# Master configuration file for the QEMU driver. # All settings described here are optional - if omitted, sensible # defaults are used. # VNC is configured to listen on 127.0.0.1 by default. # To make it listen on all public interfaces, uncomment # this next option. # # NB, strong recommendation to enable TLS + x509 certificate # verification when allowing public access # #vnc_listen = "0.0.0.0" # Enable this option to have VNC served over an automatically created # unix socket. This prevents unprivileged access from users on the # host machine, though most VNC clients do not support it. # # This will only be enabled for VNC configurations that do not have # a hardcoded 'listen' or 'socket' value. This setting takes preference # over vnc_listen. # #vnc_auto_unix_socket = 1 # Enable use of TLS encryption on the VNC server. This requires # a VNC client which supports the VeNCrypt protocol extension. # Examples include vinagre, virt-viewer, virt-manager and vencrypt # itself. UltraVNC, RealVNC, TightVNC do not support this # # It is necessary to setup CA and issue a server certificate # before enabling this. # #vnc_tls = 1 # Use of TLS requires that x509 certificates be issued. The # default it to keep them in /etc/pki/libvirt-vnc. This directory # must contain # # ca-cert.pem - the CA master certificate # server-cert.pem - the server certificate signed with ca-cert.pem # server-key.pem - the server private key # # This option allows the certificate directory to be changed # #vnc_tls_x509_cert_dir = "/etc/pki/libvirt-vnc" # The default TLS configuration only uses certificates for the server # allowing the client to verify the server's identity and establish # an encrypted channel. # # It is possible to use x509 certificates for authentication too, by # issuing a x509 certificate to every client who needs to connect. # # Enabling this option will reject any client who does not have a # certificate signed by the CA in /etc/pki/libvirt-vnc/ca-cert.pem # #vnc_tls_x509_verify = 1 # The default VNC password. Only 8 letters are significant for # VNC passwords. This parameter is only used if the per-domain # XML config does not already provide a password. To allow # access without passwords, leave this commented out. An empty # string will still enable passwords, but be rejected by QEMU, # effectively preventing any use of VNC. Obviously change this # example here before you set this. # #vnc_password = "XYZ12345" # Enable use of SASL encryption on the VNC server. This requires # a VNC client which supports the SASL protocol extension. # Examples include vinagre, virt-viewer and virt-manager # itself. UltraVNC, RealVNC, TightVNC do not support this # # It is necessary to configure /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf to choose # the desired SASL plugin (eg, GSSPI for Kerberos) # #vnc_sasl = 1 # The default SASL configuration file is located in /etc/sasl2/ # When running libvirtd unprivileged, it may be desirable to # override the configs in this location. Set this parameter to # point to the directory, and create a qemu.conf in that location # #vnc_sasl_dir = "/some/directory/sasl2" # QEMU implements an extension for providing audio over a VNC connection, # though if your VNC client does not support it, your only chance for getting # sound output is through regular audio backends. By default, libvirt will # disable all QEMU sound backends if using VNC, since they can cause # permissions issues. Enabling this option will make libvirtd honor the # QEMU_AUDIO_DRV environment variable when using VNC. # #vnc_allow_host_audio = 0 # SPICE is configured to listen on 127.0.0.1 by default. # To make it listen on all public interfaces, uncomment # this next option. # # NB, strong recommendation to enable TLS + x509 certificate # verification when allowing public access # #spice_listen = "0.0.0.0" # Enable use of TLS encryption on the SPICE server. # # It is necessary to setup CA and issue a server certificate # before enabling this. # #spice_tls = 1 # Use of TLS requires that x509 certificates be issued. The # default it to keep them in /etc/pki/libvirt-spice. This directory # must contain # # ca-cert.pem - the CA master certificate # server-cert.pem - the server certificate signed with ca-cert.pem # server-key.pem - the server private key # # This option allows the certificate directory to be changed. # #spice_tls_x509_cert_dir = "/etc/pki/libvirt-spice" # The default SPICE password. This parameter is only used if the # per-domain XML config does not already provide a password. To # allow access without passwords, leave this commented out. An # empty string will still enable passwords, but be rejected by # QEMU, effectively preventing any use of SPICE. Obviously change # this example here before you set this. # #spice_password = "XYZ12345" # Override the port for creating both VNC and SPICE sessions (min). # This defaults to 5900 and increases for consecutive sessions # or when ports are occupied, until it hits the maximum. # # Minimum must be greater than or equal to 5900 as lower number would # result into negative vnc display number. # # Maximum must be less than 65536, because higher numbers do not make # sense as a port number. # #remote_display_port_min = 5900 #remote_display_port_max = 65535 # The default security driver is SELinux. If SELinux is disabled # on the host, then the security driver will automatically disable # itself. If you wish to disable QEMU SELinux security driver while # leaving SELinux enabled for the host in general, then set this # to 'none' instead. It's also possible to use more than one security # driver at the same time, for this use a list of names separated by # comma and delimited by square brackets. For example: # # security_driver = [ "selinux", "apparmor" ] # # Notes: The DAC security driver is always enabled; as a result, the # value of security_driver cannot contain "dac". The value "none" is # a special value; security_driver can be set to that value in # isolation, but it cannot appear in a list of drivers. # #security_driver = "selinux" # If set to non-zero, then the default security labeling # will make guests confined. If set to zero, then guests # will be unconfined by default. Defaults to 1. #security_default_confined = 1 # If set to non-zero, then attempts to create unconfined # guests will be blocked. Defaults to 0. #security_require_confined = 1 # The user ID for QEMU processes run by the system instance. #user = "root" # The group ID for QEMU processes run by the system instance. #group = "root" # Whether libvirt should dynamically change file ownership # to match the configured user/group above. Defaults to 1. # Set to 0 to disable file ownership changes. #dynamic_ownership = 1 # What cgroup controllers to make use of with QEMU guests # # - 'cpu' - use for schedular tunables # - 'devices' - use for device whitelisting # - 'memory' - use for memory tunables # - 'blkio' - use for block devices I/O tunables # - 'cpuset' - use for CPUs and memory nodes # - 'cpuacct' - use for CPUs statistics. # # NB, even if configured here, they won't be used unless # the administrator has mounted cgroups, e.g.: # # mkdir /dev/cgroup # mount -t cgroup -o devices,cpu,memory,blkio,cpuset none /dev/cgroup # # They can be mounted anywhere, and different controllers # can be mounted in different locations. libvirt will detect # where they are located. # #cgroup_controllers = [ "cpu", "devices", "memory", "blkio", "cpuset", "cpuacct" ] # This is the basic set of devices allowed / required by # all virtual machines. # # As well as this, any configured block backed disks, # all sound device, and all PTY devices are allowed. # # This will only need setting if newer QEMU suddenly # wants some device we don't already know about. # #cgroup_device_acl = [ # "/dev/null", "/dev/full", "/dev/zero", # "/dev/random", "/dev/urandom", # "/dev/ptmx", "/dev/kvm", "/dev/kqemu", # "/dev/rtc","/dev/hpet" #] # The default format for Qemu/KVM guest save images is raw; that is, the # memory from the domain is dumped out directly to a file. If you have # guests with a large amount of memory, however, this can take up quite # a bit of space. If you would like to compress the images while they # are being saved to disk, you can also set "lzop", "gzip", "bzip2", or "xz" # for save_image_format. Note that this means you slow down the process of # saving a domain in order to save disk space; the list above is in descending # order by performance and ascending order by compression ratio. # # save_image_format is used when you use 'virsh save' at scheduled # saving, and it is an error if the specified save_image_format is # not valid, or the requested compression program can't be found. # # dump_image_format is used when you use 'virsh dump' at emergency # crashdump, and if the specified dump_image_format is not valid, or # the requested compression program can't be found, this falls # back to "raw" compression. # #save_image_format = "raw" #dump_image_format = "raw" # When a domain is configured to be auto-dumped when libvirtd receives a # watchdog event from qemu guest, libvirtd will save dump files in directory # specified by auto_dump_path. Default value is /var/lib/libvirt/qemu/dump # #auto_dump_path = "/var/lib/libvirt/qemu/dump" # When a domain is configured to be auto-dumped, enabling this flag # has the same effect as using the VIR_DUMP_BYPASS_CACHE flag with the # virDomainCoreDump API. That is, the system will avoid using the # file system cache while writing the dump file, but may cause # slower operation. # #auto_dump_bypass_cache = 0 # When a domain is configured to be auto-started, enabling this flag # has the same effect as using the VIR_DOMAIN_START_BYPASS_CACHE flag # with the virDomainCreateWithFlags API. That is, the system will # avoid using the file system cache when restoring any managed state # file, but may cause slower operation. # #auto_start_bypass_cache = 0 # If provided by the host and a hugetlbfs mount point is configured, # a guest may request huge page backing. When this mount point is # unspecified here, determination of a host mount point in /proc/mounts # will be attempted. Specifying an explicit mount overrides detection # of the same in /proc/mounts. Setting the mount point to "" will # disable guest hugepage backing. # # NB, within this mount point, guests will create memory backing files # in a location of $MOUNTPOINT/libvirt/qemu # #hugetlbfs_mount = "/dev/hugepages" # If clear_emulator_capabilities is enabled, libvirt will drop all # privileged capabilities of the QEmu/KVM emulator. This is enabled by # default. # # Warning: Disabling this option means that a compromised guest can # exploit the privileges and possibly do damage to the host. # #clear_emulator_capabilities = 1 # If enabled, libvirt will have QEMU set its process name to # "qemu:VM_NAME", where VM_NAME is the name of the VM. The QEMU # process will appear as "qemu:VM_NAME" in process listings and # other system monitoring tools. By default, QEMU does not set # its process title, so the complete QEMU command (emulator and # its arguments) appear in process listings. # #set_process_name = 1 # If max_processes is set to a positive integer, libvirt will use # it to set the maximum number of processes that can be run by qemu # user. This can be used to override default value set by host OS. # The same applies to max_files which sets the limit on the maximum # number of opened files. # #max_processes = 0 #max_files = 0 # mac_filter enables MAC addressed based filtering on bridge ports. # This currently requires ebtables to be installed. # #mac_filter = 1 # By default, PCI devices below non-ACS switch are not allowed to be assigned # to guests. By setting relaxed_acs_check to 1 such devices will be allowed to # be assigned to guests. # #relaxed_acs_check = 1 # If allow_disk_format_probing is enabled, libvirt will probe disk # images to attempt to identify their format, when not otherwise # specified in the XML. This is disabled by default. # # WARNING: Enabling probing is a security hole in almost all # deployments. It is strongly recommended that users update their # guest XML elements to include # elements instead of enabling this option. # #allow_disk_format_probing = 1 # To enable 'Sanlock' project based locking of the file # content (to prevent two VMs writing to the same # disk), uncomment this # #lock_manager = "sanlock" # Set limit of maximum APIs queued on one domain. All other APIs # over this threshold will fail on acquiring job lock. Specially, # setting to zero turns this feature off. # Note, that job lock is per domain. # #max_queued = 0 ################################################################### # Keepalive protocol: # This allows qemu driver to detect broken connections to remote # libvirtd during peer-to-peer migration. A keepalive message is # sent to the deamon after keepalive_interval seconds of inactivity # to check if the deamon is still responding; keepalive_count is a # maximum number of keepalive messages that are allowed to be sent # to the deamon without getting any response before the connection # is considered broken. In other words, the connection is # automatically closed approximately after # keepalive_interval * (keepalive_count + 1) seconds since the last # message received from the deamon. If keepalive_interval is set to # -1, qemu driver will not send keepalive requests during # peer-to-peer migration; however, the remote libvirtd can still # send them and source libvirtd will send responses. When # keepalive_count is set to 0, connections will be automatically # closed after keepalive_interval seconds of inactivity without # sending any keepalive messages. # #keepalive_interval = 5 #keepalive_count = 5