/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include #include #include #include /* * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { int ret; ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], s->init_num); if (ret < 0) return (-1); if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) /* * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll * ignore the result anyway */ if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], ret)) return -1; if (ret == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); return (1); } s->init_off += ret; s->init_num -= ret; return (0); } int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { size_t msglen; if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) || msglen > INT_MAX || !WPACKET_finish(pkt)) return 0; s->init_num = (int)msglen; s->init_off = 0; return 1; } int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) { unsigned char *p; int i; unsigned long l; p = ssl_handshake_start(s); i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md); if (i <= 0) return 0; s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); l = i; /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if (!s->server) { OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; } else { OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; } if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen * to far. */ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { const char *sender; int slen; /* * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set * the appropriate error. */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) return; if (!s->server) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; } else { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); } #endif MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; long remain; remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); /* * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } } else { if (remain != 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no * SCTP is used */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); #endif } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al, i; /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); goto f_err; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); goto f_err; } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if (s->server) { OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; } else { OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *p = SSL3_MT_CCS; s->init_num = 1; s->init_off = 0; return 1; } unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { unsigned char *p; unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) return 0; l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); p = ssl_handshake_start(s); l2n3(l, p); l += 3; if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); } WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { WORK_STATE ret; ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) return ret; } #endif /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf * in case there are any unexpected retransmits */ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; } ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->init_num = 0; if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; if (s->server) { ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; } else { ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; } if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* done with handshaking */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); } } return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; } int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) { /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; unsigned char *p; unsigned long l; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; do { while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, &p[s->init_num], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; return 0; } if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur * in the middle of a handshake message. */ if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; s->init_num = i - 1; s->s3->tmp.message_size = i; return 1; } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } s->init_num += i; } skip_message = 0; if (!s->server) if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) /* * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' * MAC. */ if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { s->init_num = 0; skip_message = 1; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } } while (skip_message); /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ *mt = *p; s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { /* * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible * ClientHello * * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read */ l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } else { n2l3(p, l); /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); goto f_err; } if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_num = 0; } return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return 0; } int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) { long n; unsigned char *p; int i; if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* We've already read everything in */ *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; return 1; } p = s->init_msg; n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; while (n > 0) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, &p[s->init_num], n, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; *len = 0; return 0; } s->init_num += i; n -= i; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for * Finished verification. */ if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ssl3_take_mac(s); #endif /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); *len = 0; return 0; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } else { if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); *len = 0; return 0; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } /* * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared * unsigned */ if (s->init_num < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); *len = 0; return 0; } *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; return 1; } int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) { if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) return -1; switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { default: return -1; case EVP_PKEY_RSA: return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case EVP_PKEY_EC: return SSL_PKEY_ECC; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; #endif } } int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) { int al; switch (type) { case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; break; case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; break; case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; break; case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; break; case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; break; case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; break; default: al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; break; } return (al); } int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) { if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) return 0; return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); } static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) { int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); if (a == b) return 0; if (!dtls) return a < b ? -1 : 1; return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; } typedef struct { int version; const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); } version_info; #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION. #endif static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, #else {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, #else {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, #else {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, #else {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif {0, NULL, NULL}, }; #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. #endif static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, #else {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, #else {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, #endif {0, NULL, NULL}, }; /* * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. * * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method * @method: the intended method. * * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. */ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) { int version = method->version; if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; return 0; } /* * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by * `SSL *` instance * * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method * @version: Protocol version to test against * * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 */ int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; switch (s->method->version) { default: /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: table = dtls_version_table; break; } for (vent = table; vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; ++vent) { if (vent->cmeth != NULL && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { return 1; } } return 0; } /* * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest * supported protocol version. * * @s server SSL handle. * * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. */ int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; /* * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed * s->method). */ if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) return 1; /* * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its * highest protocol version). */ if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) table = tls_version_table; else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) table = dtls_version_table; else { /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ return 0; } for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) return s->version == vent->version; } return 0; } /* * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. * * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. * @version: the intended limit. * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. * * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) { if (version == 0) { *bound = version; return 1; } /*- * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. * * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. */ switch (method_version) { default: /* * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol * versions. */ return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) return 0; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) return 0; break; } *bound = version; return 1; } /* * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and * the version specific method. * * @s: server SSL handle. * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) { /*- * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: * * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. * * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the * handle version. */ int server_version = s->method->version; int client_version = s->client_version; const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; int disabled = 0; switch (server_version) { default: if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: table = dtls_version_table; break; } for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { const SSL_METHOD *method; if (vent->smeth == NULL || version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) continue; method = vent->smeth(); if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { s->version = vent->version; s->method = method; return 0; } disabled = 1; } return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; } /* * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and * the version specific method. * * @s: client SSL handle. * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; switch (s->method->version) { default: if (version != s->version) return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: table = dtls_version_table; break; } for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { const SSL_METHOD *method; int err; if (version != vent->version) continue; if (vent->cmeth == NULL) break; method = vent->cmeth(); err = ssl_method_error(s, method); if (err != 0) return err; s->method = method; s->version = version; return 0; } return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; } /* * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version * @s: The SSL connection * @min_version: The minimum supported version * @max_version: The maximum supported version * * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. * * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. */ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) { int version; int hole; const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *method; const version_info *table; const version_info *vent; switch (s->method->version) { default: /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ *min_version = *max_version = s->version; return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: table = dtls_version_table; break; } /* * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". * * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. * * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. * * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes * selected, as we start from scratch. */ *min_version = version = 0; hole = 1; for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { /* * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the * "version capability" vector. */ if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { hole = 1; continue; } method = vent->cmeth(); if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { hole = 1; } else if (!hole) { single = NULL; *min_version = method->version; } else { version = (single = method)->version; *min_version = version; hole = 0; } } *max_version = version; /* Fail if everything is disabled */ if (version == 0) return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; return 0; } /* * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for * the initial ClientHello. * * @s: client SSL handle. * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) { int ver_min, ver_max, ret; ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); if (ret != 0) return ret; s->client_version = s->version = ver_max; return 0; }