/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" /* * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right */ int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned int ilen; const unsigned char *data; /* Parse the length byte */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } /* Check that the extension matches */ if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; return 0; } if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; return 0; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; return 1; } /*- * The servername extension is treated as follows: * * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, * in which case an fatal alert is generated. * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches * the value of the Host: field. * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername * extension. * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. */ int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned int servname_type; PACKET sni, hostname; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni) /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } /* * Although the server_name extension was intended to be * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as * such. * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. * * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. */ if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->hit) { if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname); s->session->ext.hostname = NULL; if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } s->servername_done = 1; } else { /* * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST * fall back to a full handshake. */ s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname, strlen(s->session->ext.hostname)); } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { PACKET srp_I; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I) || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } /* * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. */ if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } return 1; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { PACKET ec_point_format_list; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list) || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->hit) { if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, &s->session->ext.ecpointformats, &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } return 1; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb && !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } return 1; } int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { PACKET supported_sig_algs; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { PACKET responder_id_list, exts; /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */ if (x != NULL) return 1; if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { /* * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. */ s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing; return 1; } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } /* * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 */ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } else { s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL; } while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { OCSP_RESPID *id; PACKET responder_id; const unsigned char *id_data; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id) || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */ id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); if (id == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } /* Read in request_extensions */ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); s->ext.ocsp.exts = d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts)); if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } } return 1; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* * We shouldn't accept this extension on a * renegotiation. */ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) s->s3->npn_seen = 1; return 1; } #endif /* * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN * extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert * value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. */ int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 1; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } save_protocol_list = protocol_list; do { /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; unsigned int ct, mki_len, id; int i, srtp_pref; PACKET subpkt; /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */ if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL) return 1; /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); s->srtp_profile = NULL; /* Search all profiles for a match initially */ srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr); while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } /* * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than * current match. * If no profiles have been have been configured then this * does nothing. */ for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) { SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i); if (sprof->id == id) { s->srtp_profile = sprof; srtp_pref = i; break; } } } /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } return 1; } #endif int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) s->ext.use_etm = 1; return 1; } /* * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value. */ int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 PACKET psk_kex_modes; unsigned int mode; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes) || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) { if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE) s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; } #endif return 1; } /* * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value. */ int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int group_id; PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt; const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves; size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves; int group_nid, found = 0; unsigned int curve_flags; if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0) return 1; /* Sanity check */ if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* Get our list of supported curves */ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* * Get the clients list of supported curves. * TODO(TLS1.3): We should validate that we actually received * supported_groups! */ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt) || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them. */ if (found) continue; /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */ if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */ if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) { /* Share not suitable */ continue; } group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags); if (group_nid == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); return 0; } if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) { /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */ EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); EVP_PKEY_free(key); return 0; } s->s3->peer_tmp = key; } else { /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, group_nid) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); pctx = NULL; } s->s3->group_id = group_id; if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); return 0; } found = 1; } #endif return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { PACKET supported_groups_list; /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list) || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups); s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL; s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0; if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list, &s->session->ext.supportedgroups, &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } return 1; } #endif int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* The extension must always be empty */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; return 1; } int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } return 1; } int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { PACKET identities, binders, binder; size_t binderoffset, hashsize; SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; unsigned int id, i; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems; /* * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so * ignore this extension */ if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0) return 1; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) { PACKET identity; unsigned long ticket_agel; int ret; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity) || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel; ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity), PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, &sess); if (ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC || ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } if (ret == TICKET_NO_DECRYPT) continue; md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2); if (md == NULL) { /* * Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session. * Ignore it */ SSL_SESSION_free(sess); sess = NULL; continue; } /* * TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to handle the case of a ticket renewal. * Ignored for now */ break; } if (sess == NULL) return 1; binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto err; } for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto err; } } if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize || tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0) != 1) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } sess->ext.tick_identity = id; now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time; agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add; /* * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the client does * it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age is longer than ours * (our ticket age calculation should always be slightly longer than the * client's due to the network latency). Therefore we add 1000ms to our age * calculation to adjust for rounding errors. */ if (sess->timeout >= (long)agesec && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec && ticket_age <= agems + 1000 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) { /* * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it for early * data */ s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; } SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = sess; return 1; err: SSL_SESSION_free(sess); return 0; } /* * Add the server's renegotiation binding */ int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1 || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL); const unsigned char *plist; size_t plistlen; if (!using_ecc) return 1; tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #endif int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) { s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; return 1; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (!s->ext.status_expected) return 1; if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a * separate message */ if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { const unsigned char *npa; unsigned int npalen; int ret; int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen; s->s3->npn_seen = 0; if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL) return 1; ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg); if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->s3->npn_seen = 1; } return 1; } #endif int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->srtp_profile == NULL) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #endif int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (!s->ext.use_etm) return 1; /* * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable * for other cases too. */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) { s->ext.use_etm = 0; return 1; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned char *encodedPoint; size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL; if (ckey == NULL) { /* No key_share received from client */ if (s->hello_retry_request) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } /* Must be resuming. */ if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); if (skey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* Generate encoding of server key */ encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint); if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */ s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey; if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } #endif return 1; } int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 }; if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81) || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0) return 1; if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { if (s->max_early_data == 0) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (!s->hit) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; }