/* * Copyright (C) 2008-2014 Red Hat, Inc. * * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. * * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU * Lesser General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public * License along with this library. If not, see * . * * Authors: * James Morris * Dan Walsh * * SELinux security driver. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if HAVE_SELINUX_LABEL_H # include #endif #include "security_driver.h" #include "security_selinux.h" #include "virerror.h" #include "viralloc.h" #include "virlog.h" #include "virpci.h" #include "virusb.h" #include "virscsi.h" #include "virstoragefile.h" #include "virfile.h" #include "virhash.h" #include "virrandom.h" #include "virconf.h" #include "virtpm.h" #include "virstring.h" #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECURITY VIR_LOG_INIT("security.security_selinux"); #define MAX_CONTEXT 1024 typedef struct _virSecuritySELinuxData virSecuritySELinuxData; typedef virSecuritySELinuxData *virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr; struct _virSecuritySELinuxData { char *domain_context; char *alt_domain_context; char *file_context; char *content_context; virHashTablePtr mcs; bool skipAllLabel; #if HAVE_SELINUX_LABEL_H struct selabel_handle *label_handle; #endif }; /* Data structure to pass to various callbacks so we have everything we need */ typedef struct _virSecuritySELinuxCallbackData virSecuritySELinuxCallbackData; typedef virSecuritySELinuxCallbackData *virSecuritySELinuxCallbackDataPtr; struct _virSecuritySELinuxCallbackData { virSecurityManagerPtr mgr; virDomainDefPtr def; }; #define SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI "0" #define SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME "selinux" static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreTPMFileLabelInt(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainTPMDefPtr tpm); /* * Returns 0 on success, 1 if already reserved, or -1 on fatal error */ static int virSecuritySELinuxMCSAdd(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, const char *mcs) { virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); if (virHashLookup(data->mcs, mcs)) return 1; if (virHashAddEntry(data->mcs, mcs, (void*)0x1) < 0) return -1; return 0; } static void virSecuritySELinuxMCSRemove(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, const char *mcs) { virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); virHashRemoveEntry(data->mcs, mcs); } static char * virSecuritySELinuxMCSFind(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, const char *sens, int catMin, int catMax) { virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); int catRange; char *mcs = NULL; /* +1 since virRandomInt range is exclusive of the upper bound */ catRange = (catMax - catMin) + 1; if (catRange < 8) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("Category range c%d-c%d too small"), catMin, catMax); return NULL; } VIR_DEBUG("Using sensitivity level '%s' cat min %d max %d range %d", sens, catMin, catMax, catRange); for (;;) { int c1 = virRandomInt(catRange); int c2 = virRandomInt(catRange); VIR_DEBUG("Try cat %s:c%d,c%d", sens, c1 + catMin, c2 + catMin); if (c1 == c2) { if (virAsprintf(&mcs, "%s:c%d", sens, catMin + c1) < 0) return NULL; } else { if (c1 > c2) { int t = c1; c1 = c2; c2 = t; } if (virAsprintf(&mcs, "%s:c%d,c%d", sens, catMin + c1, catMin + c2) < 0) return NULL; } if (virHashLookup(data->mcs, mcs) == NULL) break; VIR_FREE(mcs); } return mcs; } /* * This needs to cope with several styles of range * * system_u:system_r:virtd_t * system_u:system_r:virtd_t:s0 * system_u:system_r:virtd_t:s0-s0 * system_u:system_r:virtd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 * * In the first case we'll assume s0:c0.c1023 and * in the next two cases, we'll assume c0.c1023 for * the category part, since that's what we're really * interested in. This won't work in Enforcing mode, * but will prevent libvirtd breaking in Permissive * mode when run with a weird process label. */ static int virSecuritySELinuxMCSGetProcessRange(char **sens, int *catMin, int *catMax) { security_context_t ourSecContext = NULL; context_t ourContext = NULL; char *cat = NULL; char *tmp; const char *contextRange; int ret = -1; if (getcon_raw(&ourSecContext) < 0) { virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("Unable to get current process SELinux context")); goto cleanup; } if (!(ourContext = context_new(ourSecContext))) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("Unable to parse current SELinux context '%s'"), ourSecContext); goto cleanup; } if (!(contextRange = context_range_get(ourContext))) contextRange = "s0"; if (VIR_STRDUP(*sens, contextRange) < 0) goto cleanup; /* Find and blank out the category part (if any) */ tmp = strchr(*sens, ':'); if (tmp) { *tmp = '\0'; cat = tmp + 1; } /* Find and blank out the sensitivity upper bound */ if ((tmp = strchr(*sens, '-'))) *tmp = '\0'; /* sens now just contains the sensitivity lower bound */ /* If there was no category part, just assume c0.c1023 */ if (!cat) { *catMin = 0; *catMax = 1023; ret = 0; goto cleanup; } /* Find & extract category min */ tmp = cat; if (tmp[0] != 'c') { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("Cannot parse category in %s"), cat); goto cleanup; } tmp++; if (virStrToLong_i(tmp, &tmp, 10, catMin) < 0) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("Cannot parse category in %s"), cat); goto cleanup; } /* We *must* have a pair of categories otherwise * there's no range to allocate VM categories from */ if (!tmp[0]) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", _("No category range available")); goto cleanup; } /* Find & extract category max (if any) */ if (tmp[0] != '.') { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("Cannot parse category in %s"), cat); goto cleanup; } tmp++; if (tmp[0] != 'c') { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("Cannot parse category in %s"), cat); goto cleanup; } tmp++; if (virStrToLong_i(tmp, &tmp, 10, catMax) < 0) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("Cannot parse category in %s"), cat); goto cleanup; } ret = 0; cleanup: if (ret < 0) VIR_FREE(*sens); freecon(ourSecContext); context_free(ourContext); return ret; } static char * virSecuritySELinuxContextAddRange(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst) { char *str = NULL; char *ret = NULL; context_t srccon = NULL; context_t dstcon = NULL; if (!src || !dst) return ret; if (!(srccon = context_new(src)) || !(dstcon = context_new(dst))) { virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("unable to allocate security context")); goto cleanup; } if (context_range_set(dstcon, context_range_get(srccon)) == -1) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("unable to set security context range '%s'"), dst); goto cleanup; } if (!(str = context_str(dstcon))) { virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("Unable to format SELinux context")); goto cleanup; } ignore_value(VIR_STRDUP(ret, str)); cleanup: if (srccon) context_free(srccon); if (dstcon) context_free(dstcon); return ret; } static char * virSecuritySELinuxGenNewContext(const char *basecontext, const char *mcs, bool isObjectContext) { context_t context = NULL; char *ret = NULL; char *str; security_context_t ourSecContext = NULL; context_t ourContext = NULL; VIR_DEBUG("basecontext=%s mcs=%s isObjectContext=%d", basecontext, mcs, isObjectContext); if (getcon_raw(&ourSecContext) < 0) { virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("Unable to get current process SELinux context")); goto cleanup; } if (!(ourContext = context_new(ourSecContext))) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("Unable to parse current SELinux context '%s'"), ourSecContext); goto cleanup; } VIR_DEBUG("process=%s", ourSecContext); if (!(context = context_new(basecontext))) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("Unable to parse base SELinux context '%s'"), basecontext); goto cleanup; } if (context_user_set(context, context_user_get(ourContext)) != 0) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("Unable to set SELinux context user '%s'"), context_user_get(ourContext)); goto cleanup; } if (!isObjectContext && context_role_set(context, context_role_get(ourContext)) != 0) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("Unable to set SELinux context role '%s'"), context_role_get(ourContext)); goto cleanup; } if (context_range_set(context, mcs) != 0) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("Unable to set SELinux context MCS '%s'"), mcs); goto cleanup; } if (!(str = context_str(context))) { virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("Unable to format SELinux context")); goto cleanup; } if (VIR_STRDUP(ret, str) < 0) goto cleanup; VIR_DEBUG("Generated context '%s'", ret); cleanup: freecon(ourSecContext); context_free(ourContext); context_free(context); return ret; } #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX_LXC_CONTEXTS_PATH static int virSecuritySELinuxLXCInitialize(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr) { virConfValuePtr scon = NULL; virConfValuePtr tcon = NULL; virConfValuePtr dcon = NULL; virConfPtr selinux_conf; virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); data->skipAllLabel = true; # if HAVE_SELINUX_LABEL_H data->label_handle = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, NULL, 0); if (!data->label_handle) { virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("cannot open SELinux label_handle")); return -1; } # endif if (!(selinux_conf = virConfReadFile(selinux_lxc_contexts_path(), 0))) goto error; scon = virConfGetValue(selinux_conf, "process"); if (! scon || scon->type != VIR_CONF_STRING || (! scon->str)) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read 'process' value from selinux lxc contexts file '%s'"), selinux_lxc_contexts_path()); goto error; } tcon = virConfGetValue(selinux_conf, "file"); if (! tcon || tcon->type != VIR_CONF_STRING || (! tcon->str)) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read 'file' value from selinux lxc contexts file '%s'"), selinux_lxc_contexts_path()); goto error; } dcon = virConfGetValue(selinux_conf, "content"); if (! dcon || dcon->type != VIR_CONF_STRING || (! dcon->str)) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read 'file' value from selinux lxc contexts file '%s'"), selinux_lxc_contexts_path()); goto error; } if (VIR_STRDUP(data->domain_context, scon->str) < 0 || VIR_STRDUP(data->file_context, tcon->str) < 0 || VIR_STRDUP(data->content_context, dcon->str) < 0) goto error; if (!(data->mcs = virHashCreate(10, NULL))) goto error; virConfFree(selinux_conf); return 0; error: # if HAVE_SELINUX_LABEL_H selabel_close(data->label_handle); data->label_handle = NULL; # endif virConfFree(selinux_conf); VIR_FREE(data->domain_context); VIR_FREE(data->file_context); VIR_FREE(data->content_context); virHashFree(data->mcs); return -1; } #else static int virSecuritySELinuxLXCInitialize(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) { virReportSystemError(ENOSYS, "%s", _("libselinux does not support LXC contexts path")); return -1; } #endif static int virSecuritySELinuxQEMUInitialize(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr) { char *ptr; virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); data->skipAllLabel = false; #if HAVE_SELINUX_LABEL_H data->label_handle = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, NULL, 0); if (!data->label_handle) { virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("cannot open SELinux label_handle")); return -1; } #endif if (virFileReadAll(selinux_virtual_domain_context_path(), MAX_CONTEXT, &(data->domain_context)) < 0) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read SELinux virtual domain context file '%s'"), selinux_virtual_domain_context_path()); goto error; } ptr = strchrnul(data->domain_context, '\n'); if (ptr && *ptr == '\n') { *ptr = '\0'; ptr++; if (*ptr != '\0') { if (VIR_STRDUP(data->alt_domain_context, ptr) < 0) goto error; ptr = strchrnul(data->alt_domain_context, '\n'); if (ptr && *ptr == '\n') *ptr = '\0'; } } VIR_DEBUG("Loaded domain context '%s', alt domain context '%s'", data->domain_context, NULLSTR(data->alt_domain_context)); if (virFileReadAll(selinux_virtual_image_context_path(), 2*MAX_CONTEXT, &(data->file_context)) < 0) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read SELinux virtual image context file %s"), selinux_virtual_image_context_path()); goto error; } ptr = strchrnul(data->file_context, '\n'); if (ptr && *ptr == '\n') { *ptr = '\0'; if (VIR_STRDUP(data->content_context, ptr + 1) < 0) goto error; ptr = strchrnul(data->content_context, '\n'); if (ptr && *ptr == '\n') *ptr = '\0'; } VIR_DEBUG("Loaded file context '%s', content context '%s'", data->file_context, data->content_context); if (!(data->mcs = virHashCreate(10, NULL))) goto error; return 0; error: #if HAVE_SELINUX_LABEL_H selabel_close(data->label_handle); data->label_handle = NULL; #endif VIR_FREE(data->domain_context); VIR_FREE(data->alt_domain_context); VIR_FREE(data->file_context); VIR_FREE(data->content_context); virHashFree(data->mcs); return -1; } static int virSecuritySELinuxInitialize(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr) { VIR_DEBUG("SELinuxInitialize %s", virSecurityManagerGetDriver(mgr)); if (STREQ(virSecurityManagerGetDriver(mgr), "LXC")) { return virSecuritySELinuxLXCInitialize(mgr); } else { return virSecuritySELinuxQEMUInitialize(mgr); } } static int virSecuritySELinuxGenLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def) { int rc = -1; char *mcs = NULL; char *scontext = NULL; context_t ctx = NULL; const char *range; virSecurityLabelDefPtr seclabel; virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data; const char *baselabel; char *sens = NULL; int catMin, catMax; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) return 0; data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); VIR_DEBUG("label=%s", virSecurityManagerGetDriver(mgr)); if (seclabel->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC && seclabel->label) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", _("security label already defined for VM")); return rc; } if (seclabel->imagelabel) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", _("security image label already defined for VM")); return rc; } if (seclabel->model && STRNEQ(seclabel->model, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME)) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("security label model %s is not supported with selinux"), seclabel->model); return rc; } VIR_DEBUG("type=%d", seclabel->type); switch (seclabel->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC: if (!(ctx = context_new(seclabel->label))) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("unable to allocate socket security context '%s'"), seclabel->label); return rc; } if (!(range = context_range_get(ctx))) { virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("unable to get selinux context range")); goto cleanup; } if (VIR_STRDUP(mcs, range) < 0) goto cleanup; break; case VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC: if (virSecuritySELinuxMCSGetProcessRange(&sens, &catMin, &catMax) < 0) goto cleanup; if (!(mcs = virSecuritySELinuxMCSFind(mgr, sens, catMin, catMax))) goto cleanup; if (virSecuritySELinuxMCSAdd(mgr, mcs) < 0) goto cleanup; baselabel = seclabel->baselabel; if (!baselabel) { if (def->virtType == VIR_DOMAIN_VIRT_QEMU) { if (data->alt_domain_context == NULL) { static bool warned; if (!warned) { VIR_WARN("SELinux policy does not define a domain type for QEMU TCG. " "Guest startup may be denied due to missing 'execmem' privilege " "unless the 'virt_use_execmem' policy boolean is enabled"); warned = true; } baselabel = data->domain_context; } else { baselabel = data->alt_domain_context; } } else { baselabel = data->domain_context; } } seclabel->label = virSecuritySELinuxGenNewContext(baselabel, mcs, false); if (!seclabel->label) goto cleanup; break; case VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_NONE: if (virSecuritySELinuxMCSGetProcessRange(&sens, &catMin, &catMax) < 0) goto cleanup; if (VIR_STRDUP(mcs, sens) < 0) goto cleanup; break; default: virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("unexpected security label type '%s'"), virDomainSeclabelTypeToString(seclabel->type)); goto cleanup; } /* always generate a image label, needed to label new objects */ seclabel->imagelabel = virSecuritySELinuxGenNewContext(data->file_context, mcs, true); if (!seclabel->imagelabel) goto cleanup; if (!seclabel->model && VIR_STRDUP(seclabel->model, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME) < 0) goto cleanup; rc = 0; cleanup: if (rc != 0) { if (seclabel->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC) VIR_FREE(seclabel->label); VIR_FREE(seclabel->imagelabel); if (seclabel->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC && !seclabel->baselabel) VIR_FREE(seclabel->model); } if (ctx) context_free(ctx); VIR_FREE(scontext); VIR_FREE(mcs); VIR_FREE(sens); VIR_DEBUG("model=%s label=%s imagelabel=%s baselabel=%s", NULLSTR(seclabel->model), NULLSTR(seclabel->label), NULLSTR(seclabel->imagelabel), NULLSTR(seclabel->baselabel)); return rc; } static int virSecuritySELinuxReserveLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, pid_t pid) { security_context_t pctx; context_t ctx = NULL; const char *mcs; int rv; virSecurityLabelDefPtr seclabel; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!seclabel || seclabel->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_NONE || seclabel->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC) return 0; if (getpidcon_raw(pid, &pctx) == -1) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("unable to get PID %d security context"), pid); return -1; } ctx = context_new(pctx); freecon(pctx); if (!ctx) goto error; mcs = context_range_get(ctx); if (!mcs) goto error; if ((rv = virSecuritySELinuxMCSAdd(mgr, mcs)) < 0) goto error; if (rv == 1) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("MCS level for existing domain label %s already reserved"), (char*)pctx); goto error; } context_free(ctx); return 0; error: context_free(ctx); return -1; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSecurityDriverProbe(const char *virtDriver) { if (is_selinux_enabled() <= 0) return SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE; if (virtDriver && STREQ(virtDriver, "LXC")) { #if HAVE_SELINUX_LXC_CONTEXTS_PATH if (!virFileExists(selinux_lxc_contexts_path())) #endif return SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE; } return SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr) { return virSecuritySELinuxInitialize(mgr); } static int virSecuritySELinuxSecurityDriverClose(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr) { virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); if (!data) return 0; #if HAVE_SELINUX_LABEL_H if (data->label_handle) selabel_close(data->label_handle); #endif virHashFree(data->mcs); VIR_FREE(data->domain_context); VIR_FREE(data->alt_domain_context); VIR_FREE(data->file_context); VIR_FREE(data->content_context); return 0; } static const char * virSecuritySELinuxSecurityGetModel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) { return SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME; } static const char * virSecuritySELinuxSecurityGetDOI(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) { /* * Where will the DOI come from? SELinux configuration, or qemu * configuration? For the moment, we'll just set it to "0". */ return SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI; } static int virSecuritySELinuxGetProcessLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virDomainDefPtr def ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, pid_t pid, virSecurityLabelPtr sec) { security_context_t ctx; if (getpidcon_raw(pid, &ctx) == -1) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("unable to get PID %d security context"), pid); return -1; } if (strlen((char *) ctx) >= VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("security label exceeds " "maximum length: %d"), VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN - 1); freecon(ctx); return -1; } strcpy(sec->label, (char *) ctx); freecon(ctx); VIR_DEBUG("label=%s", sec->label); sec->enforcing = security_getenforce(); if (sec->enforcing == -1) { virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("error calling security_getenforce()")); return -1; } return 0; } /* Attempt to change the label of PATH to TCON. If OPTIONAL is true, * return 1 if labelling was not possible. Otherwise, require a label * change, and return 0 for success, -1 for failure. */ static int virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconHelper(const char *path, char *tcon, bool optional, bool privileged) { security_context_t econ; VIR_INFO("Setting SELinux context on '%s' to '%s'", path, tcon); if (setfilecon_raw(path, tcon) < 0) { int setfilecon_errno = errno; if (getfilecon_raw(path, &econ) >= 0) { if (STREQ(tcon, econ)) { freecon(econ); /* It's alright, there's nothing to change anyway. */ return optional ? 1 : 0; } freecon(econ); } /* If the error complaint is related to an image hosted on a (possibly * read-only) NFS mount, or a usbfs/sysfs filesystem not supporting * labelling, then just ignore it & hope for the best. The user * hopefully sets one of the necessary SELinux virt_use_{nfs,usb,pci} * boolean tunables to allow it ... */ VIR_WARNINGS_NO_WLOGICALOP_EQUAL_EXPR if (setfilecon_errno != EOPNOTSUPP && setfilecon_errno != ENOTSUP && setfilecon_errno != EROFS) { VIR_WARNINGS_RESET virReportSystemError(setfilecon_errno, _("unable to set security context '%s' on '%s'"), tcon, path); /* However, don't claim error if SELinux is in Enforcing mode and * we are running as unprivileged user and we really did see EPERM. * Otherwise we want to return error if SELinux is Enforcing. */ if (security_getenforce() == 1 && (setfilecon_errno != EPERM || privileged)) return -1; } else { const char *msg; if (virFileIsSharedFSType(path, VIR_FILE_SHFS_NFS) == 1 && security_get_boolean_active("virt_use_nfs") != 1) { msg = _("Setting security context '%s' on '%s' not supported. " "Consider setting virt_use_nfs"); if (security_getenforce() == 1) VIR_WARN(msg, tcon, path); else VIR_INFO(msg, tcon, path); } else { VIR_INFO("Setting security context '%s' on '%s' not supported", tcon, path); } if (optional) return 1; } } return 0; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconOptional(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, const char *path, char *tcon) { bool privileged = virSecurityManagerGetPrivileged(mgr); return virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconHelper(path, tcon, true, privileged); } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, const char *path, char *tcon) { bool privileged = virSecurityManagerGetPrivileged(mgr); return virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconHelper(path, tcon, false, privileged); } static int virSecuritySELinuxFSetFilecon(int fd, char *tcon) { security_context_t econ; VIR_INFO("Setting SELinux context on fd %d to '%s'", fd, tcon); if (fsetfilecon_raw(fd, tcon) < 0) { int fsetfilecon_errno = errno; if (fgetfilecon_raw(fd, &econ) >= 0) { if (STREQ(tcon, econ)) { freecon(econ); /* It's alright, there's nothing to change anyway. */ return 0; } freecon(econ); } /* if the error complaint is related to an image hosted on * an nfs mount, or a usbfs/sysfs filesystem not supporting * labelling, then just ignore it & hope for the best. * The user hopefully set one of the necessary SELinux * virt_use_{nfs,usb,pci} boolean tunables to allow it... */ if (fsetfilecon_errno != EOPNOTSUPP) { virReportSystemError(fsetfilecon_errno, _("unable to set security context '%s' on fd %d"), tcon, fd); if (security_getenforce() == 1) return -1; } else { VIR_INFO("Setting security context '%s' on fd %d not supported", tcon, fd); } } return 0; } /* Set fcon to the appropriate label for path and mode, or return -1. */ static int getContext(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const char *newpath, mode_t mode, security_context_t *fcon) { #if HAVE_SELINUX_LABEL_H virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); return selabel_lookup_raw(data->label_handle, fcon, newpath, mode); #else return matchpathcon(newpath, mode, fcon); #endif } /* This method shouldn't raise errors, since they'll overwrite * errors that the caller(s) are already dealing with */ static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, const char *path) { struct stat buf; security_context_t fcon = NULL; int rc = -1; char *newpath = NULL; char ebuf[1024]; /* Some paths are auto-generated, so let's be safe here and do * nothing if nothing is needed. */ if (!path) return 0; VIR_INFO("Restoring SELinux context on '%s'", path); if (virFileResolveLink(path, &newpath) < 0) { VIR_WARN("cannot resolve symlink %s: %s", path, virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf))); goto err; } if (stat(newpath, &buf) != 0) { VIR_WARN("cannot stat %s: %s", newpath, virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf))); goto err; } if (getContext(mgr, newpath, buf.st_mode, &fcon) < 0) { /* Any user created path likely does not have a default label, * which makes this an expected non error */ VIR_WARN("cannot lookup default selinux label for %s", newpath); rc = 0; } else { rc = virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, newpath, fcon); } err: freecon(fcon); VIR_FREE(newpath); return rc; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetInputLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainInputDefPtr input) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr seclabel; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) return 0; switch ((virDomainInputType) input->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH: if (virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, input->source.evdev, seclabel->imagelabel) < 0) return -1; break; case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_MOUSE: case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_TABLET: case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_KBD: case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_LAST: break; } return 0; } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreInputLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainInputDefPtr input) { int rc = 0; virSecurityLabelDefPtr seclabel; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) return 0; switch ((virDomainInputType) input->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH: rc = virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, input->source.evdev); break; case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_MOUSE: case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_TABLET: case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_KBD: case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_LAST: break; } return rc; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetTPMFileLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainTPMDefPtr tpm) { int rc; virSecurityLabelDefPtr seclabel; char *cancel_path; const char *tpmdev; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) return 0; switch (tpm->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_TPM_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH: tpmdev = tpm->data.passthrough.source.data.file.path; rc = virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, tpmdev, seclabel->imagelabel); if (rc < 0) return -1; if ((cancel_path = virTPMCreateCancelPath(tpmdev)) != NULL) { rc = virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, cancel_path, seclabel->imagelabel); VIR_FREE(cancel_path); if (rc < 0) { virSecuritySELinuxRestoreTPMFileLabelInt(mgr, def, tpm); return -1; } } else { return -1; } break; case VIR_DOMAIN_TPM_TYPE_LAST: break; } return 0; } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreTPMFileLabelInt(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainTPMDefPtr tpm) { int rc = 0; virSecurityLabelDefPtr seclabel; char *cancel_path; const char *tpmdev; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) return 0; switch (tpm->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_TPM_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH: tpmdev = tpm->data.passthrough.source.data.file.path; rc = virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, tpmdev); if ((cancel_path = virTPMCreateCancelPath(tpmdev)) != NULL) { if (virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, cancel_path) < 0) rc = -1; VIR_FREE(cancel_path); } break; case VIR_DOMAIN_TPM_TYPE_LAST: break; } return rc; } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreImageLabelInt(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virStorageSourcePtr src, bool migrated) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr seclabel; virSecurityDeviceLabelDefPtr disk_seclabel; if (!src->path || !virStorageSourceIsLocalStorage(src)) return 0; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) return 0; disk_seclabel = virStorageSourceGetSecurityLabelDef(src, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!seclabel->relabel || (disk_seclabel && !disk_seclabel->relabel)) return 0; /* If labelskip is true and there are no backing files, then we * know it is safe to skip the restore. FIXME - backing files should * be tracked in domain XML, at which point labelskip should be a * per-file attribute instead of a disk attribute. */ if (disk_seclabel && disk_seclabel->labelskip && !src->backingStore) return 0; /* Don't restore labels on readonly/shared disks, because other VMs may * still be accessing these. Alternatively we could iterate over all * running domains and try to figure out if it is in use, but this would * not work for clustered filesystems, since we can't see running VMs using * the file on other nodes. Safest bet is thus to skip the restore step. */ if (src->readonly || src->shared) return 0; /* If we have a shared FS and are doing migration, we must not change * ownership, because that kills access on the destination host which is * sub-optimal for the guest VM's I/O attempts :-) */ if (migrated) { int rc = virFileIsSharedFS(src->path); if (rc < 0) return -1; if (rc == 1) { VIR_DEBUG("Skipping image label restore on %s because FS is shared", src->path); return 0; } } return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, src->path); } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreDiskLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainDiskDefPtr disk) { return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreImageLabelInt(mgr, def, disk->src, false); } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreImageLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virStorageSourcePtr src) { return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreImageLabelInt(mgr, def, src, false); } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetImageLabelInternal(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virStorageSourcePtr src, bool first) { virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; virSecurityDeviceLabelDefPtr disk_seclabel; int ret; if (!src->path || !virStorageSourceIsLocalStorage(src)) return 0; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->relabel) return 0; disk_seclabel = virStorageSourceGetSecurityLabelDef(src, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (disk_seclabel && !disk_seclabel->relabel) return 0; if (disk_seclabel && disk_seclabel->relabel && disk_seclabel->label) { ret = virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, src->path, disk_seclabel->label); } else if (first) { if (src->shared) { ret = virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconOptional(mgr, src->path, data->file_context); } else if (src->readonly) { ret = virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconOptional(mgr, src->path, data->content_context); } else if (secdef->imagelabel) { ret = virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconOptional(mgr, src->path, secdef->imagelabel); } else { ret = 0; } } else { ret = virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconOptional(mgr, src->path, data->content_context); } if (ret == 1 && !disk_seclabel) { /* If we failed to set a label, but virt_use_nfs let us * proceed anyway, then we don't need to relabel later. */ disk_seclabel = virSecurityDeviceLabelDefNew(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!disk_seclabel) return -1; disk_seclabel->labelskip = true; if (VIR_APPEND_ELEMENT(src->seclabels, src->nseclabels, disk_seclabel) < 0) { virSecurityDeviceLabelDefFree(disk_seclabel); return -1; } ret = 0; } return ret; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetImageLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virStorageSourcePtr src) { return virSecuritySELinuxSetImageLabelInternal(mgr, def, src, true); } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetDiskLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainDiskDefPtr disk) { bool first = true; virStorageSourcePtr next; for (next = disk->src; next; next = next->backingStore) { if (virSecuritySELinuxSetImageLabelInternal(mgr, def, next, first) < 0) return -1; first = false; } return 0; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetHostdevLabelHelper(const char *file, void *opaque) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; virSecuritySELinuxCallbackDataPtr data = opaque; virSecurityManagerPtr mgr = data->mgr; virDomainDefPtr def = data->def; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, file, secdef->imagelabel); } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetPCILabel(virPCIDevicePtr dev ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const char *file, void *opaque) { return virSecuritySELinuxSetHostdevLabelHelper(file, opaque); } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetUSBLabel(virUSBDevicePtr dev ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const char *file, void *opaque) { return virSecuritySELinuxSetHostdevLabelHelper(file, opaque); } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetSCSILabel(virSCSIDevicePtr dev, const char *file, void *opaque) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; virSecuritySELinuxCallbackDataPtr ptr = opaque; virSecurityManagerPtr mgr = ptr->mgr; virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(ptr->def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) return 0; if (virSCSIDeviceGetShareable(dev)) return virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconOptional(mgr, file, data->file_context); else if (virSCSIDeviceGetReadonly(dev)) return virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconOptional(mgr, file, data->content_context); else return virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconOptional(mgr, file, secdef->imagelabel); } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetHostdevSubsysLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainHostdevDefPtr dev, const char *vroot) { virDomainHostdevSubsysUSBPtr usbsrc = &dev->source.subsys.u.usb; virDomainHostdevSubsysPCIPtr pcisrc = &dev->source.subsys.u.pci; virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSIPtr scsisrc = &dev->source.subsys.u.scsi; virSecuritySELinuxCallbackData data = {.mgr = mgr, .def = def}; int ret = -1; /* Like virSecuritySELinuxSetImageLabelInternal() for a networked * disk, do nothing for an iSCSI hostdev */ if (dev->source.subsys.type == VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_SCSI && scsisrc->protocol == VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SCSI_PROTOCOL_TYPE_ISCSI) return 0; switch (dev->source.subsys.type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_USB: { virUSBDevicePtr usb; if (dev->missing) return 0; usb = virUSBDeviceNew(usbsrc->bus, usbsrc->device, vroot); if (!usb) goto done; ret = virUSBDeviceFileIterate(usb, virSecuritySELinuxSetUSBLabel, &data); virUSBDeviceFree(usb); break; } case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI: { virPCIDevicePtr pci = virPCIDeviceNew(pcisrc->addr.domain, pcisrc->addr.bus, pcisrc->addr.slot, pcisrc->addr.function); if (!pci) goto done; if (pcisrc->backend == VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_PCI_BACKEND_VFIO) { char *vfioGroupDev = virPCIDeviceGetIOMMUGroupDev(pci); if (!vfioGroupDev) { virPCIDeviceFree(pci); goto done; } ret = virSecuritySELinuxSetPCILabel(pci, vfioGroupDev, &data); VIR_FREE(vfioGroupDev); } else { ret = virPCIDeviceFileIterate(pci, virSecuritySELinuxSetPCILabel, &data); } virPCIDeviceFree(pci); break; } case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_SCSI: { virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSIHostPtr scsihostsrc = &scsisrc->u.host; virSCSIDevicePtr scsi = virSCSIDeviceNew(NULL, scsihostsrc->adapter, scsihostsrc->bus, scsihostsrc->target, scsihostsrc->unit, dev->readonly, dev->shareable); if (!scsi) goto done; ret = virSCSIDeviceFileIterate(scsi, virSecuritySELinuxSetSCSILabel, &data); virSCSIDeviceFree(scsi); break; } default: ret = 0; break; } done: return ret; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetHostdevCapsLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainHostdevDefPtr dev, const char *vroot) { int ret = -1; virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; char *path; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) return 0; switch (dev->source.caps.type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_CAPS_TYPE_STORAGE: { if (vroot) { if (virAsprintf(&path, "%s/%s", vroot, dev->source.caps.u.storage.block) < 0) return -1; } else { if (VIR_STRDUP(path, dev->source.caps.u.storage.block) < 0) return -1; } ret = virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, path, secdef->imagelabel); VIR_FREE(path); break; } case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_CAPS_TYPE_MISC: { if (vroot) { if (virAsprintf(&path, "%s/%s", vroot, dev->source.caps.u.misc.chardev) < 0) return -1; } else { if (VIR_STRDUP(path, dev->source.caps.u.misc.chardev) < 0) return -1; } ret = virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, path, secdef->imagelabel); VIR_FREE(path); break; } default: ret = 0; break; } return ret; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetHostdevLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainHostdevDefPtr dev, const char *vroot) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->relabel) return 0; switch (dev->mode) { case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS: return virSecuritySELinuxSetHostdevSubsysLabel(mgr, def, dev, vroot); case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_CAPABILITIES: return virSecuritySELinuxSetHostdevCapsLabel(mgr, def, dev, vroot); default: return 0; } } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestorePCILabel(virPCIDevicePtr dev ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const char *file, void *opaque) { virSecurityManagerPtr mgr = opaque; return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, file); } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreUSBLabel(virUSBDevicePtr dev ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const char *file, void *opaque) { virSecurityManagerPtr mgr = opaque; return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, file); } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSCSILabel(virSCSIDevicePtr dev, const char *file, void *opaque) { virSecurityManagerPtr mgr = opaque; /* Don't restore labels on a shareable or readonly hostdev, because * other VMs may still be accessing. */ if (virSCSIDeviceGetShareable(dev) || virSCSIDeviceGetReadonly(dev)) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, file); } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreHostdevSubsysLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainHostdevDefPtr dev, const char *vroot) { virDomainHostdevSubsysUSBPtr usbsrc = &dev->source.subsys.u.usb; virDomainHostdevSubsysPCIPtr pcisrc = &dev->source.subsys.u.pci; virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSIPtr scsisrc = &dev->source.subsys.u.scsi; int ret = -1; /* Like virSecuritySELinuxRestoreImageLabelInt() for a networked * disk, do nothing for an iSCSI hostdev */ if (dev->source.subsys.type == VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_SCSI && scsisrc->protocol == VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SCSI_PROTOCOL_TYPE_ISCSI) return 0; switch (dev->source.subsys.type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_USB: { virUSBDevicePtr usb; if (dev->missing) return 0; usb = virUSBDeviceNew(usbsrc->bus, usbsrc->device, vroot); if (!usb) goto done; ret = virUSBDeviceFileIterate(usb, virSecuritySELinuxRestoreUSBLabel, mgr); virUSBDeviceFree(usb); break; } case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI: { virPCIDevicePtr pci = virPCIDeviceNew(pcisrc->addr.domain, pcisrc->addr.bus, pcisrc->addr.slot, pcisrc->addr.function); if (!pci) goto done; if (pcisrc->backend == VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_PCI_BACKEND_VFIO) { char *vfioGroupDev = virPCIDeviceGetIOMMUGroupDev(pci); if (!vfioGroupDev) { virPCIDeviceFree(pci); goto done; } ret = virSecuritySELinuxRestorePCILabel(pci, vfioGroupDev, mgr); VIR_FREE(vfioGroupDev); } else { ret = virPCIDeviceFileIterate(pci, virSecuritySELinuxRestorePCILabel, mgr); } virPCIDeviceFree(pci); break; } case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_SCSI: { virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSIHostPtr scsihostsrc = &scsisrc->u.host; virSCSIDevicePtr scsi = virSCSIDeviceNew(NULL, scsihostsrc->adapter, scsihostsrc->bus, scsihostsrc->target, scsihostsrc->unit, dev->readonly, dev->shareable); if (!scsi) goto done; ret = virSCSIDeviceFileIterate(scsi, virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSCSILabel, mgr); virSCSIDeviceFree(scsi); break; } default: ret = 0; break; } done: return ret; } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreHostdevCapsLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainHostdevDefPtr dev, const char *vroot) { int ret = -1; char *path; switch (dev->source.caps.type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_CAPS_TYPE_STORAGE: { if (vroot) { if (virAsprintf(&path, "%s/%s", vroot, dev->source.caps.u.storage.block) < 0) return -1; } else { if (VIR_STRDUP(path, dev->source.caps.u.storage.block) < 0) return -1; } ret = virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, path); VIR_FREE(path); break; } case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_CAPS_TYPE_MISC: { if (vroot) { if (virAsprintf(&path, "%s/%s", vroot, dev->source.caps.u.misc.chardev) < 0) return -1; } else { if (VIR_STRDUP(path, dev->source.caps.u.misc.chardev) < 0) return -1; } ret = virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, path); VIR_FREE(path); break; } default: ret = 0; break; } return ret; } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreHostdevLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainHostdevDefPtr dev, const char *vroot) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->relabel) return 0; switch (dev->mode) { case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS: return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreHostdevSubsysLabel(mgr, dev, vroot); case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_CAPABILITIES: return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreHostdevCapsLabel(mgr, dev, vroot); default: return 0; } } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetChardevLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainChrDefPtr dev, virDomainChrSourceDefPtr dev_source) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr seclabel; virSecurityDeviceLabelDefPtr chr_seclabel = NULL; char *imagelabel = NULL; char *in = NULL, *out = NULL; int ret = -1; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!seclabel || !seclabel->relabel) return 0; if (dev) chr_seclabel = virDomainChrDefGetSecurityLabelDef(dev, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (chr_seclabel && !chr_seclabel->relabel) return 0; if (chr_seclabel) imagelabel = chr_seclabel->label; if (!imagelabel) imagelabel = seclabel->imagelabel; switch (dev_source->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_DEV: case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_FILE: ret = virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, dev_source->data.file.path, imagelabel); break; case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_UNIX: if (!dev_source->data.nix.listen) { if (virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, dev_source->data.nix.path, imagelabel) < 0) goto done; } ret = 0; break; case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_PIPE: if ((virAsprintf(&in, "%s.in", dev_source->data.file.path) < 0) || (virAsprintf(&out, "%s.out", dev_source->data.file.path) < 0)) goto done; if (virFileExists(in) && virFileExists(out)) { if ((virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, in, imagelabel) < 0) || (virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, out, imagelabel) < 0)) { goto done; } } else if (virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, dev_source->data.file.path, imagelabel) < 0) { goto done; } ret = 0; break; default: ret = 0; break; } done: VIR_FREE(in); VIR_FREE(out); return ret; } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreChardevLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainChrDefPtr dev, virDomainChrSourceDefPtr dev_source) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr seclabel; virSecurityDeviceLabelDefPtr chr_seclabel = NULL; char *in = NULL, *out = NULL; int ret = -1; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!seclabel || !seclabel->relabel) return 0; if (dev) chr_seclabel = virDomainChrDefGetSecurityLabelDef(dev, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (chr_seclabel && !chr_seclabel->relabel) return 0; switch (dev_source->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_DEV: case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_FILE: if (virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, dev_source->data.file.path) < 0) goto done; ret = 0; break; case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_UNIX: if (!dev_source->data.nix.listen) { if (virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, dev_source->data.file.path) < 0) goto done; } ret = 0; break; case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_PIPE: if ((virAsprintf(&out, "%s.out", dev_source->data.file.path) < 0) || (virAsprintf(&in, "%s.in", dev_source->data.file.path) < 0)) goto done; if (virFileExists(in) && virFileExists(out)) { if ((virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, out) < 0) || (virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, in) < 0)) { goto done; } } else if (virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, dev_source->data.file.path) < 0) { goto done; } ret = 0; break; default: ret = 0; break; } done: VIR_FREE(in); VIR_FREE(out); return ret; } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityChardevCallback(virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainChrDefPtr dev, void *opaque) { virSecurityManagerPtr mgr = opaque; /* This is taken care of by processing of def->serials */ if (dev->deviceType == VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_DEVICE_TYPE_CONSOLE && dev->targetType == VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_CONSOLE_TARGET_TYPE_SERIAL) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreChardevLabel(mgr, def, dev, &dev->source); } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecuritySmartcardCallback(virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainSmartcardDefPtr dev, void *opaque) { virSecurityManagerPtr mgr = opaque; const char *database; switch (dev->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_TYPE_HOST: break; case VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_TYPE_HOST_CERTIFICATES: database = dev->data.cert.database; if (!database) database = VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_DEFAULT_DATABASE; return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, database); case VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH: return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreChardevLabel(mgr, def, NULL, &dev->data.passthru); default: virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("unknown smartcard type %d"), dev->type); return -1; } return 0; } static const char * virSecuritySELinuxGetBaseLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, int virtType) { virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr priv = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); if (virtType == VIR_DOMAIN_VIRT_QEMU && priv->alt_domain_context) return priv->alt_domain_context; else return priv->domain_context; } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, bool migrated) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); size_t i; int rc = 0; VIR_DEBUG("Restoring security label on %s", def->name); secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->relabel || data->skipAllLabel) return 0; if (def->tpm) { if (virSecuritySELinuxRestoreTPMFileLabelInt(mgr, def, def->tpm) < 0) rc = -1; } for (i = 0; i < def->nhostdevs; i++) { if (virSecuritySELinuxRestoreHostdevLabel(mgr, def, def->hostdevs[i], NULL) < 0) rc = -1; } for (i = 0; i < def->ninputs; i++) { if (virSecuritySELinuxRestoreInputLabel(mgr, def, def->inputs[i]) < 0) rc = -1; } for (i = 0; i < def->ndisks; i++) { virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = def->disks[i]; if (virSecuritySELinuxRestoreImageLabelInt(mgr, def, disk->src, migrated) < 0) rc = -1; } if (virDomainChrDefForeach(def, false, virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityChardevCallback, mgr) < 0) rc = -1; if (virDomainSmartcardDefForeach(def, false, virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecuritySmartcardCallback, mgr) < 0) rc = -1; if (def->os.loader && def->os.loader->nvram && virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, def->os.loader->nvram) < 0) rc = -1; return rc; } static int virSecuritySELinuxReleaseLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) return 0; if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC) { if (secdef->label != NULL) { context_t con = context_new(secdef->label); if (con) { virSecuritySELinuxMCSRemove(mgr, context_range_get(con)); context_free(con); } } VIR_FREE(secdef->label); if (!secdef->baselabel) VIR_FREE(secdef->model); } VIR_FREE(secdef->imagelabel); return 0; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetSavedStateLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, const char *savefile) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->relabel) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, savefile, secdef->imagelabel); } static int virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSavedStateLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, const char *savefile) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->relabel) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreFileLabel(mgr, savefile); } static int virSecuritySELinuxSecurityVerify(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virDomainDefPtr def) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) return 0; if (STRNEQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("security label driver mismatch: " "'%s' model configured for domain, but " "hypervisor driver is '%s'."), secdef->model, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); return -1; } if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC) { if (security_check_context(secdef->label) != 0) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, _("Invalid security label %s"), secdef->label); return -1; } } return 0; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetProcessLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virDomainDefPtr def) { /* TODO: verify DOI */ virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; VIR_DEBUG("label=%s", secdef->label); if (STRNEQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("security label driver mismatch: " "'%s' model configured for domain, but " "hypervisor driver is '%s'."), secdef->model, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (security_getenforce() == 1) return -1; } if (setexeccon_raw(secdef->label) == -1) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("unable to set security context '%s'"), secdef->label); if (security_getenforce() == 1) return -1; } return 0; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetChildProcessLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virDomainDefPtr def, virCommandPtr cmd) { /* TODO: verify DOI */ virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; VIR_DEBUG("label=%s", secdef->label); if (STRNEQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("security label driver mismatch: " "'%s' model configured for domain, but " "hypervisor driver is '%s'."), secdef->model, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (security_getenforce() == 1) return -1; } /* save in cmd to be set after fork/before child process is exec'ed */ virCommandSetSELinuxLabel(cmd, secdef->label); return 0; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetDaemonSocketLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virDomainDefPtr def) { /* TODO: verify DOI */ virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; security_context_t scon = NULL; char *str = NULL; int rc = -1; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; if (STRNEQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("security label driver mismatch: " "'%s' model configured for domain, but " "hypervisor driver is '%s'."), secdef->model, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); goto done; } if (getcon_raw(&scon) == -1) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("unable to get current process context '%s'"), secdef->label); goto done; } if (!(str = virSecuritySELinuxContextAddRange(secdef->label, scon))) goto done; VIR_DEBUG("Setting VM %s socket context %s", def->name, str); if (setsockcreatecon_raw(str) == -1) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("unable to set socket security context '%s'"), str); goto done; } rc = 0; done: if (security_getenforce() != 1) rc = 0; freecon(scon); VIR_FREE(str); return rc; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetSocketLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virDomainDefPtr vm) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; int rc = -1; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(vm, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; if (STRNEQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("security label driver mismatch: " "'%s' model configured for domain, but " "hypervisor driver is '%s'."), secdef->model, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); goto done; } VIR_DEBUG("Setting VM %s socket context %s", vm->name, secdef->label); if (setsockcreatecon_raw(secdef->label) == -1) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("unable to set socket security context '%s'"), secdef->label); goto done; } rc = 0; done: if (security_getenforce() != 1) rc = 0; return rc; } static int virSecuritySELinuxClearSocketLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virDomainDefPtr def) { /* TODO: verify DOI */ virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; if (STRNEQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("security label driver mismatch: " "'%s' model configured for domain, but " "hypervisor driver is '%s'."), secdef->model, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (security_getenforce() == 1) return -1; } if (setsockcreatecon_raw(NULL) == -1) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("unable to clear socket security context '%s'"), secdef->label); if (security_getenforce() == 1) return -1; } return 0; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityChardevCallback(virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainChrDefPtr dev, void *opaque) { virSecurityManagerPtr mgr = opaque; /* This is taken care of by processing of def->serials */ if (dev->deviceType == VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_DEVICE_TYPE_CONSOLE && dev->targetType == VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_CONSOLE_TARGET_TYPE_SERIAL) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxSetChardevLabel(mgr, def, dev, &dev->source); } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetSecuritySmartcardCallback(virDomainDefPtr def, virDomainSmartcardDefPtr dev, void *opaque) { const char *database; virSecurityManagerPtr mgr = opaque; virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); switch (dev->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_TYPE_HOST: break; case VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_TYPE_HOST_CERTIFICATES: database = dev->data.cert.database; if (!database) database = VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_DEFAULT_DATABASE; return virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, database, data->content_context); case VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH: return virSecuritySELinuxSetChardevLabel(mgr, def, NULL, &dev->data.passthru); default: virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("unknown smartcard type %d"), dev->type); return -1; } return 0; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, const char *stdin_path) { size_t i; virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->relabel || data->skipAllLabel) return 0; for (i = 0; i < def->ndisks; i++) { /* XXX fixme - we need to recursively label the entire tree :-( */ if (virDomainDiskGetType(def->disks[i]) == VIR_STORAGE_TYPE_DIR) { VIR_WARN("Unable to relabel directory tree %s for disk %s", virDomainDiskGetSource(def->disks[i]), def->disks[i]->dst); continue; } if (virSecuritySELinuxSetDiskLabel(mgr, def, def->disks[i]) < 0) return -1; } /* XXX fixme process def->fss if relabel == true */ for (i = 0; i < def->nhostdevs; i++) { if (virSecuritySELinuxSetHostdevLabel(mgr, def, def->hostdevs[i], NULL) < 0) return -1; } for (i = 0; i < def->ninputs; i++) { if (virSecuritySELinuxSetInputLabel(mgr, def, def->inputs[i]) < 0) return -1; } if (def->tpm) { if (virSecuritySELinuxSetTPMFileLabel(mgr, def, def->tpm) < 0) return -1; } if (virDomainChrDefForeach(def, true, virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityChardevCallback, mgr) < 0) return -1; if (virDomainSmartcardDefForeach(def, true, virSecuritySELinuxSetSecuritySmartcardCallback, mgr) < 0) return -1; /* This is different than kernel or initrd. The nvram store * is really a disk, qemu can read and write to it. */ if (def->os.loader && def->os.loader->nvram && secdef && secdef->imagelabel && virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, def->os.loader->nvram, secdef->imagelabel) < 0) return -1; if (def->os.kernel && virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, def->os.kernel, data->content_context) < 0) return -1; if (def->os.initrd && virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, def->os.initrd, data->content_context) < 0) return -1; if (def->os.dtb && virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, def->os.dtb, data->content_context) < 0) return -1; if (stdin_path && virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, stdin_path, data->content_context) < 0) return -1; return 0; } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetImageFDLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virDomainDefPtr def, int fd) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->imagelabel) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxFSetFilecon(fd, secdef->imagelabel); } static int virSecuritySELinuxSetTapFDLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, int fd) { struct stat buf; security_context_t fcon = NULL; virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; char *str = NULL, *proc = NULL, *fd_path = NULL; int rc = -1; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; if (fstat(fd, &buf) < 0) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot stat tap fd %d"), fd); goto cleanup; } if ((buf.st_mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFCHR) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("tap fd %d is not character device"), fd); goto cleanup; } /* Label /dev/tap.* devices only. Leave /dev/net/tun alone! */ if (virAsprintf(&proc, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd) == -1) goto cleanup; if (virFileResolveLink(proc, &fd_path) < 0) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("Unable to resolve link: %s"), proc); goto cleanup; } if (!STRPREFIX(fd_path, "/dev/tap")) { VIR_DEBUG("fd=%d points to %s not setting SELinux label", fd, fd_path); rc = 0; goto cleanup; } if (getContext(mgr, "/dev/tap*", buf.st_mode, &fcon) < 0) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("cannot lookup default selinux label for tap fd %d"), fd); goto cleanup; } if (!(str = virSecuritySELinuxContextAddRange(secdef->label, fcon))) { goto cleanup; } else { rc = virSecuritySELinuxFSetFilecon(fd, str); } cleanup: freecon(fcon); VIR_FREE(fd_path); VIR_FREE(proc); VIR_FREE(str); return rc; } static char * virSecuritySELinuxGenImageLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; virSecuritySELinuxDataPtr data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); const char *range; context_t ctx = NULL; char *label = NULL; char *mcs = NULL; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) goto cleanup; if (secdef->label) { ctx = context_new(secdef->label); if (!ctx) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("unable to create selinux context for: %s"), secdef->label); goto cleanup; } range = context_range_get(ctx); if (range) { if (VIR_STRDUP(mcs, range) < 0) goto cleanup; if (!(label = virSecuritySELinuxGenNewContext(data->file_context, mcs, true))) goto cleanup; } } cleanup: context_free(ctx); VIR_FREE(mcs); return label; } static char * virSecuritySELinuxGetSecurityMountOptions(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def) { char *opts = NULL; virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; if ((secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME))) { if (!secdef->imagelabel) secdef->imagelabel = virSecuritySELinuxGenImageLabel(mgr, def); if (secdef->imagelabel && virAsprintf(&opts, ",context=\"%s\"", (const char*) secdef->imagelabel) < 0) return NULL; } if (!opts && VIR_STRDUP(opts, "") < 0) return NULL; VIR_DEBUG("imageLabel=%s opts=%s", secdef ? secdef->imagelabel : "(null)", opts); return opts; } static int virSecuritySELinuxDomainSetDirLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virDomainDefPtr def, const char *path) { virSecurityLabelDefPtr seclabel; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (!seclabel || !seclabel->relabel) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, path, seclabel->imagelabel); } virSecurityDriver virSecurityDriverSELinux = { .privateDataLen = sizeof(virSecuritySELinuxData), .name = SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, .probe = virSecuritySELinuxSecurityDriverProbe, .open = virSecuritySELinuxSecurityDriverOpen, .close = virSecuritySELinuxSecurityDriverClose, .getModel = virSecuritySELinuxSecurityGetModel, .getDOI = virSecuritySELinuxSecurityGetDOI, .domainSecurityVerify = virSecuritySELinuxSecurityVerify, .domainSetSecurityDiskLabel = virSecuritySELinuxSetDiskLabel, .domainRestoreSecurityDiskLabel = virSecuritySELinuxRestoreDiskLabel, .domainSetSecurityImageLabel = virSecuritySELinuxSetImageLabel, .domainRestoreSecurityImageLabel = virSecuritySELinuxRestoreImageLabel, .domainSetSecurityDaemonSocketLabel = virSecuritySELinuxSetDaemonSocketLabel, .domainSetSecuritySocketLabel = virSecuritySELinuxSetSocketLabel, .domainClearSecuritySocketLabel = virSecuritySELinuxClearSocketLabel, .domainGenSecurityLabel = virSecuritySELinuxGenLabel, .domainReserveSecurityLabel = virSecuritySELinuxReserveLabel, .domainReleaseSecurityLabel = virSecuritySELinuxReleaseLabel, .domainGetSecurityProcessLabel = virSecuritySELinuxGetProcessLabel, .domainSetSecurityProcessLabel = virSecuritySELinuxSetProcessLabel, .domainSetSecurityChildProcessLabel = virSecuritySELinuxSetChildProcessLabel, .domainSetSecurityAllLabel = virSecuritySELinuxSetAllLabel, .domainRestoreSecurityAllLabel = virSecuritySELinuxRestoreAllLabel, .domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel = virSecuritySELinuxSetHostdevLabel, .domainRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel = virSecuritySELinuxRestoreHostdevLabel, .domainSetSavedStateLabel = virSecuritySELinuxSetSavedStateLabel, .domainRestoreSavedStateLabel = virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSavedStateLabel, .domainSetSecurityImageFDLabel = virSecuritySELinuxSetImageFDLabel, .domainSetSecurityTapFDLabel = virSecuritySELinuxSetTapFDLabel, .domainGetSecurityMountOptions = virSecuritySELinuxGetSecurityMountOptions, .getBaseLabel = virSecuritySELinuxGetBaseLabel, .domainSetDirLabel = virSecuritySELinuxDomainSetDirLabel, };