add subtitle

subtitle en+zh/Game Theory I-Week 1/GTO-1-02 - Self Interest and Utility Theory.srt

+1
+00:00:00,210 --> 00:00:03,009
+we will be talking about self-interested
+我们将谈论自私的
+
+2
+00:00:03,209 --> 00:00:04,658
+agents and their interactions
+代理及其互动
+
+3
+00:00:04,859 --> 00:00:07,149
+so let's first speak about what we mean
+所以我们先说说我们的意思
+
+4
+00:00:07,349 --> 00:00:14,290
+by self-interested agents we don't mean
+对于自私的经纪人，我们并不是说
+
+5
+00:00:14,490 --> 00:00:17,829
+necessarily that agents are adversarial
+必然是代理商具有对抗性
+
+6
+00:00:18,028 --> 00:00:21,010
+or don't care about what happened to
+或不在乎发生了什么
+
+7
+00:00:21,210 --> 00:00:24,220
+other agents what we mean by that is
+其他代理商，我们的意思是
+
+8
+00:00:24,420 --> 00:00:26,318
+that agents have opinions have
+代理商有意见
+
+9
+00:00:26,518 --> 00:00:28,949
+preferences and so there's some
+偏好，所以有一些
+
+10
+00:00:29,149 --> 00:00:31,568
+description of the world how the world
+世界的描述世界如何
+
+11
+00:00:31,768 --> 00:00:33,518
+could be and in different descriptions
+可能是并且在不同的描述中
+
+12
+00:00:33,719 --> 00:00:36,669
+the agents have different preferences
+代理商有不同的偏好
+
+13
+00:00:36,869 --> 00:00:39,608
+and different utilities as we'll say and
+以及我们将要说的不同的实用程序
+
+14
+00:00:39,808 --> 00:00:43,329
+so what we mean by utility function is a
+所以我们所说的效用函数是
+
+15
+00:00:43,530 --> 00:00:47,619
+mathematical measure that tells you how
+告诉你如何的数学测量
+
+16
+00:00:47,820 --> 00:00:50,709
+much the agents likes or does not like a
+代理商非常喜欢或不喜欢
+
+17
+00:00:50,909 --> 00:00:52,119
+given situation
+给定情况
+
+18
+00:00:52,320 --> 00:00:57,428
+it describes not only their attitude
+它不仅描述了他们的态度
+
+19
+00:00:57,628 --> 00:01:00,279
+towards a definite of events so for
+对于一定的事件，所以
+
+20
+00:01:00,479 --> 00:01:02,198
+example tomorrow the temperature will be
+明天的温度将是
+
+21
+00:01:02,399 --> 00:01:07,988
+exactly 25 degrees centigrade but but in
+正好25摄氏度，但
+
+22
+00:01:08,188 --> 00:01:09,730
+fact it will describe the preferences
+实际上它将描述偏好
+
+23
+00:01:09,930 --> 00:01:15,129
+towards a distribution of such outcomes
+分配这样的结果
+
+24
+00:01:15,329 --> 00:01:18,039
+so it really captures their attitude
+所以这真的抓住了他们的态度
+
+25
+00:01:18,239 --> 00:01:21,399
+towards uncertainty about events so for
+对事件的不确定性
+
+26
+00:01:21,599 --> 00:01:26,200
+example if I tell you that it will be 25
+例如，如果我告诉你它将是25 
+
+27
+00:01:26,400 --> 00:01:30,069
+degrees with probability 0.7 and 24
+度为0.7和24 
+
+28
+00:01:30,269 --> 00:01:33,308
+degrees with probability 0.3 you might
+度，概率为0.3，您可能
+
+29
+00:01:33,509 --> 00:01:35,500
+have an opinion about how much you like
+对你喜欢多少有意见
+
+30
+00:01:35,700 --> 00:01:38,399
+that versus some other distribution and
+与其他发行版相比， 
+
+31
+00:01:38,599 --> 00:01:42,429
+the decision theoretic approach which is
+决策理论方法是
+
+32
+00:01:42,629 --> 00:01:45,759
+what underlies modern game theory says
+现代博弈论的基础是什么
+
+33
+00:01:45,959 --> 00:01:47,469
+that you're going to try to act in the
+你将要尝试采取行动
+
+34
+00:01:47,670 --> 00:01:50,528
+way that maximizes your expected or
+最大化您的预期或
+
+35
+00:01:50,728 --> 00:01:54,640
+average utility and so this is a concept
+平均效用，所以这是一个概念
+
+36
+00:01:54,840 --> 00:01:59,439
+we need to get comfortable with and and
+我们需要对and和
+
+37
+00:01:59,640 --> 00:02:02,230
+it's not obvious that one would want to
+人们是否愿意
+
+38
+00:02:02,430 --> 00:02:06,128
+use such an approach so for example we
+使用这种方法，例如
+
+39
+00:02:06,328 --> 00:02:08,800
+are going to look at a single dimension
+将要看一个单一的维度
+
+40
+00:02:09,000 --> 00:02:11,170
+so your preferences will
+所以你的喜好会
+
+41
+00:02:11,370 --> 00:02:15,849
+all beyond a scale as we'll see the
+一切都超出规模，我们将看到
+
+42
+00:02:16,049 --> 00:02:17,920
+scale that is not that important unlike
+规模不那么重要
+
+43
+00:02:18,120 --> 00:02:19,750
+probabilities utilities don't have to
+概率实用程序不必
+
+44
+00:02:19,949 --> 00:02:22,810
+lie in the 0-1 scale but they will lie
+说谎在0-1规模，但他们会说谎
+
+45
+00:02:23,009 --> 00:02:26,830
+on a linear dimension and maybe maybe
+在线性维度上，也许
+
+46
+00:02:27,030 --> 00:02:29,860
+that's inappropriate or for example you
+那是不合适的，例如你
+
+47
+00:02:30,060 --> 00:02:32,950
+might have some level of wealth and some
+可能有一定程度的财富和一些
+
+48
+00:02:33,150 --> 00:02:37,270
+degree of health and for a certain level
+健康程度和一定水平
+
+49
+00:02:37,469 --> 00:02:41,679
+of of each one you'll have some some
+每一个中，您都会有一些
+
+50
+00:02:41,878 --> 00:02:46,179
+some some notion of well-being but is it
+一些关于幸福的概念，但这是
+
+51
+00:02:46,378 --> 00:02:48,670
+appropriate to put the two together and
+适合将两者放在一起
+
+52
+00:02:48,870 --> 00:02:50,439
+have a single scale you might you might
+有一个单一的规模，你可能会
+
+53
+00:02:50,639 --> 00:02:54,819
+question that similarly why is looking
+同样为什么要看的问题
+
+54
+00:02:55,019 --> 00:02:56,649
+at the expected value when you're
+当您处于期望值时
+
+55
+00:02:56,848 --> 00:02:58,659
+looking at your uncertainty while
+看着你的不确定性
+
+56
+00:02:58,859 --> 00:03:00,939
+looking at the expected value an
+看期望值
+
+57
+00:03:01,139 --> 00:03:02,860
+appropriate way to capture your attitude
+捕捉态度的适当方法
+
+58
+00:03:03,060 --> 00:03:07,330
+and so these are not trivial statements
+所以这些不是琐碎的陈述
+
+59
+00:03:07,530 --> 00:03:10,209
+and in fact are not tautological they
+而且实际上不是重言式的
+
+60
+00:03:10,408 --> 00:03:13,569
+make a subjective claim but there's a
+提出主观主张，但有一个
+
+61
+00:03:13,769 --> 00:03:16,599
+very long tradition and maybe the most
+悠久的传统，也许是最悠久的
+
+62
+00:03:16,799 --> 00:03:20,319
+famous reference is to phenomena
+著名的参考是现象
+
+63
+00:03:20,519 --> 00:03:26,560
+Morgenstern simul book on on which is
+ Morgenstern simul上的书是
+
+64
+00:03:26,759 --> 00:03:28,179
+really in some ways the introduction to
+确实在某种程度上介绍了
+
+65
+00:03:28,378 --> 00:03:31,000
+modern day in game theory that derives
+博弈论中的现代派生
+
+66
+00:03:31,199 --> 00:03:34,990
+the these utility function from more
+这些实用功能更多
+
+67
+00:03:35,189 --> 00:03:38,649
+basic assumptions one makes and we won't
+一个基本假设，我们不会
+
+68
+00:03:38,848 --> 00:03:40,990
+go into that but we just wanted to flag
+进入那个，但是我们只想标记
+
+69
+00:03:41,189 --> 00:03:43,840
+this issue as something that will
+这个问题会
+
+70
+00:03:44,039 --> 00:03:48,550
+underlie everything we say about game
+成为我们谈论游戏的基础
+
+71
+00:03:48,750 --> 00:03:51,340
+theory and which really underlies one
+理论，这实际上是一个基础
+
+72
+00:03:51,539 --> 00:03:56,539
+game theory
+博弈论
+

subtitle en+zh/Game Theory I-Week 1/GTO-1-04 - Examples of Games from Game Theory.srt

+1
+00:00:00,030 --> 00:00:03,969
+in the celebrated example of prisoner's
+在囚犯的著名例子中
+
+2
+00:00:04,169 --> 00:00:05,859
+dilemma we have this general scheme
+困境，我们有这个总体方案
+
+3
+00:00:06,059 --> 00:00:08,530
+where the two prisoners can either
+两个囚犯可以
+
+4
+00:00:08,730 --> 00:00:12,550
+cooperate or not defect as is called if
+合作或不存在缺陷
+
+5
+00:00:12,750 --> 00:00:15,460
+they both cooperate they get some payoff
+他们俩都合作，他们得到了一些回报
+
+6
+00:00:15,660 --> 00:00:17,530
+a-and if they both defect they get a
+ -如果他们俩都叛逆，他们会得到一个
+
+7
+00:00:17,730 --> 00:00:20,199
+different payoff D where a is greater
+ a较大时的不同收益D 
+
+8
+00:00:20,399 --> 00:00:24,669
+than D however if they miss coordinate
+比D但是如果他们错过坐标
+
+9
+00:00:24,868 --> 00:00:26,980
+and one of them cooperates and the other
+其中一个合作，另一个
+
+10
+00:00:27,179 --> 00:00:30,460
+defects then the cooperator gets the
+缺陷，然后合作者得到
+
+11
+00:00:30,660 --> 00:00:32,768
+lowest possible payoff and the defector
+最低的回报和叛逃者
+
+12
+00:00:32,969 --> 00:00:34,899
+gets the largest possible path and
+得到最大可能的路径
+
+13
+00:00:35,100 --> 00:00:37,329
+that's true symmetrically here as well
+在这里对称也是如此
+
+14
+00:00:37,530 --> 00:00:41,320
+and this a very well-known example that
+这是一个非常著名的例子
+
+15
+00:00:41,520 --> 00:00:44,099
+has a rather counterintuitive
+有点违反直觉
+
+16
+00:00:44,299 --> 00:00:49,088
+paradoxical properties most games are
+大多数游戏的悖论性质
+
+17
+00:00:49,289 --> 00:00:55,689
+not as conceptually confusing here's an
+没有概念上的混乱，这是
+
+18
+00:00:55,890 --> 00:00:58,149
+example that conceptually very clear and
+这个例子在概念上非常清楚， 
+
+19
+00:00:58,350 --> 00:01:00,788
+these are gains of pure competition the
+这些都是纯竞争的收益
+
+20
+00:01:00,988 --> 00:01:03,070
+situation here is limited to two players
+这种情况仅限于两名球员
+
+21
+00:01:03,270 --> 00:01:07,140
+where one players payoff is exactly the
+一个玩家的收益正好是
+
+22
+00:01:07,340 --> 00:01:10,869
+complement of another players payoff so
+补充另一个玩家的收益，所以
+
+23
+00:01:11,069 --> 00:01:13,988
+they always sum to some constant C often
+他们经常总和一些常数C 
+
+24
+00:01:14,188 --> 00:01:18,009
+that concept is that we use zero and we
+这个概念是我们使用零，我们
+
+25
+00:01:18,209 --> 00:01:20,230
+call them for that reason zero-sum games
+称他们为零和游戏
+
+26
+00:01:20,430 --> 00:01:22,119
+as opposed to constant sum games
+与固定和博弈相反
+
+27
+00:01:22,319 --> 00:01:27,849
+and since they do sum to zero or to
+由于它们的总和为零或
+
+28
+00:01:28,049 --> 00:01:31,119
+constant we only need to remember one
+不变，我们只需要记住一个
+
+29
+00:01:31,319 --> 00:01:33,278
+number the path to one of the players
+编号玩家之一的路径
+
+30
+00:01:33,478 --> 00:01:36,668
+and we can infer the payoff to the other
+我们可以推断其他人的收益
+
+31
+00:01:36,868 --> 00:01:41,528
+player from that here's the most simple
+玩家从这里最简单
+
+32
+00:01:41,728 --> 00:01:43,808
+version of it this is a games of
+它的版本是
+
+33
+00:01:44,009 --> 00:01:46,599
+matching pennies so you and I each need
+匹配便士，所以您和我都需要
+
+34
+00:01:46,799 --> 00:01:49,840
+to pick either heads or tail for the for
+为之挑选头或尾
+
+35
+00:01:50,040 --> 00:01:54,189
+the coin if we pick the same side either
+如果我们选择同一面的话
+
+36
+00:01:54,390 --> 00:01:58,149
+heads or tails I win which means that I
+头或尾我赢了，这意味着我
+
+37
+00:01:58,349 --> 00:02:01,599
+get a payoff of 1 and U of minus 1 if we
+如果我们得到1的收益和-1的U 
+
+38
+00:02:01,799 --> 00:02:04,569
+miss coordinate and so I pick heads and
+想念坐标，所以我挑了头
+
+39
+00:02:04,769 --> 00:02:06,878
+you tailed or the other way around then
+你拖尾或反过来
+
+40
+00:02:07,078 --> 00:02:10,000
+you win a very straightforward game of
+您会赢得一个非常简单的游戏
+
+41
+00:02:10,199 --> 00:02:12,080
+pure competition
+纯竞争
+
+42
+00:02:12,280 --> 00:02:14,210
+here's another word our very well-known
+这是我们非常知名的另一个词
+
+43
+00:02:14,409 --> 00:02:17,090
+similar games with three actions both of
+具有三个动作的相似游戏
+
+44
+00:02:17,289 --> 00:02:20,060
+us and that's the game of rock papers
+我们就是摇滚游戏
+
+45
+00:02:20,259 --> 00:02:21,130
+and scissors
+和剪刀
+
+46
+00:02:21,330 --> 00:02:25,670
+also known as Rochambeau and so if we
+也被称为Rochambeau，所以如果我们
+
+47
+00:02:25,870 --> 00:02:29,360
+pick the same action then it's a draw
+选择相同的动作然后平局
+
+48
+00:02:29,560 --> 00:02:33,500
+and otherwise there are rules for who
+否则有谁的规则
+
+49
+00:02:33,699 --> 00:02:36,020
+wins for example if I pick Rock and you
+例如，如果我选择Rock而您获胜
+
+50
+00:02:36,219 --> 00:02:38,210
+paper the new one if I picked Rock and
+如果我选择了Rock， 
+
+51
+00:02:38,409 --> 00:02:42,800
+use scissors then I win and so on again
+用剪刀，然后我赢了，依此类推
+
+52
+00:02:43,000 --> 00:02:46,600
+the payoffs in both cases sum to zero
+两种情况下的收益总和为零
+
+53
+00:02:46,800 --> 00:02:52,490
+this parenthetically this very simple
+这很简单
+
+54
+00:02:52,689 --> 00:02:55,700
+children game actually has an annual
+儿童游戏实际上每年都有
+
+55
+00:02:55,900 --> 00:02:58,430
+competition that carries a non-trivial
+不平凡的竞争
+
+56
+00:02:58,629 --> 00:03:01,580
+prize of $10,000 and it's actually a
+奖金$ 10,000，实际上是
+
+57
+00:03:01,780 --> 00:03:02,540
+sobering thought
+清醒的思想
+
+58
+00:03:02,740 --> 00:03:05,150
+that when we look at this trivial game
+当我们看这个琐碎的游戏时
+
+59
+00:03:05,349 --> 00:03:08,330
+then perhaps check a little bit if we
+然后也许检查一下
+
+60
+00:03:08,530 --> 00:03:10,759
+actually participate in this competition
+参加比赛
+
+61
+00:03:10,959 --> 00:03:12,230
+we'd actually think hard about how to
+我们实际上会认真思考如何
+
+62
+00:03:12,430 --> 00:03:18,890
+play it is the other extreme of games of
+玩是游戏的另一极端
+
+63
+00:03:19,090 --> 00:03:22,670
+pure coordination or pure cooperation in
+纯粹的协调或纯粹的合作
+
+64
+00:03:22,870 --> 00:03:25,939
+this case all agents have exactly the
+在这种情况下，所有代理商都有
+
+65
+00:03:26,139 --> 00:03:28,039
+same interest in other words their
+换句话说，他们的兴趣相同
+
+66
+00:03:28,239 --> 00:03:32,569
+payoffs for every action vector that
+每个动作向量的收益
+
+67
+00:03:32,769 --> 00:03:37,610
+they take is the same and so the utility
+他们采取的是相同的，所以实用程序
+
+68
+00:03:37,810 --> 00:03:40,039
+for play I is always the same of utility
+对于玩游戏，我永远都是相同的工具
+
+69
+00:03:40,239 --> 00:03:44,539
+for pair J for every action sequence
+对于J对每个动作序列
+
+70
+00:03:44,739 --> 00:03:47,990
+that they choose and so again we here -
+他们选择，所以我们再次在这里- 
+
+71
+00:03:48,189 --> 00:03:50,450
+we only need to write in each cell of
+我们只需要在
+
+72
+00:03:50,650 --> 00:03:52,160
+the matrix only one number because it's
+矩阵只有一个数字，因为
+
+73
+00:03:52,360 --> 00:03:55,099
+common to all the players it drives home
+它带回家的所有球员都是共同的
+
+74
+00:03:55,299 --> 00:03:58,240
+the perhaps the unfortunate term
+也许是不幸的术语
+
+75
+00:03:58,439 --> 00:04:01,250
+noncorporeal game theory that describes
+非物质博弈论
+
+76
+00:04:01,449 --> 00:04:03,259
+this dominant strand of game theory
+博弈论的主导
+
+77
+00:04:03,459 --> 00:04:06,439
+we're discussing for now it's the name
+我们现在正在讨论的是名字
+
+78
+00:04:06,639 --> 00:04:08,710
+would suggest that these are games for
+会建议这些是
+
+79
+00:04:08,909 --> 00:04:10,910
+that describe situations that are
+描述情况
+
+80
+00:04:11,110 --> 00:04:14,180
+inherent inherently conflictual but as
+内在固有的冲突，但作为
+
+81
+00:04:14,379 --> 00:04:17,598
+we see they apply also to games in which
+我们看到它们也适用于其中
+
+82
+00:04:17,798 --> 00:04:20,750
+the interests of the players coincide so
+玩家的利益是一致的
+
+83
+00:04:20,949 --> 00:04:23,350
+here's a here's a game that
+这是一个游戏
+
+84
+00:04:23,550 --> 00:04:28,600
+describes the purely court cooperative
+描述纯粹的法院合作社
+
+85
+00:04:28,800 --> 00:04:31,259
+situation you and I walk each other
+你和我互相走动的情况
+
+86
+00:04:31,459 --> 00:04:34,120
+towards each other on the sidewalk we
+在人行道上彼此接近
+
+87
+00:04:34,319 --> 00:04:36,129
+can each decide whether to go to our
+每个人都可以决定是否去我们的
+
+88
+00:04:36,329 --> 00:04:37,840
+respective lay lifts our respective
+各自的升降机
+
+89
+00:04:38,040 --> 00:04:40,900
+right and if we pick the same side then
+对，如果我们选择同一边，那么
+
+90
+00:04:41,100 --> 00:04:44,079
+all is good we avoid a collision if we
+一切都很好，如果我们避免碰撞
+
+91
+00:04:44,279 --> 00:04:48,550
+don't then the then we do collide and
+然后，那么我们就发生了碰撞， 
+
+92
+00:04:48,750 --> 00:04:52,810
+that's equally bad for both of us of
+这对我们两个人都同样有害
+
+93
+00:04:53,009 --> 00:04:55,110
+course in general gains will be neither
+当然，总的收益不会
+
+94
+00:04:55,310 --> 00:04:58,020
+purely cooperative nor purely
+纯粹合作也不是纯粹
+
+95
+00:04:58,220 --> 00:05:02,460
+conflictual and here's a game that
+冲突，这是一个游戏
+
+96
+00:05:02,660 --> 00:05:05,050
+exemplifies that this is a game that
+举例说明这是一款
+
+97
+00:05:05,250 --> 00:05:07,900
+called battle of the sexes imagine a
+所谓的性别之战想象
+
+98
+00:05:08,100 --> 00:05:10,629
+husband and a wife we want to go out to
+丈夫和妻子，我们想出去
+
+99
+00:05:10,829 --> 00:05:13,300
+a movie there are two movies they could
+电影可以有两部电影
+
+100
+00:05:13,500 --> 00:05:16,870
+choose from let's say Battle of
+从说“战役”中选择
+
+101
+00:05:17,069 --> 00:05:21,759
+Armageddon and flower child the one a
+大决战和花童一个
+
+102
+00:05:21,959 --> 00:05:25,900
+violent war movie and the other is a is
+暴力战争电影，另一个是
+
+103
+00:05:26,100 --> 00:05:30,100
+a romantic comedy above all they want to
+他们想要的浪漫喜剧
+
+104
+00:05:30,300 --> 00:05:31,660
+go together to the movie if they go to
+一起去看电影，如果他们去
+
+105
+00:05:31,860 --> 00:05:34,840
+different movies then they are equally
+不同的电影，他们都是一样的
+
+106
+00:05:35,040 --> 00:05:36,910
+unhappy so they want to go to the same
+不开心，所以他们想去同一个
+
+107
+00:05:37,110 --> 00:05:38,530
+movie but they have conflicting
+电影，但他们有冲突
+
+108
+00:05:38,730 --> 00:05:41,980
+preferences the wife clearly would
+妻子的喜好显然会
+
+109
+00:05:42,180 --> 00:05:47,250
+prefer to go to battle of Armageddon and
+宁愿去参加世界末日之战， 
+
+110
+00:05:47,449 --> 00:05:50,379
+husband romantic as he is would like to
+丈夫浪漫，因为他想
+
+111
+00:05:50,579 --> 00:05:51,460
+go to flower child
+去花童
+
+112
+00:05:51,660 --> 00:05:56,860
+so both cooperation and competition in
+因此，在
+
+113
+00:05:57,060 --> 00:06:02,060
+this game
+这个游戏
+

subtitle en+zh/Game Theory I-Week 1/GTO-1-05 - Nash Equilibrium Introduction, and the Keynes Beauty Contest.srt

+1
+00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:02,889
+hi folks its Matt again and now we're
+嗨，大家好，Matt，现在我们
+
+2
+00:00:03,089 --> 00:00:04,509
+ready to start solving games and making
+准备开始解决游戏和制作
+
+3
+00:00:04,710 --> 00:00:06,519
+some predictions of how people will play
+关于人们如何玩的一些预测
+
+4
+00:00:06,719 --> 00:00:08,500
+in different settings and so we're
+在不同的设置中，所以我们
+
+5
+00:00:08,699 --> 00:00:11,859
+talking right now about Nash equilibrium
+现在谈论纳什均衡
+
+6
+00:00:12,058 --> 00:00:14,950
+which is one probably the most basic and
+这可能是最基本的
+
+7
+00:00:15,150 --> 00:00:17,260
+standard solution concept of all in all
+全部的标准解决方案概念
+
+8
+00:00:17,460 --> 00:00:19,600
+of game theory it's named after John
+博弈论的名字，以约翰命名
+
+9
+00:00:19,800 --> 00:00:21,310
+Nash who was a mathematician at
+纳什（Nash）是数学家
+
+10
+00:00:21,510 --> 00:00:23,470
+Princeton and actually some years back
+普林斯顿，实际上几年前
+
+11
+00:00:23,670 --> 00:00:25,329
+won the Nobel Prize for his work on this
+他在这方面的工作获得了诺贝尔奖
+
+12
+00:00:25,528 --> 00:00:28,510
+subject and it's a very basic and
+主题，这是一个非常基本的
+
+13
+00:00:28,710 --> 00:00:31,329
+fundamental concept and in order to sort
+基本概念和排序
+
+14
+00:00:31,528 --> 00:00:33,070
+of motivate it let's let's start by just
+激励它，让我们从一开始就开始
+
+15
+00:00:33,270 --> 00:00:38,349
+talking through some a particular game
+通过特定游戏进行交谈
+
+16
+00:00:38,549 --> 00:00:41,320
+that was described and invented by
+被描述和发明的
+
+17
+00:00:41,520 --> 00:00:45,189
+another famous person so this is John
+另一个名人，所以这是约翰
+
+18
+00:00:45,390 --> 00:00:48,219
+Kane John Maynard Keynes beauty contest
+凯恩·约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯选美大赛
+
+19
+00:00:48,420 --> 00:00:51,998
+game so what's the idea here so let's
+游戏，这是什么主意，让我们
+
+20
+00:00:52,198 --> 00:00:53,919
+let's think of a basic situation that
+让我们考虑一个基本情况
+
+21
+00:00:54,119 --> 00:00:57,038
+you might be interested in and this was
+您可能对此感兴趣，这是
+
+22
+00:00:57,238 --> 00:00:58,658
+one that Keynes described in some detail
+凯恩斯对此进行了详细描述
+
+23
+00:00:58,859 --> 00:01:01,419
+so the idea was you have a stock you're
+所以想法是你有一只股票
+
+24
+00:01:01,619 --> 00:01:04,388
+holding on to it and the stock price is
+坚持下去，股价就是
+
+25
+00:01:04,588 --> 00:01:07,090
+rising that's great you're an investor
+上升那太好了，您是投资者
+
+26
+00:01:07,290 --> 00:01:08,769
+you're trying to make profits off of
+你试图从中获利
+
+27
+00:01:08,969 --> 00:01:12,278
+your your stock holdings and you begin
+您的库存量，然后开始
+
+28
+00:01:12,478 --> 00:01:13,869
+to believe that maybe the stock is too
+相信也许股票也是如此
+
+29
+00:01:14,069 --> 00:01:15,849
+high to be justified by the value of the
+高要由价值来证明
+
+30
+00:01:16,049 --> 00:01:17,799
+company so you're thinking that it's
+公司，所以您认为这是
+
+31
+00:01:18,000 --> 00:01:19,599
+possible that this stock is overvalued
+这只股票可能被高估了
+
+32
+00:01:19,799 --> 00:01:22,209
+maybe there's a bubble in the market and
+也许市场上有泡沫， 
+
+33
+00:01:22,409 --> 00:01:24,629
+you're starting to think about selling
+您开始考虑出售
+
+34
+00:01:24,829 --> 00:01:27,308
+okay well you'd like to sell it but
+好吧，你想卖掉它，但是
+
+35
+00:01:27,509 --> 00:01:28,840
+you'd like to wait until the price is at
+您想等到价格在
+
+36
+00:01:29,040 --> 00:01:31,090
+its peak right so you'd want to wait
+它的峰值合适，所以您想等待
+
+37
+00:01:31,290 --> 00:01:33,009
+until the price was just where it's
+直到价格刚好在
+
+38
+00:01:33,209 --> 00:01:35,909
+going to hit its maximum before you sold
+在您卖出之前将达到最高
+
+39
+00:01:36,109 --> 00:01:37,959
+so you wanted to get out of the market
+所以你想退出市场
+
+40
+00:01:38,159 --> 00:01:40,539
+just before the other investors do so
+就在其他投资者这样做之前
+
+41
+00:01:40,739 --> 00:01:41,950
+this is a game where now you have to
+这是一个游戏，现在您必须
+
+42
+00:01:42,150 --> 00:01:43,390
+predict what other people think about
+预测别人的想法
+
+43
+00:01:43,590 --> 00:01:45,189
+the stock price and and what they're
+股票价格以及它们的含义
+
+44
+00:01:45,390 --> 00:01:46,778
+going to do and when they want to get
+去做，什么时候想得到
+
+45
+00:01:46,978 --> 00:01:50,168
+out so how will they act how should you
+出来，他们将如何行动，你应该如何
+
+46
+00:01:50,368 --> 00:01:53,049
+respond to that so this is the basic
+对此做出回应，这是最基本的
+
+47
+00:01:53,250 --> 00:01:55,149
+ingredients of Nash equilibrium are
+纳什均衡的成分是
+
+48
+00:01:55,349 --> 00:01:57,009
+going to be having some prediction of
+会有一些预测
+
+49
+00:01:57,209 --> 00:01:58,778
+what other players are doing and then
+其他玩家在做什么，然后
+
+50
+00:01:58,978 --> 00:02:00,579
+choosing the optimal strategy in
+选择最佳策略
+
+51
+00:02:00,780 --> 00:02:01,959
+response to that so these are they're
+回应，所以这些是
+
+52
+00:02:02,159 --> 00:02:03,579
+going to be two key ingredients that we
+将成为我们的两个关键要素
+
+53
+00:02:03,780 --> 00:02:07,000
+have so there's a very stylized version
+有一个非常程式化的版本
+
+54
+00:02:07,200 --> 00:02:09,880
+of this which is known as the the Keynes
+这就是凯恩斯
+
+55
+00:02:10,080 --> 00:02:12,850
+beauty contest game where did it come
+选美比赛是哪里来的
+
+56
+00:02:13,050 --> 00:02:13,600
+from
+从
+
+57
+00:02:13,800 --> 00:02:17,140
+actually Keynes described the there was
+实际上凯恩斯描述了
+
+58
+00:02:17,340 --> 00:02:22,950
+a newspaper in the in England that had a
+英格兰的一家报纸
+
+59
+00:02:23,150 --> 00:02:26,500
+contest where players had to guess which
+比赛中玩家必须猜测哪个
+
+60
+00:02:26,699 --> 00:02:32,290
+picture of several women other readers
+其他读者的几个女人的照片
+
+61
+00:02:32,490 --> 00:02:36,460
+would think was the the the most
+会认为是最
+
+62
+00:02:36,659 --> 00:02:38,290
+attractive one so it wasn't to guess
+有吸引力的一个，所以不用猜测
+
+63
+00:02:38,490 --> 00:02:39,910
+what you thought but what you thought
+你在想什么，但你在想什么
+
+64
+00:02:40,110 --> 00:02:43,620
+other people were thinking so Keynes
+其他人在想，所以凯恩斯
+
+65
+00:02:43,819 --> 00:02:47,290
+likened investing to this you it's not
+比作投资，这不是
+
+66
+00:02:47,490 --> 00:02:49,900
+only what you think of this the stock
+只有您对此的看法
+
+67
+00:02:50,099 --> 00:02:51,340
+but what you think other people are
+但是你认为别人是什么
+
+68
+00:02:51,539 --> 00:02:52,540
+thinking about the stock that's
+考虑那只股票
+
+69
+00:02:52,740 --> 00:02:54,130
+important and driving your decisions
+重要并推动您的决策
+
+70
+00:02:54,330 --> 00:02:57,280
+okay so this now is represented by a
+好吧，现在以
+
+71
+00:02:57,479 --> 00:02:59,530
+very simple game that is is played by
+玩的非常简单的游戏
+
+72
+00:02:59,729 --> 00:03:02,230
+many people so what's this game look
+很多人，所以这个游戏看起来像什么
+
+73
+00:03:02,430 --> 00:03:06,400
+like each person gets to name an integer
+就像每个人都用一个整数命名
+
+74
+00:03:06,599 --> 00:03:08,890
+between 1 and 100 ok so you get to pick
+在1到100 ok之间，所以您可以选择
+
+75
+00:03:09,090 --> 00:03:11,230
+a number between 1 and 100 s to be an
+ 1到100秒之间的数字是一个
+
+76
+00:03:11,430 --> 00:03:15,340
+integer so 1 2 3 etc players are going
+整数，所以1 2 3等玩家进行
+
+77
+00:03:15,539 --> 00:03:17,800
+to move simultaneously and the player
+与玩家同时移动
+
+78
+00:03:18,000 --> 00:03:19,900
+who names the integer that's closest to
+谁命名最接近的整数
+
+79
+00:03:20,099 --> 00:03:23,020
+two-thirds of the average integer wins a
+平均整数的三分之二赢得
+
+80
+00:03:23,219 --> 00:03:25,900
+prize and the other players get nothing
+奖，其他玩家一无所获
+
+81
+00:03:26,099 --> 00:03:28,509
+so to win this game you have to get you
+所以要赢得这场比赛，你必须让你
+
+82
+00:03:28,709 --> 00:03:32,050
+have to guess the average and then 2/3
+必须猜测平均值，然后再2/3 
+
+83
+00:03:32,250 --> 00:03:34,120
+of it right so you want to be right at
+它是正确的，所以你想在正确
+
+84
+00:03:34,319 --> 00:03:36,280
+2/3 of whatever the average guess is so
+平均猜测的2/3 
+
+85
+00:03:36,479 --> 00:03:39,520
+a little bit below the average guess if
+比平均猜测低一点
+
+86
+00:03:39,719 --> 00:03:41,289
+there's two people that happen to hit
+有两个人碰巧
+
+87
+00:03:41,489 --> 00:03:43,240
+the same integer that it's the the right
+正确的整数
+
+88
+00:03:43,439 --> 00:03:46,090
+one then ties are going to be broken
+一个然后领带将被打破
+
+89
+00:03:46,289 --> 00:03:47,890
+uniformly at random so we'll just flip a
+均匀地随机分布，所以我们只需要翻转一个
+
+90
+00:03:48,090 --> 00:03:49,710
+coin or if there's three people will
+硬币，或者如果有三个人
+
+91
+00:03:49,909 --> 00:03:54,520
+roll a dice a three-sided die etc okay
+掷骰子，三面骰子等
+
+92
+00:03:54,719 --> 00:03:57,789
+so how would you play this game you have
+所以你会怎么玩这个游戏
+
+93
+00:03:57,989 --> 00:03:58,930
+to think about what other players are
+考虑其他玩家
+
+94
+00:03:59,129 --> 00:04:01,600
+going to do and then forecast what you
+去做，然后预测你
+
+95
+00:04:01,800 --> 00:04:04,120
+think the best integer is in a response
+认为最好的整数在响应中
+
+96
+00:04:04,319 --> 00:04:09,319
+to that
+那个
+

subtitle en+zh/Game Theory I-Week 1/GTO-1-07 - Best Response and Nash Equilibrium.srt

+1
+00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:03,099
+I will now speak about how we predict
+我现在将谈论我们如何预测
+
+2
+00:00:03,299 --> 00:00:05,139
+that people will play in a game and
+人们会玩游戏， 
+
+3
+00:00:05,339 --> 00:00:07,780
+specifically about the concepts of best
+特别是关于最佳概念
+
+4
+00:00:07,980 --> 00:00:12,100
+response and Nash equilibrium now let's
+反应和纳什均衡现在让我们
+
+5
+00:00:12,300 --> 00:00:14,319
+go home were to assume that you are one
+回家假设你是一个
+
+6
+00:00:14,519 --> 00:00:17,530
+of the players and the other players are
+的球员和其他球员是
+
+7
+00:00:17,730 --> 00:00:19,109
+going to play in a way that you know
+会以您知道的方式演奏
+
+8
+00:00:19,309 --> 00:00:22,239
+then we can speak about what is your
+那我们可以说说你是什么
+
+9
+00:00:22,439 --> 00:00:24,039
+best thing to do and we'll call that the
+最好的事情，我们称之为
+
+10
+00:00:24,239 --> 00:00:27,550
+best response and technically speaking
+最佳回应，从技术上讲
+
+11
+00:00:27,750 --> 00:00:31,149
+let's use the following notation let's
+让我们使用以下表示法
+
+12
+00:00:31,349 --> 00:00:36,099
+call AI the action sequence of everybody
+把AI称为每个人的行动顺序
+
+13
+00:00:36,299 --> 00:00:39,878
+except you player I so it's player 1 and
+除了你我是玩家1 
+
+14
+00:00:40,079 --> 00:00:42,909
+so on internal player I minus 1 I plus 1
+所以内部玩家我减去1我加1 
+
+15
+00:00:43,109 --> 00:00:46,619
+and all the rest so the entire action
+其余的一切，整个动作
+
+16
+00:00:46,820 --> 00:00:49,649
+vector we call it the action profile a
+向量，我们将其称为行动概况
+
+17
+00:00:49,850 --> 00:00:53,320
+is really made up of all those a minus I
+真的是由所有减去我的人组成
+
+18
+00:00:53,520 --> 00:00:58,329
+and your own action with that notation
+以及您使用该符号的操作
+
+19
+00:00:58,530 --> 00:01:01,149
+here's the definition we will say that
+这是我们要说的定义
+
+20
+00:01:01,350 --> 00:01:03,849
+your best response which we'll call AI
+您最好的回应，我们称之为AI 
+
+21
+00:01:04,049 --> 00:01:07,689
+star it may not be unique but it's got
+明星可能不是唯一的但有
+
+22
+00:01:07,890 --> 00:01:10,599
+to be part of the set it will call BR
+作为集合的一部分，它将调用BR 
+
+23
+00:01:10,799 --> 00:01:13,269
+the best response assuming that all the
+假设所有
+
+24
+00:01:13,469 --> 00:01:17,709
+other agents play is a a - I if it's the
+其他特工打的是aa-如果是
+
+25
+00:01:17,909 --> 00:01:20,890
+case that for any anything you might be
+不管你做什么， 
+
+26
+00:01:21,090 --> 00:01:24,250
+thinking of doing a sub I for all a sub
+想为所有子项目做一个子项目
+
+27
+00:01:24,450 --> 00:01:27,399
+I it's got to be the case that your
+我一定要这样
+
+28
+00:01:27,599 --> 00:01:31,028
+utility for playing that in other words
+换句话说，实用程序
+
+29
+00:01:31,228 --> 00:01:34,899
+when you playing AI star and the others
+当你玩AI之星和其他人
+
+30
+00:01:35,099 --> 00:01:38,500
+are playing AI a - I for whatever it is
+在玩AI a-我不管
+
+31
+00:01:38,700 --> 00:01:40,778
+has got to be at least as great as
+必须至少与
+
+32
+00:01:40,978 --> 00:01:44,278
+anything else you might choose a sub I
+还有其他你可以选择的子
+
+33
+00:01:44,478 --> 00:01:47,439
+that's the case we'll say that a AI star
+就是这样，我们会说一个AI明星
+
+34
+00:01:47,640 --> 00:01:51,069
+is a best response very intuitive notion
+最好的回应是非常直观的概念
+
+35
+00:01:51,269 --> 00:01:55,119
+and that would bring us all almost all
+那将带给我们几乎所有人
+
+36
+00:01:55,319 --> 00:01:57,369
+the way there the problem of course is
+那里的问题当然是
+
+37
+00:01:57,569 --> 00:01:59,319
+that you don't know what the others will
+你不知道别人会怎么做
+
+38
+00:01:59,519 --> 00:02:02,378
+do but that's ok because when we use the
+可以，但是没关系，因为当我们使用
+
+39
+00:02:02,578 --> 00:02:04,778
+notion of best response as a building
+最佳响应的概念
+
+40
+00:02:04,978 --> 00:02:07,028
+block to define what we call the Nash
+定义我们称为Nash的块
+
+41
+00:02:07,228 --> 00:02:09,850
+equilibrium and the National Caribbean
+均衡与加勒比国家联盟
+
+42
+00:02:10,050 --> 00:02:12,520
+briefly is a set of acts
+简单来说是一套行为
+
+43
+00:02:12,719 --> 00:02:14,950
+one for each of the agents such that
+每个代理一个
+
+44
+00:02:15,150 --> 00:02:17,730
+each is the best response to the others
+每个都是对其他人的最佳回应
+
+45
+00:02:17,930 --> 00:02:20,469
+specifically we'll look at an action
+具体来说，我们来看看一个动作
+
+46
+00:02:20,669 --> 00:02:24,850
+profile here a a one through a n and
+在这里通过一个和一个配置文件
+
+47
+00:02:25,050 --> 00:02:26,710
+we'll say that it's a Nash equilibrium
+我们会说那是纳什均衡
+
+48
+00:02:26,909 --> 00:02:29,560
+and later on we'll tell you why we call
+稍后我们会告诉您为什么我们打电话
+
+49
+00:02:29,759 --> 00:02:32,140
+it specifically a pure strategy Nash
+它专门是一种纯粹的策略纳什
+
+50
+00:02:32,340 --> 00:02:35,020
+equilibrium if it's the case that for
+如果是这样的话
+
+51
+00:02:35,219 --> 00:02:38,650
+every agent that action a sub I
+每个行动一个子我
+
+52
+00:02:38,849 --> 00:02:40,120
+associate with agent is your best
+与代理商合作是您最好的选择
+
+53
+00:02:40,319 --> 00:02:45,319
+response all the rest
+其余所有回应
+

subtitle en+zh/Game Theory I-Week 1/GTO-1-08 - Examples.srt

+1
+00:00:00,149 --> 00:00:03,188
+let us now look at some examples and of
+现在让我们来看一些例子
+
+2
+00:00:03,388 --> 00:00:07,609
+games and Nash equilibria in those games
+游戏和那些游戏中的纳什均衡
+
+3
+00:00:08,000 --> 00:00:10,390
+so here's the first game a familiar game
+所以这是第一个熟悉的游戏
+
+4
+00:00:10,589 --> 00:00:14,189
+this is of course the prisoner's dilemma
+这当然是囚犯的困境
+
+5
+00:00:14,388 --> 00:00:18,190
+the if both prisoners cooperate and
+如果两个囚犯合作， 
+
+6
+00:00:18,390 --> 00:00:20,859
+content and then they get a light
+内容，然后他们就亮了
+
+7
+00:00:21,059 --> 00:00:25,568
+punishment and if they do not cooperate
+惩罚，如果他们不配合
+
+8
+00:00:25,768 --> 00:00:28,839
+they get a more severe punishment if the
+他们会受到更严厉的惩罚
+
+9
+00:00:29,039 --> 00:00:30,550
+one cooperates and the others does not
+一个合作而其他不合作
+
+10
+00:00:30,750 --> 00:00:33,309
+then the co-op irrigated terrible
+然后合作社灌溉很糟糕
+
+11
+00:00:33,509 --> 00:00:36,608
+punishment and the one that does not
+惩罚与不惩罚
+
+12
+00:00:36,808 --> 00:00:38,500
+cooperate gets off scot it gets off
+合作下车苏格兰人下车
+
+13
+00:00:38,700 --> 00:00:41,378
+scot-free and of course this game has a
+无苏格兰人，当然这个游戏有
+
+14
+00:00:41,579 --> 00:00:45,038
+dominant strategy to defect no matter
+主导缺陷策略无论如何
+
+15
+00:00:45,238 --> 00:00:47,649
+what the other agent does you're better
+另一个代理商你做得更好
+
+16
+00:00:47,850 --> 00:00:52,570
+off not cooperating and so of course the
+不合作，所以当然
+
+17
+00:00:52,770 --> 00:00:56,018
+only dominant strategy outcome is this
+唯一的主要策略结果是
+
+18
+00:00:56,219 --> 00:00:58,689
+one of both defecting and indeed that is
+既有缺陷，又有缺陷的是
+
+19
+00:00:58,890 --> 00:01:00,788
+the only Nash equilibrium in this game
+这场比赛中唯一的纳什均衡
+
+20
+00:01:00,988 --> 00:01:03,729
+so it's the Nash equilibrium it's the
+所以这是纳什均衡
+
+21
+00:01:03,929 --> 00:01:05,560
+best response if the other person
+如果对方最佳反应
+
+22
+00:01:05,760 --> 00:01:07,659
+defects then it's the best respond to
+缺陷，那么它是最好的应对方法
+
+23
+00:01:07,859 --> 00:01:09,969
+defect but in fact it's much stronger
+缺陷，但实际上要强大得多
+
+24
+00:01:10,170 --> 00:01:11,709
+than that it's best to defect no matter
+最好不要有任何缺点
+
+25
+00:01:11,909 --> 00:01:14,890
+what the other the other agent does so
+另一个代理人这样做
+
+26
+00:01:15,090 --> 00:01:17,439
+this is an example of one unique Nash
+这是一个独特的纳什的例子
+
+27
+00:01:17,640 --> 00:01:19,090
+equilibrium that happened to be very
+恰好是非常均衡
+
+28
+00:01:19,290 --> 00:01:21,278
+strong one a dominant strategy Nash
+强势策略Nash 
+
+29
+00:01:21,478 --> 00:01:25,659
+equilibrium so so here's another game
+平衡，所以这是另一个游戏
+
+30
+00:01:25,859 --> 00:01:27,549
+this is the game of pure coordination I
+这是纯粹协调的游戏
+
+31
+00:01:27,750 --> 00:01:31,299
+think of it as walking towards each
+认为它是走向每个
+
+32
+00:01:31,500 --> 00:01:33,789
+other on the sidewalk and you both can
+其他人行道上，你们俩都可以
+
+33
+00:01:33,989 --> 00:01:35,950
+decide whether to go to your respective
+决定是否去你各自的
+
+34
+00:01:36,150 --> 00:01:40,769
+lifts or respective rights in both cases
+两种情况下的升降机或各自的权利
+
+35
+00:01:40,969 --> 00:01:43,659
+you will do fine and you will not
+你会做得很好，你不会
+
+36
+00:01:43,859 --> 00:01:45,549
+collide and of course if you miss
+碰撞，当然，如果您想念
+
+37
+00:01:45,750 --> 00:01:47,619
+coordinate if you one goes to the left
+协调，如果你去左边
+
+38
+00:01:47,819 --> 00:01:48,609
+and the other to the right you will
+另一个在右边
+
+39
+00:01:48,810 --> 00:01:52,628
+collide so this is a natural game and in
+碰撞，所以这是自然的游戏
+
+40
+00:01:52,828 --> 00:01:55,359
+fact you see that you have two Nash
+事实上你看到你有两个纳什
+
+41
+00:01:55,560 --> 00:01:58,028
+equilibria the one that I wrote down
+平衡我写下的那一个
+
+42
+00:01:58,228 --> 00:02:01,869
+here if one one of the players goes to
+如果一位玩家去
+
+43
+00:02:02,069 --> 00:02:03,730
+the left it's the best respond to go to
+左边是最好的回应
+
+44
+00:02:03,930 --> 00:02:06,609
+the left and conversely if the other
+左边，反之亦然
+
+45
+00:02:06,810 --> 00:02:08,469
+player goes to the right you're best off
+玩家向右走，你最好
+
+46
+00:02:08,669 --> 00:02:10,838
+going to the right as well and the
+也会向右走， 
+
+47
+00:02:11,038 --> 00:02:12,550
+others are not Nash equilibria so here's
+其他人不是纳什均衡，所以这里的
+
+48
+00:02:12,750 --> 00:02:13,090
+an exam
+考试
+
+49
+00:02:13,289 --> 00:02:17,649
+of a game where there are two Nash
+一个游戏中有两个纳什
+
+50
+00:02:17,848 --> 00:02:20,560
+equilibria or to specifically pure
+均衡或特纯
+
+51
+00:02:20,759 --> 00:02:23,200
+strategy Nash equilibria again we'll
+策略纳什均衡再一次
+
+52
+00:02:23,400 --> 00:02:25,929
+discuss why we call these pure strategy
+讨论为什么我们称这些为纯策略
+
+53
+00:02:26,128 --> 00:02:31,110
+later on here's a very different game
+稍后这是一个非常不同的游戏
+
+54
+00:02:31,310 --> 00:02:33,879
+this is often called the game of battle
+这通常被称为战斗游戏
+
+55
+00:02:34,079 --> 00:02:37,480
+of the sexes imagine a couple and they
+的性别想象一对夫妇，他们
+
+56
+00:02:37,680 --> 00:02:39,039
+want to go together to a movie and
+想一起去看电影， 
+
+57
+00:02:39,239 --> 00:02:41,379
+they're considering two movies one of
+他们正在考虑两部电影之一
+
+58
+00:02:41,579 --> 00:02:45,399
+them a very violent movie Battle of the
+他们是一部非常暴力的电影
+
+59
+00:02:45,598 --> 00:02:49,569
+Titans and the other very relaxed movie
+泰坦和另一部非常轻松的电影
+
+60
+00:02:49,769 --> 00:02:53,640
+about flower growing called Lee's B&F
+关于花的成长，叫做李的B＆F 
+
+61
+00:02:53,840 --> 00:02:56,409
+the wife of course would prefer to go to
+妻子当然更愿意去
+
+62
+00:02:56,609 --> 00:02:58,899
+battle of the Titans and the the husband
+泰坦与丈夫之战
+
+63
+00:02:59,098 --> 00:03:01,599
+would prefer to watch flower growing but
+宁愿看花开，但
+
+64
+00:03:01,799 --> 00:03:03,219
+more than anything else they would want
+比他们想要的更重要
+
+65
+00:03:03,419 --> 00:03:05,080
+to go together and so here are the
+一起去，所以这里是
+
+66
+00:03:05,280 --> 00:03:09,520
+payoffs if they both go to battle of the
+如果他们都参加战斗的话
+
+67
+00:03:09,719 --> 00:03:12,849
+Titans then they're both positively
+泰坦然后他们都是积极的
+
+68
+00:03:13,049 --> 00:03:15,580
+happy their wife more than the husband
+妻子比丈夫更快乐
+
+69
+00:03:15,780 --> 00:03:18,670
+if the go both go to the flower growing
+如果两者都去花开
+
+70
+00:03:18,870 --> 00:03:22,599
+movie then the husband is slightly happy
+电影，然后丈夫有点高兴
+
+71
+00:03:22,799 --> 00:03:24,340
+and the wife but if they go to different
+和妻子，但如果他们去不同的地方
+
+72
+00:03:24,539 --> 00:03:26,409
+movies neither of them is happy that's
+电影他们俩都不开心
+
+73
+00:03:26,609 --> 00:03:30,340
+that's that's the that's that's the the
+那就是那那就是那
+
+74
+00:03:30,539 --> 00:03:36,999
+game how many how many equilibria we
+游戏我们多少平衡
+
+75
+00:03:37,199 --> 00:03:40,629
+have here well again we have two pure
+再来一遍，我们有两个纯
+
+76
+00:03:40,829 --> 00:03:43,390
+strategy Nash equilibria why is that
+策略纳什均衡为什么
+
+77
+00:03:43,590 --> 00:03:49,030
+well if either them goes to the Battle
+好吧，如果他们去参加战斗
+
+78
+00:03:49,229 --> 00:03:50,439
+of the Titans then the other one would
+的泰坦，然后另一个
+
+79
+00:03:50,639 --> 00:03:52,659
+want to go there too because if they go
+也想去那里，因为如果他们去
+
+80
+00:03:52,859 --> 00:03:54,969
+to a different one they would get zero
+换成另一种，他们将得到零
+
+81
+00:03:55,169 --> 00:03:57,969
+rather than whatever they get here one
+而不是他们来到这里
+
+82
+00:03:58,169 --> 00:03:59,499
+or two depending on whether the husband
+一两个取决于丈夫
+
+83
+00:03:59,699 --> 00:04:02,140
+of the wife and conversely on the on the
+的妻子，相反在
+
+84
+00:04:02,340 --> 00:04:04,300
+flower watching movie flower grow movie
+花看电影花种电影
+
+85
+00:04:04,500 --> 00:04:07,090
+and so in both cases they were the best
+所以在两种情况下它们都是最好的
+
+86
+00:04:07,289 --> 00:04:09,999
+response is to go to the movie selected
+回应是去看电影
+
+87
+00:04:10,199 --> 00:04:13,360
+by the other party so on the face of it
+对方如此面对
+
+88
+00:04:13,560 --> 00:04:15,159
+it looks very similar to the game of
+它看起来非常类似于
+
+89
+00:04:15,359 --> 00:04:17,499
+pure coordination that we have here but
+我们在这里有纯粹的协调，但是
+
+90
+00:04:17,699 --> 00:04:19,180
+we do see a slight difference here and
+我们在这里确实看到了细微的差别， 
+
+91
+00:04:19,379 --> 00:04:21,310
+it will revisit that later on when we
+稍后，当我们
+
+92
+00:04:21,509 --> 00:04:23,860
+speak about not pure strategies but
+谈论的不是纯粹的策略，而是
+
+93
+00:04:24,060 --> 00:04:25,670
+mixed strategies
+混合策略
+
+94
+00:04:25,870 --> 00:04:28,259
+here's a here's another example the last
+这是一个这是另一个例子
+
+95
+00:04:28,459 --> 00:04:30,090
+one we'll look at and this is the game
+我们来看一看，这就是游戏
+
+96
+00:04:30,290 --> 00:04:32,939
+called matching pennies imagine each of
+所谓的匹配便士想象每个
+
+97
+00:04:33,139 --> 00:04:35,218
+us two players needing to just need to
+我们两个玩家只需要
+
+98
+00:04:35,418 --> 00:04:38,430
+decide on some side of a of a coin heads
+在硬币头的a的某一侧决定
+
+99
+00:04:38,629 --> 00:04:41,879
+or tail if we decide on the same size
+还是尾巴，如果我们决定相同的尺寸
+
+100
+00:04:42,079 --> 00:04:44,730
+heads or tail but we decide on the same
+头或尾，但我们决定相同
+
+101
+00:04:44,930 --> 00:04:48,960
+one then then I win if we decide on
+一个然后我赢了，如果我们决定
+
+102
+00:04:49,160 --> 00:04:51,090
+different sides you heads and me tails
+你的头和我的尾巴的不同侧面
+
+103
+00:04:51,290 --> 00:04:54,449
+or vice versa the new win and so we see
+反之亦然，新的胜利，所以我们看到
+
+104
+00:04:54,649 --> 00:04:59,999
+this here if we both decides on heads or
+如果我们俩都决定要这样做，还是在这里
+
+105
+00:05:00,199 --> 00:05:01,949
+we both decides on tails I win and
+我们都决定我赢的尾巴， 
+
+106
+00:05:02,149 --> 00:05:03,900
+otherwise you win by winning I mean I
+不然你赢了就是我
+
+107
+00:05:04,100 --> 00:05:05,759
+get 1 you get minus 1 so this is a
+得到1你得到负1所以这是一个
+
+108
+00:05:05,959 --> 00:05:10,338
+zero-sum game the sum of our payoff is 0
+零和游戏，我们的收益之和为0 
+
+109
+00:05:10,538 --> 00:05:13,439
+what is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
+什么是纯策略纳什均衡
+
+110
+00:05:13,639 --> 00:05:16,710
+here let's think about it suppose I pick
+让我们考虑一下，假设我选择了
+
+111
+00:05:16,910 --> 00:05:20,400
+head what is your best response well
+领导什么是你最好的反应
+
+112
+00:05:20,600 --> 00:05:22,740
+your best response then is to pick tails
+你最好的选择就是挑尾巴
+
+113
+00:05:22,939 --> 00:05:26,100
+because you get one rather than minus
+因为你得到一个而不是减
+
+114
+00:05:26,300 --> 00:05:31,350
+one but if you pick I tails then my best
+一个，但是如果你选择我尾巴，那我最好
+
+115
+00:05:31,550 --> 00:05:33,540
+response is not to play tail because I
+回应不是打尾巴，因为我
+
+116
+00:05:33,740 --> 00:05:36,000
+want to coordinate with you because then
+想和你协调，因为
+
+117
+00:05:36,199 --> 00:05:39,660
+I will get one rather than minus one
+我会得到一个而不是减一
+
+118
+00:05:39,860 --> 00:05:42,360
+that I would be getting here but now if
+我会到这里，但现在如果
+
+119
+00:05:42,560 --> 00:05:47,009
+I play tails you'd rather play heads
+我打尾巴你宁可打头
+
+120
+00:05:47,209 --> 00:05:50,189
+because you'd get one rather than the
+因为你会得到一个而不是
+
+121
+00:05:50,389 --> 00:05:53,009
+minus one you're getting here but again
+减一，你要来这里，但是再来一次
+
+122
+00:05:53,209 --> 00:05:55,528
+if you're playing tails I want to if you
+如果你在打尾巴，我想
+
+123
+00:05:55,728 --> 00:05:57,300
+playing heads I want to play heads to
+我要打头
+
+124
+00:05:57,500 --> 00:06:01,528
+match so we have this cycle where the
+匹配，所以我们有这个周期
+
+125
+00:06:01,728 --> 00:06:07,230
+best responses are leading us in the
+最好的回应正在引领我们
+
+126
+00:06:07,430 --> 00:06:10,800
+cycle and so there is no pure strategy
+周期，所以没有纯粹的策略
+
+127
+00:06:11,000 --> 00:06:12,629
+Nash equilibrium in this game of mashing
+这场捣蛋游戏中的纳什均衡
+
+128
+00:06:12,829 --> 00:06:17,829
+pennies
+便士
+