Update from stable branch.

CHANGES

@@ -751,6 +751,11 @@
 
  Changes between 0.9.8j and 0.9.8k  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Don't set val to NULL when freeing up structures, it is freed up by
+     underlying code. If sizeof(void *) > sizeof(long) this can result in
+     zeroing past the valid field. (CVE-2009-0789)
+     [Paolo Ganci <Paolo.Ganci@AdNovum.CH>]
+
   *) Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not
      checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to
      appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591)

crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c

@@ -613,7 +613,6 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
 
 	err:
 	ASN1_template_free(val, tt);
-	*val = NULL;
 	return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -762,7 +761,6 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
 
 	err:
 	ASN1_template_free(val, tt);
-	*val = NULL;
 	return 0;
 	}
 

crypto/cms/cms_smime.c

@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
 		for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++)
 			{
 			si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
-			if (!CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(si, cmsbio))
+			if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(si, cmsbio) <= 0)
 				{
 				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY,
 					CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR);