diff --git a/demos/tunala/cb.c b/demos/tunala/cb.c
index 4633c0993e7e5e48c53287e41286fffbae433038..ac7122da4f9803ecebd328bf0be95f2b6a7a21c4 100644
--- a/demos/tunala/cb.c
+++ b/demos/tunala/cb.c
@@ -5,10 +5,15 @@
/* For callbacks generating output, here are their file-descriptors. */
static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_info = NULL;
static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_verify = NULL;
+/* Output level:
+ * 0 = nothing,
+ * 1 = minimal, just errors,
+ * 2 = minimal, all steps,
+ * 3 = detail, all steps */
+static unsigned int cb_ssl_verify_level = 1;
/* Other static rubbish (to mirror s_cb.c where required) */
static int int_verify_depth = 10;
-static int int_verify_error = X509_V_OK;
/* This function is largely borrowed from the one used in OpenSSL's "s_client"
* and "s_server" utilities. */
@@ -26,12 +31,18 @@ void cb_ssl_info(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
str2 = SSL_state_string_long(s);
if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
- fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:%s\n", str1, str2);
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "(%s) %s\n", str1, str2);
else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
if (ret == 0)
- fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:failed in %s\n", str1, str2);
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "(%s) failed in %s\n", str1, str2);
+/* In a non-blocking model, we get a few of these "error"s simply because we're
+ * calling "reads" and "writes" on the state-machine that are virtual NOPs
+ * simply to avoid wasting the time seeing if we *should* call them. Removing
+ * this case makes the "-out_state" output a lot easier on the eye. */
+#if 0
else if (ret < 0)
fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:error in %s\n", str1, str2);
+#endif
}
}
@@ -40,52 +51,65 @@ void cb_ssl_info_set_output(FILE *fp)
fp_cb_ssl_info = fp;
}
-/* Stolen wholesale from apps/s_cb.c :-) */
+static const char *int_reason_no_issuer = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT";
+static const char *int_reason_not_yet = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID";
+static const char *int_reason_before = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD";
+static const char *int_reason_expired = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED";
+static const char *int_reason_after = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD";
+
+/* Stolen wholesale from apps/s_cb.c :-) And since then, mutilated ... */
int cb_ssl_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- char buf[256];
+ char buf1[256]; /* Used for the subject name */
+ char buf2[256]; /* Used for the issuer name */
+ const char *reason = NULL; /* Error reason (if any) */
X509 *err_cert;
int err, depth;
- BIO *bio;
- if(!fp_cb_ssl_verify)
+ if(!fp_cb_ssl_verify || (cb_ssl_verify_level == 0))
return ok;
- /* There's no FILE* version of ASN1_TIME_print */
- bio = BIO_new_fp(fp_cb_ssl_verify, BIO_NOCLOSE);
err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
- fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "depth=%d %s\n", depth, buf);
- if(!ok) {
- fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify,"verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
- if((int)int_verify_depth >= depth)
- int_verify_error = err;
- else
- int_verify_error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
- }
+ buf1[0] = buf2[0] = '\0';
+ /* Fill buf1 */
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf1, 256);
+ /* Fill buf2 */
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf2, 256);
switch (ctx->error) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert),
- buf, 256);
- fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "issuer= %s\n", buf);
+ reason = int_reason_no_issuer;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ reason = int_reason_not_yet;
+ break;
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
- fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "notBefore=");
- ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
- fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "\n");
+ reason = int_reason_before;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ reason = int_reason_expired;
+ break;
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
- fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "notAfter=");
- ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
- fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "\n");
+ reason = int_reason_after;
break;
}
- fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "verify return:%d\n",ok);
+
+ if((cb_ssl_verify_level == 1) && ok)
+ return ok;
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
+ if(reason)
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "error=%s\n", reason);
+ else
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "error=%d\n", err);
+ if(cb_ssl_verify_level < 3)
+ return ok;
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> subject = %s\n", buf1);
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> issuer = %s\n", buf2);
+ if(!ok)
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify,"--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> verify return:%d\n",ok);
return ok;
}
@@ -99,5 +123,11 @@ void cb_ssl_verify_set_depth(unsigned int verify_depth)
int_verify_depth = verify_depth;
}
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_level(unsigned int level)
+{
+ if(level < 4)
+ cb_ssl_verify_level = level;
+}
+
#endif /* !defined(NO_OPENSSL) */
diff --git a/demos/tunala/tunala.c b/demos/tunala/tunala.c
index 19d7d1150d8d0ac97268e0eafd47f207a5b142f4..2b3d65d98cc6da5c83f076c2adf585937c68bc67 100644
--- a/demos/tunala/tunala.c
+++ b/demos/tunala/tunala.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static const char *def_engine_id = NULL;
static int def_server_mode = 0;
static const char *def_cipher_list = NULL;
static int def_out_state = 0;
-static int def_out_verify = 0;
+static unsigned int def_out_verify = 0;
static int def_verify_mode = 0;
static unsigned int def_verify_depth = 10;
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static const char *helpstring =
" -server <0|1> (default = 0, ie. an SSL client)\n"
" -cipher (specifies cipher list to use)\n"
" -out_state (prints SSL handshake states)\n"
-" -out_verify (prints certificate verification states)\n"
+" -out_verify <0|1|2|3> (prints certificate verification states: def=1)\n"
" -v_peer (verify the peer certificate)\n"
" -v_strict (do not continue if peer doesn't authenticate)\n"
" -v_once (no verification in renegotiates)\n"
@@ -180,6 +180,20 @@ static int parse_server_mode(const char *s, int *servermode)
return 1;
}
+static int parse_verify_level(const char *s, unsigned int *verify_level)
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+ char *temp;
+ l = strtoul(s, &temp, 10);
+ if((temp == s) || (*temp != '\0') || (l > 3)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, '%s' is an invalid value for "
+ "out_verify\n", s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *verify_level = (unsigned int)l;
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int parse_verify_depth(const char *s, unsigned int *verify_depth)
{
unsigned long l;
@@ -215,7 +229,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
int server_mode = def_server_mode;
const char *cipher_list = def_cipher_list;
int out_state = def_out_state;
- int out_verify = def_out_verify;
+ unsigned int out_verify = def_out_verify;
int verify_mode = def_verify_mode;
unsigned int verify_depth = def_verify_depth;
@@ -310,7 +324,11 @@ next_arg:
out_state = 1;
goto next_arg;
} else if(strcmp(*argv, "-out_verify") == 0) {
- out_verify = 1;
+ if(argc < 2)
+ return usage("-out_verify requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--; argv++;
+ if(!parse_verify_level(*argv, &out_verify))
+ return 1;
goto next_arg;
} else if(strcmp(*argv, "-v_peer") == 0) {
verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
@@ -570,8 +588,10 @@ static SSL_CTX *initialise_ssl_ctx(int server_mode, const char *engine_id,
cb_ssl_info_set_output(stderr);
/* out_verify */
- if(out_verify)
+ if(out_verify > 0) {
cb_ssl_verify_set_output(stderr);
+ cb_ssl_verify_set_level(out_verify);
+ }
/* verify_depth */
cb_ssl_verify_set_depth(verify_depth);
@@ -857,7 +877,7 @@ static int tunala_item_io(tunala_selector_t *selector, tunala_item_t *item)
return 0;
}
if((item->dirty_read == -1) || (item->dirty_send == -1)) {
- if(state_machine_close_dirty(&item->sm))
+ if(!state_machine_close_dirty(&item->sm))
return 0;
}
return 1;
diff --git a/demos/tunala/tunala.h b/demos/tunala/tunala.h
index 1aaa3e0ab7f76f962390f85e16a02e0a1095fb37..7d4e35dc9c68e9bcd8e652122992a6da31f2a921 100644
--- a/demos/tunala/tunala.h
+++ b/demos/tunala/tunala.h
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ void cb_ssl_info_set_output(FILE *fp); /* Called if output should be sent too */
int cb_ssl_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
void cb_ssl_verify_set_output(FILE *fp);
void cb_ssl_verify_set_depth(unsigned int verify_depth);
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_level(unsigned int level);
#endif /* !defined(NO_OPENSSL) */
#endif /* !defined(NO_BUFFER) */