提交 792546eb 编写于 作者: B Billy Brumley 提交者: Matt Caswell

[crypto/ec] default to FLT or error

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6116)
上级 262dccc0
......@@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ struct ec_method_st {
int (*ecdh_compute_key)(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh);
/* Inverse modulo order */
int (*field_inverse_mod_ord)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *x,
BN_CTX *ctx);
int (*field_inverse_mod_ord)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r,
const BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *);
int (*blind_coordinates)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
};
......@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ int X25519(uint8_t out_shared_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32],
void X25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_value[32],
const uint8_t private_key[32]);
int EC_GROUP_do_inverse_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *res,
BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx);
int ec_group_do_inverse_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *res,
const BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx);
int ec_point_blind_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
......@@ -1018,12 +1018,15 @@ int ec_group_simple_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group)
}
static int ec_field_inverse_mod_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx)
const BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *e = NULL;
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (group->mont_data == NULL)
return 0;
if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
......@@ -1031,32 +1034,22 @@ static int ec_field_inverse_mod_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
/* Check if optimized inverse is implemented */
if (group->mont_data != NULL) {
/*-
* We want inverse in constant time, therefore we utilize the fact
* order must be prime and use Fermats Little Theorem instead.
*/
if (!BN_set_word(e, 2))
goto err;
if (!BN_sub(e, group->order, e))
goto err;
/*-
* Exponent e is public.
* No need for scatter-gather or BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
*/
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data))
goto err;
/* Inverse of zero doesn't exist. Let the fallback catch it. */
ret = (BN_is_zero(r)) ? 0 : 1;
}
/*-
* We want inverse in constant time, therefore we utilize the fact
* order must be prime and use Fermats Little Theorem instead.
*/
if (!BN_set_word(e, 2))
goto err;
if (!BN_sub(e, group->order, e))
goto err;
/*-
* Exponent e is public.
* No need for scatter-gather or BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
*/
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data))
goto err;
/* Fallback to classic inverse */
if (ret == 0) {
if (!BN_mod_inverse(r, x, group->order, ctx))
goto err;
ret = 1;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (ctx != NULL)
......@@ -1065,8 +1058,21 @@ static int ec_field_inverse_mod_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
return ret;
}
int EC_GROUP_do_inverse_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *res,
BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx)
/*-
* Default behavior, if group->meth->field_inverse_mod_ord is NULL:
* - When group->order is even, this function returns an error.
* - When group->order is otherwise composite, the correctness
* of the output is not guaranteed.
* - When x is outside the range [1, group->order), the correctness
* of the output is not guaranteed.
* - Otherwise, this function returns the multiplicative inverse in the
* range [1, group->order).
*
* EC_METHODs must implement their own field_inverse_mod_ord for
* other functionality.
*/
int ec_group_do_inverse_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *res,
const BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if (group->meth->field_inverse_mod_ord != NULL)
return group->meth->field_inverse_mod_ord(group, res, x, ctx);
......
......@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
while (BN_is_zero(r));
/* compute the inverse of k */
if (!EC_GROUP_do_inverse_ord(group, k, k, ctx)) {
if (!ec_group_do_inverse_ord(group, k, k, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
......@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
goto err;
}
/* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */
if (!EC_GROUP_do_inverse_ord(group, u2, sig->s, ctx)) {
if (!ec_group_do_inverse_ord(group, u2, sig->s, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
......
......@@ -1512,7 +1512,7 @@ void ecp_nistz256_ord_sqr_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
int rep);
static int ecp_nistz256_inv_mod_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx)
const BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
/* RR = 2^512 mod ord(p256) */
static const BN_ULONG RR[P256_LIMBS] = {
......
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