提交 57376542 编写于 作者: B Bodo Möller

use tabs for indentation, not spaces

上级 b8dc9693
......@@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
......@@ -860,10 +860,10 @@ static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
!= (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)
&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
!= (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
)
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
......@@ -886,16 +886,16 @@ static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
& (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
== (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
& (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
== (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
......@@ -917,31 +917,31 @@ static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
goto f_err;
}
if (need_cert)
{
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
/* Why would the following ever happen?
* We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
s->session->peer=x;
}
else
{
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
sc->peer_key= NULL;
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer=NULL;
}
if (need_cert)
{
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
/* Why would the following ever happen?
* We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
s->session->peer=x;
}
else
{
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
sc->peer_key= NULL;
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer=NULL;
}
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x=NULL;
......@@ -1584,7 +1584,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
......@@ -1602,8 +1602,8 @@ static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
/* Fool emacs indentation */
if (0) {}
/* Fool emacs indentation */
if (0) {}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (l & SSL_kRSA)
{
......@@ -1665,12 +1665,12 @@ static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
else if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
/* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
krb5_data *enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
/* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
krb5_data *enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
......@@ -1682,8 +1682,8 @@ static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
l, SSL_kKRB5);
printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
l, SSL_kKRB5);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
authp = NULL;
......@@ -1691,37 +1691,37 @@ static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
&kssl_err);
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
{
printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
}
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (krb5rc)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
if (krb5rc)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
goto err;
}
/* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
**
** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
**
** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
**
** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
......@@ -1786,14 +1786,14 @@ static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
p+=outl;
n+=outl + 2;
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
......@@ -1928,7 +1928,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
clnt_ecdh->group = srvr_group;
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
{
/* Reuse key info from our certificate
/* Reuse key info from our certificate
* We only need our private key to perform
* the ECDH computation.
*/
......@@ -1945,25 +1945,25 @@ static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
}
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
* make sure to clear it out afterwards
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
* make sure to clear it out afterwards
*/
n=ECDH_compute_key(p, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh);
n=ECDH_compute_key(p, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh);
if (n <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
goto err;
}
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-> generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
p, n);
memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
{
......@@ -1999,7 +1999,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
......@@ -2012,7 +2012,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
{
/* group is shared */
/* group is shared */
clnt_ecdh->group = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
}
......@@ -2049,7 +2049,7 @@ err:
clnt_ecdh->group = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
}
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
return(-1);
}
......
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