Merge tag '4.14-smb3-fixes-from-recent-test-events-for-stable' of...

Merge tag '4.14-smb3-fixes-from-recent-test-events-for-stable' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6

Pull cifs fixes from Steve French:
 "Various SMB3 fixes for stable and security improvements from the
  recently completed SMB3/Samba test events

* tag '4.14-smb3-fixes-from-recent-test-events-for-stable' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
  SMB3: Don't ignore O_SYNC/O_DSYNC and O_DIRECT flags
  SMB3: handle new statx fields
  SMB: Validate negotiate (to protect against downgrade) even if signing off
  cifs: release auth_key.response for reconnect.
  cifs: release cifs root_cred after exit_cifs
  CIFS: make arrays static const, reduces object code size
  [SMB3] Update session and share information displayed for debugging SMB2/SMB3
  cifs: show 'soft' in the mount options for hard mounts
  SMB3: Warn user if trying to sign connection that authenticated as guest
  SMB3: Fix endian warning
  Fix SMB3.1.1 guest authentication to Samba

fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c

@@ -160,8 +160,13 @@ static int cifs_debug_data_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 			if ((ses->serverDomain == NULL) ||
 				(ses->serverOS == NULL) ||
 				(ses->serverNOS == NULL)) {
-				seq_printf(m, "\n%d) entry for %s not fully "
-					   "displayed\n\t", i, ses->serverName);
+				seq_printf(m, "\n%d) Name: %s Uses: %d Capability: 0x%x\tSession Status: %d\t",
+					i, ses->serverName, ses->ses_count,
+					ses->capabilities, ses->status);
+				if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST)
+					seq_printf(m, "Guest\t");
+				else if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL)
+					seq_printf(m, "Anonymous\t");
 			} else {
 				seq_printf(m,
 				    "\n%d) Name: %s  Domain: %s Uses: %d OS:"

fs/cifs/cifsfs.c

@@ -461,6 +461,8 @@ cifs_show_options(struct seq_file *s, struct dentry *root)
 		seq_puts(s, ",nocase");
 	if (tcon->retry)
 		seq_puts(s, ",hard");
+	else
+		seq_puts(s, ",soft");
 	if (tcon->use_persistent)
 		seq_puts(s, ",persistenthandles");
 	else if (tcon->use_resilient)
@@ -1447,7 +1449,7 @@ exit_cifs(void)
 	exit_cifs_idmap();
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL
-	unregister_key_type(&cifs_spnego_key_type);
+	exit_cifs_spnego();
 #endif
 	cifs_destroy_request_bufs();
 	cifs_destroy_mids();

fs/cifs/connect.c

@@ -4154,6 +4154,14 @@ cifs_setup_session(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
 	cifs_dbg(FYI, "Security Mode: 0x%x Capabilities: 0x%x TimeAdjust: %d\n",
 		 server->sec_mode, server->capabilities, server->timeAdj);
 
+	if (ses->auth_key.response) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "Free previous auth_key.response = %p\n",
+			 ses->auth_key.response);
+		kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
+		ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
+		ses->auth_key.len = 0;
+	}
+
 	if (server->ops->sess_setup)
 		rc = server->ops->sess_setup(xid, ses, nls_info);
 

fs/cifs/file.c

@@ -224,6 +224,13 @@ cifs_nt_open(char *full_path, struct inode *inode, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
 	if (backup_cred(cifs_sb))
 		create_options |= CREATE_OPEN_BACKUP_INTENT;
 
+	/* O_SYNC also has bit for O_DSYNC so following check picks up either */
+	if (f_flags & O_SYNC)
+		create_options |= CREATE_WRITE_THROUGH;
+
+	if (f_flags & O_DIRECT)
+		create_options |= CREATE_NO_BUFFER;
+
 	oparms.tcon = tcon;
 	oparms.cifs_sb = cifs_sb;
 	oparms.desired_access = desired_access;
@@ -1102,8 +1109,10 @@ cifs_push_mandatory_locks(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile)
 	struct cifs_tcon *tcon;
 	unsigned int num, max_num, max_buf;
 	LOCKING_ANDX_RANGE *buf, *cur;
-	int types[] = {LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES,
-		       LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES};
+	static const int types[] = {
+		LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES,
+		LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES
+	};
 	int i;
 
 	xid = get_xid();
@@ -1434,8 +1443,10 @@ cifs_unlock_range(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, struct file_lock *flock,
 		  unsigned int xid)
 {
 	int rc = 0, stored_rc;
-	int types[] = {LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES,
-		       LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES};
+	static const int types[] = {
+		LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES,
+		LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES
+	};
 	unsigned int i;
 	unsigned int max_num, num, max_buf;
 	LOCKING_ANDX_RANGE *buf, *cur;

fs/cifs/inode.c

@@ -234,6 +234,8 @@ cifs_unix_basic_to_fattr(struct cifs_fattr *fattr, FILE_UNIX_BASIC_INFO *info,
 	fattr->cf_atime = cifs_NTtimeToUnix(info->LastAccessTime);
 	fattr->cf_mtime = cifs_NTtimeToUnix(info->LastModificationTime);
 	fattr->cf_ctime = cifs_NTtimeToUnix(info->LastStatusChange);
+	/* old POSIX extensions don't get create time */
+
 	fattr->cf_mode = le64_to_cpu(info->Permissions);
 
 	/*
@@ -2024,6 +2026,19 @@ int cifs_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
 	stat->blksize = CIFS_MAX_MSGSIZE;
 	stat->ino = CIFS_I(inode)->uniqueid;
 
+	/* old CIFS Unix Extensions doesn't return create time */
+	if (CIFS_I(inode)->createtime) {
+		stat->result_mask |= STATX_BTIME;
+		stat->btime =
+		      cifs_NTtimeToUnix(cpu_to_le64(CIFS_I(inode)->createtime));
+	}
+
+	stat->attributes_mask |= (STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED | STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED);
+	if (CIFS_I(inode)->cifsAttrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_COMPRESSED)
+		stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED;
+	if (CIFS_I(inode)->cifsAttrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ENCRYPTED)
+		stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED;
+
 	/*
 	 * If on a multiuser mount without unix extensions or cifsacl being
 	 * enabled, and the admin hasn't overridden them, set the ownership

fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c

@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ assemble_neg_contexts(struct smb2_negotiate_req *req)
 	build_encrypt_ctxt((struct smb2_encryption_neg_context *)pneg_ctxt);
 	req->NegotiateContextOffset = cpu_to_le32(OFFSET_OF_NEG_CONTEXT);
 	req->NegotiateContextCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
-	inc_rfc1001_len(req, 4 + sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) + 2
+	inc_rfc1001_len(req, 4 + sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context)
 			+ sizeof(struct smb2_encryption_neg_context)); /* calculate hash */
 }
 #else
@@ -570,10 +570,11 @@ SMB2_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
 			/* ops set to 3.0 by default for default so update */
 			ses->server->ops = &smb21_operations;
 		}
-	} else if (rsp->DialectRevision != ses->server->vals->protocol_id) {
+	} else if (le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision) !=
+				ses->server->vals->protocol_id) {
 		/* if requested single dialect ensure returned dialect matched */
 		cifs_dbg(VFS, "Illegal 0x%x dialect returned: not requested\n",
-			cpu_to_le16(rsp->DialectRevision));
+			le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision));
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
@@ -655,14 +656,21 @@ int smb3_validate_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon)
 
 	/*
 	 * validation ioctl must be signed, so no point sending this if we
-	 * can not sign it.  We could eventually change this to selectively
+	 * can not sign it (ie are not known user).  Even if signing is not
+	 * required (enabled but not negotiated), in those cases we selectively
 	 * sign just this, the first and only signed request on a connection.
-	 * This is good enough for now since a user who wants better security
-	 * would also enable signing on the mount. Having validation of
-	 * negotiate info for signed connections helps reduce attack vectors
+	 * Having validation of negotiate info  helps reduce attack vectors.
 	 */
-	if (tcon->ses->server->sign == false)
+	if (tcon->ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST)
+		return 0; /* validation requires signing */
+
+	if (tcon->ses->user_name == NULL) {
+		cifs_dbg(FYI, "Can't validate negotiate: null user mount\n");
 		return 0; /* validation requires signing */
+	}
+
+	if (tcon->ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "Unexpected null user (anonymous) auth flag sent by server\n");
 
 	vneg_inbuf.Capabilities =
 			cpu_to_le32(tcon->ses->server->vals->req_capabilities);
@@ -1175,6 +1183,8 @@ SMB2_sess_setup(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
 	while (sess_data->func)
 		sess_data->func(sess_data);
 
+	if ((ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST) && (ses->sign))
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "signing requested but authenticated as guest\n");
 	rc = sess_data->result;
 out:
 	kfree(sess_data);