From ff7231043f1f348764fdf3463e73cf7ed9d3ce85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2011 14:23:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] make timing attack protection unconditional --- crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c index 8b407c5470..acdeea83d4 100644 --- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c @@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, } while (BN_is_zero(k)); -#ifdef ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME /* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed * bit-length. */ @@ -159,7 +158,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err; if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order)) if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err; -#endif /* def(ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME) */ /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) -- GitLab