diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 7613a28f157e185ec62f761e8d5b97b355989d85..6834000640d70944baf0f4375ba71b46ef0b6831 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -213,6 +213,144 @@ static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_remove = {
 	.llseek = default_llseek,
 };
 
+/**
+ * query_data - queries a policy and writes its data to buf
+ * @buf: the resulting data is stored here (NOT NULL)
+ * @buf_len: size of buf
+ * @query: query string used to retrieve data
+ * @query_len: size of query including second NUL byte
+ *
+ * The buffers pointed to by buf and query may overlap. The query buffer is
+ * parsed before buf is written to.
+ *
+ * The query should look like "<LABEL>\0<KEY>\0", where <LABEL> is the name of
+ * the security confinement context and <KEY> is the name of the data to
+ * retrieve. <LABEL> and <KEY> must not be NUL-terminated.
+ *
+ * Don't expect the contents of buf to be preserved on failure.
+ *
+ * Returns: number of characters written to buf or -errno on failure
+ */
+static ssize_t query_data(char *buf, size_t buf_len,
+			  char *query, size_t query_len)
+{
+	char *out;
+	const char *key;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_data *data;
+	u32 bytes, blocks;
+	__le32 outle32;
+
+	if (!query_len)
+		return -EINVAL; /* need a query */
+
+	key = query + strnlen(query, query_len) + 1;
+	if (key + 1 >= query + query_len)
+		return -EINVAL; /* not enough space for a non-empty key */
+	if (key + strnlen(key, query + query_len - key) >= query + query_len)
+		return -EINVAL; /* must end with NUL */
+
+	if (buf_len < sizeof(bytes) + sizeof(blocks))
+		return -EINVAL; /* not enough space */
+
+	profile = aa_current_profile();
+
+	/* We are going to leave space for two numbers. The first is the total
+	 * number of bytes we are writing after the first number. This is so
+	 * users can read the full output without reallocation.
+	 *
+	 * The second number is the number of data blocks we're writing. An
+	 * application might be confined by multiple policies having data in
+	 * the same key.
+	 */
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(bytes) + sizeof(blocks));
+	out = buf + sizeof(bytes) + sizeof(blocks);
+
+	blocks = 0;
+	if (profile->data) {
+		data = rhashtable_lookup_fast(profile->data, &key,
+					      profile->data->p);
+
+		if (data) {
+			if (out + sizeof(outle32) + data->size > buf + buf_len)
+				return -EINVAL; /* not enough space */
+			outle32 = __cpu_to_le32(data->size);
+			memcpy(out, &outle32, sizeof(outle32));
+			out += sizeof(outle32);
+			memcpy(out, data->data, data->size);
+			out += data->size;
+			blocks++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	outle32 = __cpu_to_le32(out - buf - sizeof(bytes));
+	memcpy(buf, &outle32, sizeof(outle32));
+	outle32 = __cpu_to_le32(blocks);
+	memcpy(buf + sizeof(bytes), &outle32, sizeof(outle32));
+
+	return out - buf;
+}
+
+#define QUERY_CMD_DATA		"data\0"
+#define QUERY_CMD_DATA_LEN	5
+
+/**
+ * aa_write_access - generic permissions and data query
+ * @file: pointer to open apparmorfs/access file
+ * @ubuf: user buffer containing the complete query string (NOT NULL)
+ * @count: size of ubuf
+ * @ppos: position in the file (MUST BE ZERO)
+ *
+ * Allows for one permissions or data query per open(), write(), and read()
+ * sequence. The only queries currently supported are label-based queries for
+ * permissions or data.
+ *
+ * For permissions queries, ubuf must begin with "label\0", followed by the
+ * profile query specific format described in the query_label() function
+ * documentation.
+ *
+ * For data queries, ubuf must have the form "data\0<LABEL>\0<KEY>\0", where
+ * <LABEL> is the name of the security confinement context and <KEY> is the
+ * name of the data to retrieve.
+ *
+ * Returns: number of bytes written or -errno on failure
+ */
+static ssize_t aa_write_access(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *buf;
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	if (*ppos)
+		return -ESPIPE;
+
+	buf = simple_transaction_get(file, ubuf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(buf))
+		return PTR_ERR(buf);
+
+	if (count > QUERY_CMD_DATA_LEN &&
+		   !memcmp(buf, QUERY_CMD_DATA, QUERY_CMD_DATA_LEN)) {
+		len = query_data(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
+				 buf + QUERY_CMD_DATA_LEN,
+				 count - QUERY_CMD_DATA_LEN);
+	} else
+		len = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (len < 0)
+		return len;
+
+	simple_transaction_set(file, len);
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_access = {
+	.write		= aa_write_access,
+	.read		= simple_transaction_read,
+	.release	= simple_transaction_release,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
 static int aa_fs_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 {
 	struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file = seq->private;
@@ -1078,6 +1216,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
 };
 
 static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_apparmor[] = {
+	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".access", 0640, &aa_fs_access),
 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_level", 0666, &aa_fs_ns_level),
 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_name", 0640, &aa_fs_ns_name),
 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0440, &aa_fs_profiles_fops),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index a5a997896836e9fbd8fef1824227aea2f6459b60..93b1b1f440d339d4271540a5af2c4e988bcbe9bc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/rhashtable.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/socket.h>
@@ -98,6 +99,19 @@ struct aa_proxy {
 	struct aa_profile __rcu *profile;
 };
 
+/* struct aa_data - generic data structure
+ * key: name for retrieving this data
+ * size: size of data in bytes
+ * data: binary data
+ * head: reserved for rhashtable
+ */
+struct aa_data {
+	char *key;
+	u32 size;
+	char *data;
+	struct rhash_head head;
+};
+
 
 /* struct aa_profile - basic confinement data
  * @base - base components of the profile (name, refcount, lists, lock ...)
@@ -122,6 +136,7 @@ struct aa_proxy {
  *
  * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
  * @dirname: name of the profile dir in apparmorfs
+ * @data: hashtable for free-form policy aa_data
  *
  * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data.  Each profile
  * has a name, and exists in a namespace.  The @name and @exec_match are
@@ -165,6 +180,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
 	unsigned char *hash;
 	char *dirname;
 	struct dentry *dents[AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF];
+	struct rhashtable *data;
 };
 
 extern enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 6a5cf54cfa7296c630618569440ca5b5d75fad8e..b1def70b94f1ebc3d9a70fa1f5572698c4dac22c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index bc63cf7b606add99370ebcf2d370f74461de1f23..f2c4bb26b06001afa536dd69dc14e3f4cf261e07 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -194,6 +194,20 @@ void aa_free_proxy_kref(struct kref *kref)
 	free_proxy(p);
 }
 
+/**
+ * aa_free_data - free a data blob
+ * @ptr: data to free
+ * @arg: unused
+ */
+static void aa_free_data(void *ptr, void *arg)
+{
+	struct aa_data *data = ptr;
+
+	kzfree(data->data);
+	kzfree(data->key);
+	kzfree(data);
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_free_profile - free a profile
  * @profile: the profile to free  (MAYBE NULL)
@@ -206,6 +220,8 @@ void aa_free_proxy_kref(struct kref *kref)
  */
 void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
+	struct rhashtable *rht;
+
 	AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
 
 	if (!profile)
@@ -227,6 +243,13 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
 	aa_put_proxy(profile->proxy);
 
+	if (profile->data) {
+		rht = profile->data;
+		profile->data = NULL;
+		rhashtable_free_and_destroy(rht, aa_free_data, NULL);
+		kzfree(rht);
+	}
+
 	kzfree(profile->hash);
 	aa_put_loaddata(profile->rawdata);
 	kzfree(profile);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 59c891ad127023f8061b33bb31be359d0eb58765..4f61d40e29b0fec7a7ea1a6c5230bcdd12bf5d39 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -485,6 +485,30 @@ static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void *kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+	void *p = kvmalloc(len);
+
+	if (p)
+		memcpy(p, src, len);
+	return p;
+}
+
+static u32 strhash(const void *data, u32 len, u32 seed)
+{
+	const char * const *key = data;
+
+	return jhash(*key, strlen(*key), seed);
+}
+
+static int datacmp(struct rhashtable_compare_arg *arg, const void *obj)
+{
+	const struct aa_data *data = obj;
+	const char * const *key = arg->key;
+
+	return strcmp(data->key, *key);
+}
+
 /**
  * unpack_profile - unpack a serialized profile
  * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL)
@@ -496,6 +520,9 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
 	const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL;
 	size_t ns_len;
+	struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 };
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct aa_data *data;
 	int i, error = -EPROTO;
 	kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
 	u32 tmp;
@@ -654,6 +681,45 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 	if (!unpack_trans_table(e, profile))
 		goto fail;
 
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "data")) {
+		profile->data = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile->data), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!profile->data)
+			goto fail;
+
+		params.nelem_hint = 3;
+		params.key_len = sizeof(void *);
+		params.key_offset = offsetof(struct aa_data, key);
+		params.head_offset = offsetof(struct aa_data, head);
+		params.hashfn = strhash;
+		params.obj_cmpfn = datacmp;
+
+		if (rhashtable_init(profile->data, &params))
+			goto fail;
+
+		while (unpack_strdup(e, &key, NULL)) {
+			data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!data) {
+				kzfree(key);
+				goto fail;
+			}
+
+			data->key = key;
+			data->size = unpack_blob(e, &data->data, NULL);
+			data->data = kvmemdup(data->data, data->size);
+			if (data->size && !data->data) {
+				kzfree(data->key);
+				kzfree(data);
+				goto fail;
+			}
+
+			rhashtable_insert_fast(profile->data, &data->head,
+					       profile->data->p);
+		}
+
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
 	if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
 		goto fail;