1. 03 12月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      Remove legacy sign/verify from EVP_MD. · 7f572e95
      Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
      Remove sign/verify and required_pkey_type fields of EVP_MD: these are a
      legacy from when digests were linked to public key types. All signing is
      now handled by the corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD.
      
      Only allow supported digest types in RSA EVP_PKEY_METHOD: other algorithms
      already block unsupported types.
      
      Remove now obsolete EVP_dss1() and EVP_ecdsa().
      Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      7f572e95
  2. 28 11月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      PRF and handshake hash revision. · 28ba2541
      Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
      Change handshake hash array into a single digest context simplifying the
      handhake hash code. Use EVP_md5_sha1() if needed for handshake hashes in
      TLS 1.1 and earlier.
      
      Simplify PRF code to also use a single digest and treat EVP_md5_sha1()
      as a special case.
      
      Modify algorithm2 field of ciphers to use a single index value for handshake
      hash and PRF instead of a bitmap.
      Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      28ba2541
  3. 14 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  4. 23 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  5. 11 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  6. 28 1月, 2015 1 次提交
    • R
      OPENSSL_NO_xxx cleanup: SHA · 474e469b
      Rich Salz 提交于
      Remove support for SHA0 and DSS0 (they were broken), and remove
      the ability to attempt to build without SHA (it didn't work).
      For simplicity, remove the option of not building various SHA algorithms;
      you could argue that SHA_224/256/384/512 should be kept, since they're
      like crypto algorithms, but I decided to go the other way.
      So these options are gone:
      	GENUINE_DSA         OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
      	OPENSSL_NO_SHA      OPENSSL_NO_SHA1
      	OPENSSL_NO_SHA224   OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
      	OPENSSL_NO_SHA384   OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
      Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      474e469b
  7. 22 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  8. 04 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  9. 14 5月, 2013 1 次提交
  10. 06 2月, 2013 2 次提交
    • A
      e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c: address the CBC decrypt timing issues. · 9970308c
      Andy Polyakov 提交于
      Address CBC decrypt timing issues and reenable the AESNI+SHA1 stitch.
      (cherry picked from commit 125093b59f3c2a2d33785b5563d929d0472f1721)
      9970308c
    • B
      Make CBC decoding constant time. · 2acc020b
      Ben Laurie 提交于
      This patch makes the decoding of SSLv3 and TLS CBC records constant
      time. Without this, a timing side-channel can be used to build a padding
      oracle and mount Vaudenay's attack.
      
      This patch also disables the stitched AESNI+SHA mode pending a similar
      fix to that code.
      
      In order to be easy to backport, this change is implemented in ssl/,
      rather than as a generic AEAD mode. In the future this should be changed
      around so that HMAC isn't in ssl/, but crypto/ as FIPS expects.
      (cherry picked from commit e130841bccfc0bb9da254dc84e23bc6a1c78a64e)
      2acc020b
  11. 10 10月, 2011 1 次提交
  12. 24 8月, 2011 1 次提交
  13. 07 4月, 2010 1 次提交
  14. 20 1月, 2010 1 次提交
  15. 08 7月, 2009 1 次提交
  16. 24 4月, 2007 1 次提交
  17. 09 6月, 2006 1 次提交
  18. 22 8月, 2005 1 次提交
  19. 06 10月, 2003 1 次提交
  20. 09 8月, 2002 1 次提交
    • B
      ECC ciphersuite support · ea262260
      Bodo Möller 提交于
      Submitted by: Douglas Stebila <douglas.stebila@sun.com>
      (Authors: Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta, Sun Microsystems Laboratories)
      ea262260
  21. 20 2月, 2001 1 次提交
  22. 08 2月, 2001 1 次提交
    • D
      · deb2c1a1
      Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
      Fix AES code.
      
      Update Rijndael source to v3.0
      
      Add AES OIDs.
      
      Change most references of Rijndael to AES.
      
      Add new draft AES ciphersuites.
      deb2c1a1
  23. 06 2月, 2001 1 次提交
  24. 23 1月, 2001 1 次提交
  25. 08 6月, 1999 1 次提交
  26. 27 4月, 1999 1 次提交
  27. 24 4月, 1999 1 次提交
  28. 20 4月, 1999 1 次提交
  29. 16 2月, 1999 1 次提交
    • M
      Updates to the new SSL compression code · 413c4f45
      Mark J. Cox 提交于
           [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
      
      Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
           via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
           (because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
           is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
           [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
      
      Submitted by:
      Reviewed by:
      PR:
      413c4f45
  30. 21 12月, 1998 3 次提交