// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux * * AMD SVM-SEV support * * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "x86.h" #include "svm.h" static int sev_flush_asids(void); static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock); static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock); unsigned int max_sev_asid; static unsigned int min_sev_asid; static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap; static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap; #define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT) struct enc_region { struct list_head list; unsigned long npages; struct page **pages; unsigned long uaddr; unsigned long size; }; static int sev_flush_asids(void) { int ret, error = 0; /* * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail, * so it must be guarded. */ down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock); wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error); up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock); if (ret) pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error); return ret; } /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */ static bool __sev_recycle_asids(void) { int pos; /* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_sev_asid - 1); if (pos >= max_sev_asid) return false; if (sev_flush_asids()) return false; bitmap_xor(sev_asid_bitmap, sev_asid_bitmap, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid); bitmap_zero(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid); return true; } static int sev_asid_new(void) { bool retry = true; int pos; mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock); /* * SEV-enabled guest must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid. */ again: pos = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_sev_asid - 1); if (pos >= max_sev_asid) { if (retry && __sev_recycle_asids()) { retry = false; goto again; } mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock); return -EBUSY; } __set_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap); mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock); return pos + 1; } static int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; return sev->asid; } static void sev_asid_free(int asid) { struct svm_cpu_data *sd; int cpu, pos; mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock); pos = asid - 1; __set_bit(pos, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap); for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu); sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL; } mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock); } static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle) { struct sev_data_decommission *decommission; struct sev_data_deactivate *data; if (!handle) return; data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); if (!data) return; /* deactivate handle */ data->handle = handle; /* Guard DEACTIVATE against WBINVD/DF_FLUSH used in ASID recycling */ down_read(&sev_deactivate_lock); sev_guest_deactivate(data, NULL); up_read(&sev_deactivate_lock); kfree(data); decommission = kzalloc(sizeof(*decommission), GFP_KERNEL); if (!decommission) return; /* decommission handle */ decommission->handle = handle; sev_guest_decommission(decommission, NULL); kfree(decommission); } static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; int asid, ret; ret = -EBUSY; if (unlikely(sev->active)) return ret; asid = sev_asid_new(); if (asid < 0) return ret; ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error); if (ret) goto e_free; sev->active = true; sev->asid = asid; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list); return 0; e_free: sev_asid_free(asid); return ret; } static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error) { struct sev_data_activate *data; int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm); int ret; data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; /* activate ASID on the given handle */ data->handle = handle; data->asid = asid; ret = sev_guest_activate(data, error); kfree(data); return ret; } static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error) { struct fd f; int ret; f = fdget(fd); if (!f.file) return -EBADF; ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error); fdput(f); return ret; } static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error); } static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct sev_data_launch_start *start; struct kvm_sev_launch_start params; void *dh_blob, *session_blob; int *error = &argp->error; int ret; if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params))) return -EFAULT; start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!start) return -ENOMEM; dh_blob = NULL; if (params.dh_uaddr) { dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len); if (IS_ERR(dh_blob)) { ret = PTR_ERR(dh_blob); goto e_free; } start->dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob)); start->dh_cert_len = params.dh_len; } session_blob = NULL; if (params.session_uaddr) { session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len); if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) { ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob); goto e_free_dh; } start->session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob)); start->session_len = params.session_len; } start->handle = params.handle; start->policy = params.policy; /* create memory encryption context */ ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, start, error); if (ret) goto e_free_session; /* Bind ASID to this guest */ ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start->handle, error); if (ret) goto e_free_session; /* return handle to userspace */ params.handle = start->handle; if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) { sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start->handle); ret = -EFAULT; goto e_free_session; } sev->handle = start->handle; sev->fd = argp->sev_fd; e_free_session: kfree(session_blob); e_free_dh: kfree(dh_blob); e_free: kfree(start); return ret; } static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr, unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n, int write) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; unsigned long npages, size; int npinned; unsigned long locked, lock_limit; struct page **pages; unsigned long first, last; if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); /* Calculate number of pages. */ first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT; last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT; npages = (last - first + 1); locked = sev->pages_locked + npages; lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT; if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) { pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } if (WARN_ON_ONCE(npages > INT_MAX)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); /* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */ size = npages * sizeof(struct page *); if (size > PAGE_SIZE) pages = __vmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO); else pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!pages) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); /* Pin the user virtual address. */ npinned = pin_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages); if (npinned != npages) { pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages); goto err; } *n = npages; sev->pages_locked = locked; return pages; err: if (npinned > 0) { unpin_user_pages(pages, npinned); npinned = -ENOMEM; } kvfree(pages); return ERR_PTR(npinned); } static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages, unsigned long npages) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; unpin_user_pages(pages, npages); kvfree(pages); sev->pages_locked -= npages; } static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages) { uint8_t *page_virtual; unsigned long i; if (npages == 0 || pages == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) { page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]); clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE); kunmap_atomic(page_virtual); } } static unsigned long get_num_contig_pages(unsigned long idx, struct page **inpages, unsigned long npages) { unsigned long paddr, next_paddr; unsigned long i = idx + 1, pages = 1; /* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */ paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]); while (i < npages) { next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]); if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) { pages++; paddr = next_paddr; continue; } break; } return pages; } static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) { unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, pages, size, i; struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params; struct sev_data_launch_update_data *data; struct page **inpages; int ret; if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params))) return -EFAULT; data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; vaddr = params.uaddr; size = params.len; vaddr_end = vaddr + size; /* Lock the user memory. */ inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1); if (!inpages) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto e_free; } /* * The LAUNCH_UPDATE command will perform in-place encryption of the * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1). * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e., * unencrypted so invalidate it first. */ sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages); for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) { int offset, len; /* * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset * within the page. */ offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); /* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */ pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages); len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size); data->handle = sev->handle; data->len = len; data->address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset; ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error); if (ret) goto e_unpin; size -= len; next_vaddr = vaddr + len; } e_unpin: /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */ for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) { set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]); mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]); } /* unlock the user pages */ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages); e_free: kfree(data); return ret; } static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) { void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data; struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct sev_data_launch_measure *data; struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params; void __user *p = NULL; void *blob = NULL; int ret; if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; if (copy_from_user(¶ms, measure, sizeof(params))) return -EFAULT; data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; /* User wants to query the blob length */ if (!params.len) goto cmd; p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr; if (p) { if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) { ret = -EINVAL; goto e_free; } ret = -ENOMEM; blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!blob) goto e_free; data->address = __psp_pa(blob); data->len = params.len; } cmd: data->handle = sev->handle; ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, data, &argp->error); /* * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data. */ if (!params.len) goto done; if (ret) goto e_free_blob; if (blob) { if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len)) ret = -EFAULT; } done: params.len = data->len; if (copy_to_user(measure, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) ret = -EFAULT; e_free_blob: kfree(blob); e_free: kfree(data); return ret; } static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct sev_data_launch_finish *data; int ret; if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; data->handle = sev->handle; ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, data, &argp->error); kfree(data); return ret; } static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct kvm_sev_guest_status params; struct sev_data_guest_status *data; int ret; if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; data->handle = sev->handle; ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, data, &argp->error); if (ret) goto e_free; params.policy = data->policy; params.state = data->state; params.handle = data->handle; if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) ret = -EFAULT; e_free: kfree(data); return ret; } static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src, unsigned long dst, int size, int *error, bool enc) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct sev_data_dbg *data; int ret; data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; data->handle = sev->handle; data->dst_addr = dst; data->src_addr = src; data->len = size; ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT, data, error); kfree(data); return ret; } static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr, unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err) { int offset; /* * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that * destination has enough space. */ src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16); offset = src_paddr & 15; sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16); return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false); } static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long __user dst_uaddr, unsigned long dst_paddr, int size, int *err) { struct page *tpage = NULL; int ret, offset; /* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */ if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(paddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) { tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!tpage) return -ENOMEM; dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage); } ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err); if (ret) goto e_free; if (tpage) { offset = paddr & 15; if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)dst_uaddr, page_address(tpage) + offset, size)) ret = -EFAULT; } e_free: if (tpage) __free_page(tpage); return ret; } static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long __user vaddr, unsigned long dst_paddr, unsigned long __user dst_vaddr, int size, int *error) { struct page *src_tpage = NULL; struct page *dst_tpage = NULL; int ret, len = size; /* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */ if (!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, 16)) { src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!src_tpage) return -ENOMEM; if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage), (void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) { __free_page(src_tpage); return -EFAULT; } paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage); } /* * If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write: * - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer * - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer * - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer */ if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) { int dst_offset; dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!dst_tpage) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto e_free; } ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr, __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error); if (ret) goto e_free; /* * If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise * copy_from_user(). */ dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15; if (src_tpage) memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset, page_address(src_tpage), size); else { if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) { ret = -EFAULT; goto e_free; } } paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage); dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16); len = round_up(size, 16); } ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true); e_free: if (src_tpage) __free_page(src_tpage); if (dst_tpage) __free_page(dst_tpage); return ret; } static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec) { unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr; unsigned long dst_vaddr; struct page **src_p, **dst_p; struct kvm_sev_dbg debug; unsigned long n; unsigned int size; int ret; if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug))) return -EFAULT; if (!debug.len || debug.src_uaddr + debug.len < debug.src_uaddr) return -EINVAL; if (!debug.dst_uaddr) return -EINVAL; vaddr = debug.src_uaddr; size = debug.len; vaddr_end = vaddr + size; dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr; for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) { int len, s_off, d_off; /* lock userspace source and destination page */ src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); if (!src_p) return -EFAULT; dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1); if (!dst_p) { sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n); return -EFAULT; } /* * The DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT commands will perform {dec,en}cryption of the * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1). * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e., * unencrypted so invalidate it first. */ sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1); sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1); /* * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the * offset within the page. */ s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK; d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK; len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size); if (dec) ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm, __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off, dst_vaddr, __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off, len, &argp->error); else ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm, __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off, vaddr, __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off, dst_vaddr, len, &argp->error); sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n); sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, n); if (ret) goto err; next_vaddr = vaddr + len; dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len; size -= len; } err: return ret; } static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct sev_data_launch_secret *data; struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params; struct page **pages; void *blob, *hdr; unsigned long n; int ret, offset; if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params))) return -EFAULT; pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1); if (IS_ERR(pages)) return PTR_ERR(pages); /* * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command. */ if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) { ret = -EINVAL; goto e_unpin_memory; } ret = -ENOMEM; data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!data) goto e_unpin_memory; offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); data->guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset; data->guest_len = params.guest_len; blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len); if (IS_ERR(blob)) { ret = PTR_ERR(blob); goto e_free; } data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob); data->trans_len = params.trans_len; hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len); if (IS_ERR(hdr)) { ret = PTR_ERR(hdr); goto e_free_blob; } data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; data->handle = sev->handle; ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error); kfree(hdr); e_free_blob: kfree(blob); e_free: kfree(data); e_unpin_memory: sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n); return ret; } int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; int r; if (!svm_sev_enabled()) return -ENOTTY; if (!argp) return 0; if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd))) return -EFAULT; mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); switch (sev_cmd.id) { case KVM_SEV_INIT: r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START: r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA: r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE: r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH: r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS: r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT: r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true); break; case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT: r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false); break; case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET: r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out; } if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd))) r = -EFAULT; out: mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); return r; } int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct enc_region *region; int ret = 0; if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX) return -EINVAL; region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!region) return -ENOMEM; region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, ®ion->npages, 1); if (IS_ERR(region->pages)) { ret = PTR_ERR(region->pages); goto e_free; } /* * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with * correct C-bit. */ sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages); region->uaddr = range->addr; region->size = range->size; mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); list_add_tail(®ion->list, &sev->regions_list); mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); return ret; e_free: kfree(region); return ret; } static struct enc_region * find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list; struct enc_region *i; list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) { if (i->uaddr == range->addr && i->size == range->size) return i; } return NULL; } static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm, struct enc_region *region) { sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages); list_del(®ion->list); kfree(region); } int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range) { struct enc_region *region; int ret; mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); if (!sev_guest(kvm)) { ret = -ENOTTY; goto failed; } region = find_enc_region(kvm, range); if (!region) { ret = -EINVAL; goto failed; } /* * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will * not do this, so issue a WBINVD. */ wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region); mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); return 0; failed: mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); return ret; } void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list; struct list_head *pos, *q; if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return; mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); /* * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will * not do this, so issue a WBINVD. */ wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); /* * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions * then lets unpin all the registered memory. */ if (!list_empty(head)) { list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) { __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list)); } } mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle); sev_asid_free(sev->asid); } int __init sev_hardware_setup(void) { struct sev_user_data_status *status; int rc; /* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */ max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F); if (!svm_sev_enabled()) return 1; /* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */ min_sev_asid = cpuid_edx(0x8000001F); /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmaps */ sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL); if (!sev_asid_bitmap) return 1; sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL); if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) return 1; status = kmalloc(sizeof(*status), GFP_KERNEL); if (!status) return 1; /* * Check SEV platform status. * * PLATFORM_STATUS can be called in any state, if we failed to query * the PLATFORM status then either PSP firmware does not support SEV * feature or SEV firmware is dead. */ rc = sev_platform_status(status, NULL); if (rc) goto err; pr_info("SEV supported\n"); err: kfree(status); return rc; } void sev_hardware_teardown(void) { if (!svm_sev_enabled()) return; bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap); bitmap_free(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap); sev_flush_asids(); } void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu) { struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu); int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm); /* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */ svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid; /* * Flush guest TLB: * * 1) when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU. * 2) or this VMCB was executed on different host CPU in previous VMRUNs. */ if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb && svm->vcpu.arch.last_vmentry_cpu == cpu) return; sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb; svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID; mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID); }