提交 bf95cde2 编写于 作者: M Matt Caswell

Fix SRP memory leaks

There were some memory leaks in the creation of an SRP verifier (both on
successful completion and also on some error paths).
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
上级 dfd6211c
......@@ -522,12 +522,12 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g)
{
int len;
char *result = NULL;
char *vf;
char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL;
BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
char *defgNid = NULL;
int vfsize = 0;
if ((user == NULL) ||
(pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL))
......@@ -565,22 +565,23 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
goto err;
BN_bn2bin(v, tmp);
if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(BN_num_bytes(v) * 2)) == NULL))
vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2;
if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL))
goto err;
t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v));
*verifier = vf;
if (*salt == NULL) {
char *tmp_salt;
if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(vf);
goto err;
}
t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
*salt = tmp_salt;
}
*verifier = vf;
vf = NULL;
result = defgNid;
err:
......@@ -588,11 +589,20 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
BN_free(N_bn);
BN_free(g_bn);
}
OPENSSL_clear_free(vf, vfsize);
BN_clear_free(s);
BN_clear_free(v);
return result;
}
/*
* create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs)
* create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL
* then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point
* to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not
* provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a
* random salt.
* The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier
* BIGNUMS.
*/
int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
BIGNUM **verifier, const BIGNUM *N,
......@@ -602,6 +612,7 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
BIGNUM *x = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL;
if ((user == NULL) ||
(pass == NULL) ||
......@@ -613,10 +624,12 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
goto err;
*salt = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
} else {
salttmp = *salt;
}
x = SRP_Calc_x(*salt, user, pass);
x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass);
*verifier = BN_new();
if (*verifier == NULL)
......@@ -628,9 +641,11 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
}
result = 1;
*salt = salttmp;
err:
if (*salt != salttmp)
BN_clear_free(salttmp);
BN_clear_free(x);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
return result;
......
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