Give the API new names, document it.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

A new X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() function sets the
authentication security level.  For verification of SSL peers, this
is automatically set from the SSL security level.  Otherwise, for
now, the authentication security level remains at (effectively) 0
by default.

The new "-auth_level" verify(1) option is available in all the
command-line tools that support the standard verify(1) options.

New verify(1) tests added to check enforcement of chain signature
and public key security levels.  Also added new tests of enforcement
of the verify_depth limit.

Updated documentation.
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reverts commit 087ca80a

Instead of battling the odd format of argv given to main() in default
P64 mode, tell the compiler to make it an array of 64-bit pointers
when compiling in P64 mode.

A note is added in NOTES.VMS regarding minimum DEC C version.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

The argument 'argv' in 'main' is a short pointer to a short pointer on
VMS, regardless of initial pointer size.  We must therefore make sure
that 'copy_argv' gets a 32-bit pointer for argv, and that the copied
argv is used for the rest of main().

This introduces the local type argv_t, which will have correct pointer
size in all cases (and be harmless on all other platforms) as well as
the macro Argv, which is defined as 'copied_argv' or 'argv', as the
case may be.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Don't have #error statements in header files, but instead wrap
the contents of that file in #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx
This means it is now always safe to include the header file.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This reverts commit a45d7d53.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Also improves some documentation of those functions.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

* Perform ALPN after the SNI callback; the SSL_CTX may change due to
  that processing
* Add flags to indicate that we actually sent ALPN, to properly error
  out if unexpectedly received.
* clean up ssl3_free() no need to explicitly clear when doing memset
* document ALPN functions
Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NBen Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Fixes github issue 463.  Building the app without OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
isn't supported, so only do OPENSSL_NO_OCSP.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

On some platforms, the implementation is such that a signed char
triggers a warning when used with is*() functions.  On others, the
behavior is outright buggy when presented with a char that happens
to get promoted to a negative integer.

The safest thing is to cast the char that's used to an unsigned char.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Make these more correct, concise and less tautological.
Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

This was a developer debugging feature and was never a useful public
interface.

Added all missing X509 error codes to the verify(1) manpage, but
many still need a description beyond the associated text string.

Sorted the errors in x509_txt.c by error number.
Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

    * added missing help option messages
    * ecdh_single option is removed as it is a no-op and not an option
    supported in earlier versions
    * ssl_ctx_security_debug() was invoked before ctx check for NULL
    * trusted_first option can be removed, as it is always enabled in 1.1.
    But not removed the option, require confirmation.
Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

opt_valtype 0 is same as '-' while printing cmd usage
asn1parse/ca/ciphers help cleanup
Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

CRIME protection: disable compression by default, even if OpenSSL is
compiled with zlib enabled. Applications can still enable compression by
calling SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION), or by using
the SSL_CONF library to configure compression. SSL_CONF continues to
work as before:

SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Options", "Compression") enables compression.

SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Options", "-Compression") disables compression (now
no-op by default).

The command-line switch has changed from -no_comp to -comp.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Also fix option processing in pkeyutl to allow use of (formerly)
"out-of-order" switches that were needless implementation limitations.

Handle documented "ENGINE" form with -keyform and -peerform.

Better handling of OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE and OPENSSL_NO_RSA.

RT2018
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Not all architectures have a time_t defined the same way.  To make
sure we get the same result, we need to cast &checkoffset to (intmax_t *)
and make sure that intmax_t is defined somehow.

To make really sure we don't pass a variable with the wrong size down
to opt_imax(), we use a temporary intmax_t.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This was done by the following
        find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
        print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
        close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.

And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Well, I'm not actually changing time_t, just changing how time_t
valued opt values are converted from string to time_t.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

s_server already had the ability to wait on an async file descriptor. This
adds it to s_client too.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

For those command line options that take the verification options
-CApath and -CAfile, if those options are absent then the default path or
file is used instead. It is not currently possible to specify *no* path or
file at all. This change adds the options -no-CApath and -no-CAfile to
specify that the default locations should not be used to all relevant
applications.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Real fix for RT 4033
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

-Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers (the latter did not require
any code changes).
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

If the output to stdout or the input from stdin is meant to be binary,
it's deeply unsetting to get the occasional LF converted to CRLF or
the other way around.  If someone happens to forget to redirect stdin
or stdout, they will get gibberish anyway, line ending conversion will
not change that.

Therefore, let's not have dup_bio_* decide unilaterally what mode the
BIO derived from stdin and stdout, and rather let the app decide by
declaring the intended format.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The different apps had the liberty to decide whether they would open their
input and output files in binary mode or not, which could be confusing if
two different apps were handling the same type of file in different ways.

The solution is to centralise the decision of low level file organisation,
and that the apps would use a selection of formats to state the intent of
the file.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Most of all, we needed to sort out which ones are binary and which
ones are text, and make sure they are treated accordingly and
consistently so
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>