提交 0fe17491 编写于 作者: A Andy Polyakov 提交者: Matt Caswell

Don't switch password formats using global state.

To avoid possible race conditions don't switch password format using
global state in crypto/pkcs12
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
上级 cc069067
......@@ -17,16 +17,6 @@ void PKCS12_PBE_add(void)
{
}
#undef PKCS12_key_gen
/*
* See p12_multi.c:PKCS12_verify_mac() for details...
*/
extern int (*PKCS12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *salt, int slen,
int id, int iter, int n,
unsigned char *out,
const EVP_MD *md_type);
int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
......@@ -41,13 +31,7 @@ int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *out,
const EVP_MD *md_type);
if (PKCS12_key_gen == NULL || en_de)
/*
* Default to UTF-8, but force it in encrypt case.
*/
pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
else
pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen;
if (cipher == NULL)
return 0;
......
......@@ -41,13 +41,3 @@ struct pkcs12_bag_st {
ASN1_TYPE *other; /* Secret or other bag */
} value;
};
#undef PKCS12_key_gen
/*
* See p12_multi.c:PKCS12_verify_mac() for details...
*/
extern int (*PKCS12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *salt, int slen,
int id, int iter, int n,
unsigned char *out,
const EVP_MD *md_type);
......@@ -66,32 +66,6 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(const char *pass, int passlen,
return 1;
}
#undef PKCS12_key_gen
/*
* |PKCS12_key_gen| is used to convey information about old-style broken
* password being used to PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen in decrypt cases. Workflow
* is if PKCS12_verify_mac notes that password encoded with compliant
* PKCS12_key_gen_utf8 conversion subroutine isn't right, while encoded
* with legacy non-compliant one is, then it sets |PKCS12_key_gen| to
* legacy PKCS12_key_gen_asc conversion subroutine, which is then picked
* by PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen. This applies to reading data. Written data
* on the other hand is protected with standard-compliant encoding, i.e.
* in backward-incompatible manner. Note that formally the approach is
* not MT-safe. Rationale is that in order to access PKCS#12 files from
* MT or even production application, you would be required to convert
* data to correct interoperable format. In which case this variable
* won't have to change. Conversion would have to be done with pkcs12
* utility, which is not MT, and hence can tolerate it. In other words
* goal is not to make this heuristic approach work in general case,
* but in one specific one, apps/pkcs12.c.
*/
int (*PKCS12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *salt, int slen,
int id, int iter, int n,
unsigned char *out,
const EVP_MD *md_type) = NULL;
/* Generate a MAC */
static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen,
......@@ -110,8 +84,6 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
const X509_ALGOR *macalg;
const ASN1_OBJECT *macoid;
if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL)
pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen;
if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL)
pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
......@@ -187,30 +159,10 @@ int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen)
return 0;
}
X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
if (maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
return 0;
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0) {
if (pass == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* In order to facilitate accessing old data retry with
* old-style broken password ...
*/
if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen,
PKCS12_key_gen_asc)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
return 0;
else
PKCS12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_asc;
/*
* ... and if suceeded, pass it on to PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen.
*/
}
return 1;
}
......
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