From 248385c606620b29ecc96ca9d3603463f879652b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Caswell Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2015 00:54:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane. Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson --- ssl/d1_pkt.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c index 9badc5e3f2..1028e41b56 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c +++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c @@ -679,7 +679,8 @@ again: * would be dropped unnecessarily. */ if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && - *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && + s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH && + s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; -- GitLab