name);
 int		X509_REQ_set_pubkey(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 EVP_PKEY *	X509_REQ_get_pubkey(X509_REQ *req);
+int		X509_REQ_extension_nid(int nid);
+int *		X509_REQ_get_extesion_nids(void);
+void		X509_REQ_set_extension_nids(int *nids);
+STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REQ_get_extensions(X509_REQ *req);
 
 int		X509_check_private_key(X509 *x509,EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 

crypto/x509/x509_req.c

@@ -113,3 +113,59 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get_pubkey(X509_REQ *req)
 	return(X509_PUBKEY_get(req->req_info->pubkey));
 	}
 
+/* It seems several organisations had the same idea of including a list of
+ * extensions in a certificate request. There are at least two OIDs that are
+ * used and there may be more: so the list is configurable.
+ */
+
+static int ext_nid_list[] = { NID_ms_ext_req, NID_ext_req, NID_undef};
+
+static int *ext_nids = ext_nid_list;
+
+int X509_REQ_extension_nid(int req_nid)
+{
+	int i, nid;
+	for(i = 0; ; i++) {
+		nid = ext_nids[i];
+		if(nid == NID_undef) return 0;
+		else if (req_nid == nid) return 1;
+	}
+}
+
+int *X509_REQ_get_extesion_nids(void)
+{
+	return ext_nids;
+}
+	
+void X509_REQ_set_extension_nids(int *nids)
+{
+	ext_nids = nids;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REQ_get_extensions(X509_REQ *req)
+{
+	X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
+	STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk;
+	ASN1_TYPE *ext = NULL;
+	int i;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	if ((req == NULL) || (req->req_info == NULL))
+		return(NULL);
+	sk=req->req_info->attributes;
+        if (!sk) return NULL;
+	for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk); i++) {
+		attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(sk, i);
+		if(X509_REQ_extension_nid(OBJ_obj2nid(attr->object))) {
+			if(attr->set && sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(attr->value.set))
+				ext = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(attr->value.set, 0);
+			else ext = attr->value.single;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if(!ext || (ext->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) return NULL;
+	p = ext->value.sequence->data;
+	return d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_EXTENSION(NULL, &p,
+			ext->value.sequence->length,
+			d2i_X509_EXTENSION, X509_EXTENSION_free,
+			V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
+}

doc/openssl.txt

@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ email.1=steve@here
 email.2=steve@there
 
 This is because the configuration file code cannot handle the same name
-occurring twice in the same extension.
+occurring twice in the same section.
 
 The syntax of raw extensions is governed by the extension code: it can
 for example contain data in multiple sections. The correct syntax to
@@ -315,6 +315,36 @@ TRUE. An end user certificate MUST NOT have the CA value set to true.
 According to PKIX recommendations it should exclude the extension entirely,
 however some software may require CA set to FALSE for end entity certificates.
 
+Extended Key Usage.
+
+This extensions consists of a list of usages.
+
+These can either be object short names of the dotted numerical form of OIDs.
+While any OID can be used only certain values make sense. In partiular the
+following PKIX, NS and MS values are meaningful:
+
+Value			Meaning
+-----			-------
+serverAuth		SSL/TLS Web Server Authentication.
+clientAuth		SSL/TLS Web Client Authentication.
+codeSigning		Code signing.
+emailProtection		E-mail Protection (S/MIME).
+timeStamping		Trusted Timestamping
+msCodeInd		Microsoft Individual Code Signing (authenticode)
+msCodeCom		Microsoft Commercial Code Signing (authenticode)
+msCTLSign		Microsoft Trust List Signing
+msSGC			Microsoft Server Gated Crypto
+msEFS			Microsoft Encrypted File System
+nsSGC			Netscape Server Gated Crypto
+
+For example, under IE5 a CA can be used for any purpose: by including a list
+of the above usages the CA can be restricted to only authorised uses.
+
+Note: software packages may place additional interpretations on certificate 
+use, in particular some usages may only work for selected CAs. Don't for example
+expect just including msSGC or nsSGC will automatically mean that a certificate
+can be used for SGC ("step up" encryption) otherwise anyone could use it.
+
 Subject Key Identifier.
 
 This is really a string extension and can take two possible values. Either