提交 7dc1c647 编写于 作者: M Matt Caswell

Split out the PSK preamble from tls_process_key_exchange()

The tls_process_key_exchange() function is too long. This commit starts
the process of splitting it up by moving the PSK preamble code to a
separate function.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
上级 02a74590
......@@ -1302,19 +1302,52 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
return ret;
}
static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, int *al)
static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
PACKET psk_identity_hint;
#else
/* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/*
* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
* tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
* identity.
*/
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
} else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
&s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
int al;
int al = -1;
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
PACKET save_param_start, signature;
......@@ -1337,48 +1370,13 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
PACKET psk_identity_hint;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
* ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
* identity.
*/
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
} else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
&s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
goto err;
}
/* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
/*
* Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
* options
*/
if (0) {
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
......@@ -1678,8 +1676,11 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
if (al == -1)
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
err:
if (al != -1)
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
......
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