/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) { if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) return (SSLv3_server_method()); else return (NULL); } IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, ssl3_accept, ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) { int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { /* * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp * login name */ ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; } else { ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); } } return ret; } #endif int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf; unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; int ret = -1; int new_state, state, skip = 0; RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; /* init things to blank */ s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { if (!SSL_clear(s)) return -1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during * handshakes anyway. */ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; s->tlsext_hb_seq++; } #endif for (;;) { state = s->state; switch (s->state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->renegotiate = 1; /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: s->server = 1; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); return -1; } s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { BUF_MEM_free(buf); ret = -1; goto end; } s->init_buf = buf; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } s->init_num = 0; s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; /* * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { /* * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) */ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { ret = -1; goto end; } ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { /* * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't * support secure renegotiation. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); ret = -1; goto end; } else { /* * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a * HelloRequest */ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: s->shutdown = 0; ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num = 0; ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: s->state = SSL_ST_OK; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: { int al; if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { /* * callback indicates firther work to be done */ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; goto end; } if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); /* * This is not really an error but the only means to for * a client to detect whether srp is supported. */ if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; ret = -1; goto end; } } #endif s->renegotiate = 2; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->hit) { if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; } #else if (s->hit) s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; #endif else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ if (! (s->s3->tmp. new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | SSL_aSRP)) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_status_expected) s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } #else } else skip = 1; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; #endif s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* * clear this, it may get reset by * send_server_key_exchange */ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; /* * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, * the server certificate contains the server's public key for * key exchange. */ if (0 /* * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if * provided */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) #endif || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ) ) ) ) { ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } else skip = 1; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || /* * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert * during re-negotiation: */ ((s->session->peer != NULL) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || /* * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in * RFC 2246): */ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && /* * ... except when the application insists on * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts * this for SSL 3) */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || /* * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) /* * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests * are omitted */ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { /* no cert request */ skip = 1; s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) return -1; } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; s->init_num = 0; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: /* * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush * unconditionally. */ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { ret = -1; goto end; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } s->init_num = 0; s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { /* * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses * its key from the certificate for key exchange. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #else if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #endif s->init_num = 0; } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num = 0; if (!s->session->peer) break; if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support * extms we've done this already. */ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) { s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) return -1; } } else { int offset = 0; int dgst_num; s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num = 0; /* * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next * step */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) return -1; for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { int dgst_size; s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, EVP_MD_CTX_type (s-> s3->handshake_dgst [dgst_num]), &(s->s3-> tmp.cert_verify_md [offset])); dgst_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); if (dgst_size < 0) { ret = -1; goto end; } offset += dgst_size; } } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: /* * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need * to set this here because we don't know if we're * expecting a CertificateVerify or not. */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; /* we should decide if we expected this one */ ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #else if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #endif s->init_num = 0; break; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: /* * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN. * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until * the client's Finished message is read. */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->init_num = 0; s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: /* * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN. * In a full handshake, we end up here through * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until * the client's Finished message is read. */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) s->state = SSL_ST_OK; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; #endif else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num = 0; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num = 0; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { ret = -1; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, s->method-> ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, s->method-> ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; if (s->hit) { #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #else if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; } else s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #endif } else s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; /* remove buffering on output */ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->init_num = 0; if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a * HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; /* s->server=1; */ s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); } ret = 1; goto end; /* break; */ default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret = -1; goto end; /* break; */ } if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->debug) { if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { new_state = s->state; s->state = state; cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); s->state = new_state; } } skip = 0; } end: /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ s->in_handshake--; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); return (ret); } int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) { int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1; unsigned int cookie_len; long n; unsigned long id; unsigned char *p, *d; SSL_CIPHER *c; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP unsigned char *q; SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; #endif STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet) goto retry_cert; /* * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. */ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; } s->first_packet = 1; n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); s->first_packet = 0; d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte * for session id length */ if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } /* * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; p += 2; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version && s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) : (s->client_version < s->version)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { /* * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version * number */ s->version = s->client_version; } al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } /* * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check * cookie length... */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); if (cookie_length == 0) return 1; } /* load the client random */ memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* get the session-id */ j = *(p++); if (p + j > d + n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } s->hit = 0; /* * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally * ignore resumption requests with flag * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this * for security won't even compile against older library versions). * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. */ if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) goto err; } else { i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); /* * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated * version. * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and * will abort the handshake with an error. */ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous * session */ s->hit = 1; } else if (i == -1) goto err; else { /* i == 0 */ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) goto err; } } p += j; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* cookie stuff */ if (p + 1 > d + n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } cookie_len = *(p++); if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } /* * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it * does not cause an overflow. */ if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { /* too much data */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* else cookie verification succeeded */ } /* default verification */ else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */ ret = -2; } p += cookie_len; if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { /* Select version to use */ if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) { s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method(); } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); s->version = s->client_version; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) { s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; s->method = DTLSv1_server_method(); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); s->version = s->client_version; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } s->session->ssl_version = s->version; } } if (p + 2 > d + n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } n2s(p, i); if (i == 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { /* not enough data */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) { goto err; } p += i; /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ if (s->hit) { j = 0; id = s->session->cipher->id; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); #endif for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); #endif if (c->id == id) { j = 1; break; } } /* * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: * CVE-2010-4180. */ #if 0 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { /* * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. */ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { s->session->cipher = c; j = 1; } } #endif if (j == 0) { /* * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked * to reuse it */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); goto f_err; } } /* compression */ i = *(p++); if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { /* not enough data */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP q = p; #endif for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { if (p[j] == 0) break; } p += i; if (j >= i) { /* no compress */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto err; } } /* * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket * processing to use it in key derivation. */ { unsigned char *pos; pos = s->s3->server_random; if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { goto f_err; } } if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { s->hit = 1; s->session->ciphers = ciphers; s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; ciphers = NULL; /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s-> session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers (s)); if (pref_cipher == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; if (s->cipher_list) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); if (s->cipher_list_by_id) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); } } #endif /* * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ /* Can't disable compression */ if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } /* Look for resumed compression method */ for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); if (comp_id == comp->id) { s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; break; } } if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { if (q[m] == comp_id) break; } if (m >= i) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); goto f_err; } } else if (s->hit) comp = NULL; else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { /* See if we have a match */ int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); v = comp->id; for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { if (v == q[o]) { done = 1; break; } } if (done) break; } if (done) s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; else comp = NULL; } #else /* * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } #endif /* * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */ if (!s->hit) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth = 0; #else s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; #endif if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); s->session->ciphers = ciphers; if (ciphers == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } ciphers = NULL; if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ retry_cert: if (s->cert->cert_cb) { int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (rv < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return -1; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); if (c == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); if (s->session->not_resumable) /* do not send a session ticket */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; } else { /* Session-id reuse */ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; } if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) goto f_err; } /*- * we now have the following setup. * client_random * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers * compression - basically ignored right now * ssl version is set - sslv3 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. * s->hit - session reuse flag * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. */ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } } if (ret < 0) ret = -ret; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); } err: if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret; } int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *d; int i, sl; int al = 0; unsigned long l; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT p = s->s3->server_random; if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) return -1; #endif /* Do the message type and length last */ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); *(p++) = s->version >> 8; *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /*- * There are several cases for the session ID to send * back in the server hello: * - For session reuse from the session cache, * we send back the old session ID. * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" * (which doesn't actually identify the session). * - If it is a new session, we send back the new * session ID. * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, * we send back a 0-length session ID. * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed * to send back. */ if (s->session->not_resumable || (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) && !s->hit)) s->session->session_id_length = 0; sl = s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } *(p++) = sl; memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); p += sl; /* put the cipher */ i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); p += i; /* put the compression method */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++) = 0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) *(p++) = 0; else *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); return -1; } if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } #endif /* do the header */ l = (p - d); if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; int j, num; RSA *rsa; unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned int u; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encodedlen = 0; int curve_id = 0; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif EVP_PKEY *pkey; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; unsigned char *p, *d; int al, i; unsigned long type; int n; CERT *cert; BIGNUM *r[4]; int nr[4], kn; BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; cert = s->cert; buf = s->init_buf; r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; n = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (type & SSL_kRSA) { rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> tmp.new_cipher)); if (rsa == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } RSA_up_ref(rsa); cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; } if (rsa == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } r[0] = rsa->n; r[1] = rsa->e; s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (type & SSL_kDHE) { if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); if (dhp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } } else dhp = cert->dh_tmp; if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> tmp.new_cipher)); if (dhp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) dh = dhp; else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || dhp->priv_key == NULL || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } else { dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } r[0] = dh->p; r[1] = dh->g; r[2] = dh->pub_key; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { const EC_GROUP *group; ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2); if (nid != NID_undef) ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) { ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> s3->tmp.new_cipher)); } if (ecdhp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ if (ecdhp == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) ecdh = ecdhp; else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } } if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); goto err; } /* * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is * non-zero. */ if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); goto err; } /* * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and * allocate memory accordingly. */ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); if (encodedlen == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx = NULL; /* * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams * structure. */ n = 4 + encodedlen; /* * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we * can set these to NULLs */ r[0] = NULL; r[1] = NULL; r[2] = NULL; r[3] = NULL; } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_kPSK) { /* * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint */ n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (type & SSL_kSRP) { if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); goto err; } r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; } else #endif { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) n += 1 + nr[i]; else #endif n += 2 + nr[i]; } if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); } else { pkey = NULL; kn = 0; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); goto err; } d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { *p = nr[i]; p++; } else #endif s2n(nr[i], p); BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); p += nr[i]; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { /* * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself */ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; p += 1; *p = 0; p += 1; *p = curve_id; p += 1; *p = encodedlen; p += 1; memcpy((unsigned char *)p, (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); encodedPoint = NULL; p += encodedlen; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_kPSK) { /* copy PSK identity hint */ s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); } #endif /* not anonymous */ if (pkey != NULL) { /* * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p * points to the space at the end. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { q = md_buf; j = 0; for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i); q += i; j += i; } if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); goto err; } s2n(u, p); n += u + 2; } else #endif if (md) { /* send signature algorithm */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { /* Should never happen */ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } p += 2; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); goto err; } s2n(i, p); n += i + 2; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) n += 2; } else { /* Is this error check actually needed? */ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); goto f_err; } } if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return ssl_do_write(s); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return (-1); } int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p, *d; int i, j, nl, off, n; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; X509_NAME *name; BUF_MEM *buf; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { buf = s->init_buf; d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ p++; n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); d[0] = n; p += n; n++; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { const unsigned char *psigs; unsigned char *etmp = p; nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs); /* Skip over length for now */ p += 2; nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl); /* Now fill in length */ s2n(nl, etmp); p += nl; n += nl + 2; } off = n; p += 2; n += 2; sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); nl = 0; if (sk != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; s2n(j, p); i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); n += 2 + j; nl += 2 + j; } } /* else no CA names */ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off; s2n(nl, p); if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); err: return (-1); } int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { int i, al, ok; long n; unsigned long alg_k; unsigned char *p; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH BIGNUM *pub = NULL; DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; int decrypt_len; unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; size_t j; /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; /* * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already */ if (rsa == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); goto f_err; } } else { pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); goto f_err; } rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; } /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { n2s(p, i); if (n != i + 2) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } else p -= 2; } else n = i; } /* * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the * bound is sufficient to be safe. */ if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } /* * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) goto err; decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); ERR_clear_error(); /* * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */ decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); /* * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. */ version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); /* * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol * version instead if the server does not support the requested * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such * clients. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { unsigned char workaround_good; workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); version_good |= workaround_good; } /* * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to * remain non-zero (0xff). */ decrypt_good &= version_good; /* * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees * it is still sufficiently large to read from. */ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], rand_premaster_secret[j]); } s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, p, sizeof (rand_premaster_secret)); OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { int idx = -1; EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; if (n > 1) { n2s(p, i); } else { if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } i = 0; } if (n && n != i + 2) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto err; } else { p -= 2; i = (int)n; } } if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; if (idx >= 0) { skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey; if ((skey == NULL) || (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); goto f_err; } dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh; } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } else dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; if (n == 0L) { /* Get pubkey from cert */ EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (clkey) { if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1) dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); } if (dh_clnt == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } EVP_PKEY_free(clkey); pub = dh_clnt->pub_key; } else pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); if (pub == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); BN_clear_free(pub); goto err; } DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; if (dh_clnt) DH_free(dh_clnt); else BN_clear_free(pub); pub = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, p, i); OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (dh_clnt) return 2; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { krb5_error_code krb5rc; krb5_data enc_ticket; krb5_data authenticator; krb5_data enc_pms; KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; int padl, outl; krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; krb5_ticket_times ttimes; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); n2s(p, i); enc_ticket.length = i; if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; p += enc_ticket.length; n2s(p, i); authenticator.length = i; if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } authenticator.data = (char *)p; p += authenticator.length; n2s(p, i); enc_pms.length = i; enc_pms.data = (char *)p; p += enc_pms.length; /* * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption */ if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + enc_pms.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, &kssl_err)) != 0) { # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); if (kssl_err.text) fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } /* * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will * return authtime == 0. */ if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); if (kssl_err.text) fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); goto err; } # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); if (enc == NULL) goto err; memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } outl += padl; if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { /* * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random * bytes instead of the protocol version. If * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos * cipher) */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, pms, outl); if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) { al = SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, len); } } /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, * but it caused problems for apache. * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; */ } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { int ret = 1; int field_size = 0; const EC_KEY *tkey; const EC_GROUP *group; const BIGNUM *priv_key; /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Let's get server private key and group information */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { /* use the certificate */ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; } else { /* * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the * ServerKeyExchange msg. */ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* Let's get client's public key */ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (n == 0L) { /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { /* * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the * code is never executed. When that support is added, we * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. */ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); goto f_err; } if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> pkey.ec)) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ } else { /* * Get client's public key from encoded point in the * ClientKeyExchange message. */ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Get encoded point length */ i = *p; p += 1; if (n != 1 + i) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it * to the start */ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; } /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); if (field_size <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; /* Compute the master secret */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, p, i); OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } return (ret); } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { unsigned char *t = NULL; unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; int psk_err = 1; char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; n2s(p, i); if (n != i + 2) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto psk_err; } if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto psk_err; } if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); goto psk_err; } /* * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback */ memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i); psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1); if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto psk_err; } else if (psk_len == 0) { /* * PSK related to the given identity not found */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; goto psk_err; } /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; t = psk_or_pre_ms; memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); s2n(psk_len, t); memset(t, 0, psk_len); t += psk_len; s2n(psk_len, t); if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto psk_err; } if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto psk_err; } s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto psk_err; } psk_err = 0; psk_err: OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); if (psk_err != 0) goto f_err; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { int param_len; n2s(p, i); param_len = i + 2; if (param_len > n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key)) < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } p += i; } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { int ret = 0; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; size_t outlen = 32, inlen; unsigned long alg_a; int Ttag, Tclass; long Tlen; /* Get our certificate private key */ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); /* * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a * client certificate for authorization only. */ client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (client_pub_pkey) { if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) ERR_clear_error(); } /* Decrypt session key */ if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto gerr; } start = p; inlen = Tlen; if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto gerr; } /* Generate master secret */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32); if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) ret = 2; else ret = 1; gerr: EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); if (ret) return ret; goto err; } else { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); goto f_err; } return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) err: #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif return (-1); } int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; unsigned char *p; int al, ok, ret = 0; long n; int type = 0, i, j; X509 *peer; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (s->session->peer != NULL) { peer = s->session->peer; pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); } else { peer = NULL; pkey = NULL; } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; if (peer != NULL) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } ret = 1; goto end; } if (peer == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto f_err; } if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ /* * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without * length field */ if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) { i = 64; } else { if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey); if (rv == -1) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } else if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif p += 2; n -= 2; } n2s(p, i); n -= 2; if (i > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } } j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { long hdatalen = 0; void *hdata; hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); if (hdatalen <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.rsa); if (i < 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); goto f_err; } if (i == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { unsigned char signature[64]; int idx; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); if (i != 64) { fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); } for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) { signature[63 - idx] = p[idx]; } j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 32); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); if (j <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; goto f_err; } ret = 1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); } end: if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return (ret); } int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) { int i, ok, al, ret = -1; X509 *x = NULL; unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; const unsigned char *p, *q; unsigned char *d; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } /* * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } n2l3(p, llen); if (llen + 3 != n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { n2l3(p, l); if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } q = p; x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (p != (q + l)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x = NULL; nc += l + 3; } if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } else { EVP_PKEY *pkey; i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); if (i <= 0) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto f_err; } if (i > 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); if (pkey == NULL) { al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto f_err; } EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } X509_free(s->session->peer); s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; /* * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we * arrive here. */ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ sk = NULL; ret = 1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); } err: X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return (ret); } int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); if (cpk == NULL) { /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return (0); } } if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return (0); } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) { unsigned char *senc = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; HMAC_CTX hctx; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { unsigned char *p, *macstart; const unsigned char *const_p; int len, slen_full, slen; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned int hlen; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[16]; /* get session encoding length */ slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); /* * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too * long */ if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) return -1; senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); if (!senc) return -1; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); p = senc; if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) goto err; /* * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ const_p = senc; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); if (sess == NULL) goto err; sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ SSL_SESSION_free(sess); goto err; } p = senc; if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { SSL_SESSION_free(sess); goto err; } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); /*- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows handshake_header_length + * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) goto err; p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) goto err; } else { if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) goto err; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) goto err; memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); } /* * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. */ l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); /* Skip ticket length for now */ p += 2; /* Output key name */ macstart = p; memcpy(p, key_name, 16); p += 16; /* output IV */ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); /* Encrypt session data */ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) goto err; p += len; if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) goto err; p += len; if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) goto err; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); p += hlen; /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ /* Total length */ len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; s2n(len - 6, p); if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len)) goto err; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; OPENSSL_free(senc); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); err: if (senc) OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); return -1; } int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { unsigned char *p; /*- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) * + (ocsp response) */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) return -1; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* do the header */ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; /* message length */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); /* status type */ *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; /* length of OCSP response */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); /* actual response */ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; s->init_off = 0; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. * It sets the next_proto member in s if found */ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) { int ok; int proto_len, padding_len; long n; const unsigned char *p; /* * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the * extension in their ClientHello */ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); return -1; } /* See the payload format below */ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); /* * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by * ssl3_get_finished). */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); return -1; } if (n < 2) return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /*- * The payload looks like: * uint8 proto_len; * uint8 proto[proto_len]; * uint8 padding_len; * uint8 padding[padding_len]; */ proto_len = p[0]; if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) return 0; padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) return 0; s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; return 1; } # endif #endif