From 635efc702984857b45a2a2491ed7a529e14cbdf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2016 19:56:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] tile/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace Close the hole where ptrace can change a syscall out from under seccomp. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Cc: Chris Metcalf --- arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c index 8c6d2f2fefa3..d89b7011667c 100644 --- a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -255,14 +255,15 @@ int do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { u32 work = ACCESS_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags); - if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) + if ((work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) && + tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) { + regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1; return -1; - - if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) { - if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) - regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1; } + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) + return -1; + if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT) trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR]); -- GitLab