From 07f9b6f019ac308dd31f766635e687bcdebba708 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Daniel P. Berrange" Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2011 11:13:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Allow certificate sanity checking to be disabled When libvirtd starts it it will sanity check its own certs, and before libvirt clients connect to a remote server they will sanity check their own certs. This patch allows such sanity checking to be skipped. There is no strong reason to need to do this, other than to bypass possible libvirt bugs in sanity checking, or for testing purposes. libvirt.conf gains tls_no_sanity_certificate parameter to go along with tls_no_verify_certificate. The remote driver client URIs gain a no_sanity URI parameter * daemon/test_libvirtd.aug, daemon/libvirtd.conf, daemon/libvirtd.c, daemon/libvirtd.aug: Add parameter to allow cert sanity checks to be skipped * src/remote/remote_driver.c: Add no_sanity parameter to skip cert checks * src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c, src/rpc/virnettlscontext.h: Add new parameter for skipping sanity checks independantly of skipping session cert validation checks --- daemon/libvirtd.aug | 1 + daemon/libvirtd.c | 4 ++++ daemon/libvirtd.conf | 9 +++++++++ daemon/test_libvirtd.aug | 2 ++ src/remote/remote_driver.c | 14 ++++++++------ src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------- src/rpc/virnettlscontext.h | 4 ++++ 7 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/daemon/libvirtd.aug b/daemon/libvirtd.aug index 0e061425da..3f47ebb66b 100644 --- a/daemon/libvirtd.aug +++ b/daemon/libvirtd.aug @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ module Libvirtd = | str_entry "crl_file" let authorization_entry = bool_entry "tls_no_verify_certificate" + | bool_entry "tls_no_sanity_certificate" | str_array_entry "tls_allowed_dn_list" | str_array_entry "sasl_allowed_username_list" diff --git a/daemon/libvirtd.c b/daemon/libvirtd.c index f2f3a4eaf7..9e044e2cc9 100644 --- a/daemon/libvirtd.c +++ b/daemon/libvirtd.c @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ struct daemonConfig { char *mdns_name; int tls_no_verify_certificate; + int tls_no_sanity_certificate; char **tls_allowed_dn_list; char **sasl_allowed_username_list; @@ -535,12 +536,14 @@ static int daemonSetupNetworking(virNetServerPtr srv, config->cert_file, config->key_file, (const char *const*)config->tls_allowed_dn_list, + config->tls_no_sanity_certificate ? false : true, config->tls_no_verify_certificate ? false : true))) goto error; } else { if (!(ctxt = virNetTLSContextNewServerPath(NULL, !privileged, (const char *const*)config->tls_allowed_dn_list, + config->tls_no_sanity_certificate ? false : true, config->tls_no_verify_certificate ? false : true))) goto error; } @@ -1054,6 +1057,7 @@ daemonConfigLoad(struct daemonConfig *data, GET_CONF_INT (conf, filename, mdns_adv); GET_CONF_STR (conf, filename, mdns_name); + GET_CONF_INT (conf, filename, tls_no_sanity_certificate); GET_CONF_INT (conf, filename, tls_no_verify_certificate); GET_CONF_STR (conf, filename, key_file); diff --git a/daemon/libvirtd.conf b/daemon/libvirtd.conf index 3a071b0fce..217f2f4a70 100644 --- a/daemon/libvirtd.conf +++ b/daemon/libvirtd.conf @@ -187,6 +187,15 @@ # +# Flag to disable verification of our own server certificates +# +# When libvirtd starts it performs some sanity checks against +# its own certificates. +# +# Default is to always sanity. Uncommenting this will disable +# sanity checks which is not a good idea +#tls_no_sanity_certificate = 1 + # Flag to disable verification of client certificates # # Client certificate verification is the primary authentication mechanism. diff --git a/daemon/test_libvirtd.aug b/daemon/test_libvirtd.aug index 5f8b644676..58b7170e90 100644 --- a/daemon/test_libvirtd.aug +++ b/daemon/test_libvirtd.aug @@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ crl_file = \"/etc/pki/CA/crl.pem\" # Default is to always verify. Uncommenting this will disable # verification - make sure an IP whitelist is set tls_no_verify_certificate = 1 +tls_no_sanity_certificate = 1 # A whitelist of allowed x509 Distinguished Names @@ -468,6 +469,7 @@ audit_level = 2 { "#comment" = "Default is to always verify. Uncommenting this will disable" } { "#comment" = "verification - make sure an IP whitelist is set" } { "tls_no_verify_certificate" = "1" } + { "tls_no_sanity_certificate" = "1" } { "#empty" } { "#empty" } { "#comment" = "A whitelist of allowed x509 Distinguished Names" } diff --git a/src/remote/remote_driver.c b/src/remote/remote_driver.c index 665ef04a34..0652e0ddbe 100644 --- a/src/remote/remote_driver.c +++ b/src/remote/remote_driver.c @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ doRemoteOpen (virConnectPtr conn, */ char *name = NULL, *command = NULL, *sockname = NULL, *netcat = NULL; char *port = NULL, *authtype = NULL, *username = NULL; - int no_verify = 0, no_tty = 0; + bool sanity = true, verify = true, tty = true; char *pkipath = NULL, *keyfile = NULL; /* Return code from this function, and the private data. */ @@ -429,12 +429,14 @@ doRemoteOpen (virConnectPtr conn, VIR_FREE(keyfile); keyfile = strdup (var->value); if (!keyfile) goto out_of_memory; + } else if (STRCASEEQ (var->name, "no_sanity")) { + sanity = atoi(var->value) == 0; var->ignore = 1; } else if (STRCASEEQ (var->name, "no_verify")) { - no_verify = atoi (var->value); + verify = atoi (var->value) == 0; var->ignore = 1; } else if (STRCASEEQ (var->name, "no_tty")) { - no_tty = atoi (var->value); + tty = atoi (var->value) == 0; var->ignore = 1; } else if (STRCASEEQ(var->name, "pkipath")) { VIR_FREE(pkipath); @@ -514,7 +516,7 @@ doRemoteOpen (virConnectPtr conn, case trans_tls: priv->tls = virNetTLSContextNewClientPath(pkipath, geteuid() != 0 ? true : false, - no_verify ? false : true); + sanity, verify); if (!priv->tls) goto failed; priv->is_secure = 1; @@ -584,8 +586,8 @@ doRemoteOpen (virConnectPtr conn, port, command, username, - no_tty, - no_verify, + !tty, + !verify, netcat ? netcat : "nc", keyfile, sockname))) diff --git a/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c b/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c index 5c94df637f..bde4e7a75f 100644 --- a/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c +++ b/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ virNetTLSContextCheckCertDN(gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, certFile, gnutls_strerror(ret)); return -1; } - + VIR_DEBUG("Peer DN is %s", name); if (whitelist && virNetTLSContextCheckCertDNWhitelist(name, whitelist) <= 0) return -1; @@ -637,6 +637,7 @@ static virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNew(const char *cacert, const char *cert, const char *key, const char *const*x509dnWhitelist, + bool sanityCheckCert, bool requireValidCert, bool isServer) { @@ -644,8 +645,8 @@ static virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNew(const char *cacert, char *gnutlsdebug; int err; - VIR_DEBUG("cacert=%s cacrl=%s cert=%s key=%s requireValid=%d isServer=%d", - cacert, NULLSTR(cacrl), cert, key, requireValidCert, isServer); + VIR_DEBUG("cacert=%s cacrl=%s cert=%s key=%s sanityCheckCert=%d requireValid=%d isServer=%d", + cacert, NULLSTR(cacrl), cert, key, sanityCheckCert, requireValidCert, isServer); if (VIR_ALLOC(ctxt) < 0) { virReportOOMError(); @@ -675,7 +676,7 @@ static virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNew(const char *cacert, goto error; } - if (requireValidCert && + if (sanityCheckCert && virNetTLSContextSanityCheckCredentials(isServer, cacert, cert) < 0) goto error; @@ -851,6 +852,7 @@ out_of_memory: static virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNewPath(const char *pkipath, bool tryUserPkiPath, const char *const*x509dnWhitelist, + bool sanityCheckCert, bool requireValidCert, bool isServer) { @@ -862,7 +864,8 @@ static virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNewPath(const char *pkipath, return NULL; ctxt = virNetTLSContextNew(cacert, cacrl, cert, key, - x509dnWhitelist, requireValidCert, isServer); + x509dnWhitelist, sanityCheckCert, + requireValidCert, isServer); VIR_FREE(cacert); VIR_FREE(cacrl); @@ -875,18 +878,20 @@ static virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNewPath(const char *pkipath, virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNewServerPath(const char *pkipath, bool tryUserPkiPath, const char *const*x509dnWhitelist, + bool sanityCheckCert, bool requireValidCert) { - return virNetTLSContextNewPath(pkipath, tryUserPkiPath, - x509dnWhitelist, requireValidCert, true); + return virNetTLSContextNewPath(pkipath, tryUserPkiPath, x509dnWhitelist, + sanityCheckCert, requireValidCert, true); } virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNewClientPath(const char *pkipath, bool tryUserPkiPath, + bool sanityCheckCert, bool requireValidCert) { - return virNetTLSContextNewPath(pkipath, tryUserPkiPath, - NULL, requireValidCert, false); + return virNetTLSContextNewPath(pkipath, tryUserPkiPath, NULL, + sanityCheckCert, requireValidCert, false); } @@ -895,10 +900,11 @@ virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNewServer(const char *cacert, const char *cert, const char *key, const char *const*x509dnWhitelist, + bool sanityCheckCert, bool requireValidCert) { - return virNetTLSContextNew(cacert, cacrl, cert, key, - x509dnWhitelist, requireValidCert, true); + return virNetTLSContextNew(cacert, cacrl, cert, key, x509dnWhitelist, + sanityCheckCert, requireValidCert, true); } @@ -906,10 +912,11 @@ virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNewClient(const char *cacert, const char *cacrl, const char *cert, const char *key, + bool sanityCheckCert, bool requireValidCert) { - return virNetTLSContextNew(cacert, cacrl, key, cert, - NULL, requireValidCert, false); + return virNetTLSContextNew(cacert, cacrl, cert, key, NULL, + sanityCheckCert, requireValidCert, false); } @@ -1047,11 +1054,14 @@ int virNetTLSContextCheckCertificate(virNetTLSContextPtr ctxt, virNetTLSSessionPtr sess) { if (virNetTLSContextValidCertificate(ctxt, sess) < 0) { + virErrorPtr err = virGetLastError(); + VIR_WARN("Certificate check failed %s", err && err->message ? err->message : ""); if (ctxt->requireValidCert) { virNetError(VIR_ERR_AUTH_FAILED, "%s", _("Failed to verify peer's certificate")); return -1; } + virResetLastError(); VIR_INFO("Ignoring bad certificate at user request"); } return 0; diff --git a/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.h b/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.h index f23667f4c8..641d67e949 100644 --- a/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.h +++ b/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.h @@ -33,10 +33,12 @@ typedef virNetTLSSession *virNetTLSSessionPtr; virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNewServerPath(const char *pkipath, bool tryUserPkiPath, const char *const*x509dnWhitelist, + bool sanityCheckCert, bool requireValidCert); virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNewClientPath(const char *pkipath, bool tryUserPkiPath, + bool sanityCheckCert, bool requireValidCert); virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNewServer(const char *cacert, @@ -44,12 +46,14 @@ virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNewServer(const char *cacert, const char *cert, const char *key, const char *const*x509dnWhitelist, + bool sanityCheckCert, bool requireValidCert); virNetTLSContextPtr virNetTLSContextNewClient(const char *cacert, const char *cacrl, const char *cert, const char *key, + bool sanityCheckCert, bool requireValidCert); void virNetTLSContextRef(virNetTLSContextPtr ctxt); -- GitLab