From b3357cdf2cb703f0676c477a9487debb0ea582aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2022 18:26:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.119 commit 63c1aae40ac16ed136188bb9c9b595c0147fe6fa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5L6BB Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=63c1aae40ac16ed136188bb9c9b595c0147fe6fa -------------------------------- commit 434537ae54ad37e93555de21b6ac8133d6d773a9 upstream. In 79a8468747c5 ("random: check for increase of entropy_count because of signed conversion"), a number of checks were added around what values were passed to account(), because account() was doing fancy fixed point fractional arithmetic, and a user had some ability to pass large values directly into it. One of things in that commit was limiting those values to INT_MAX >> 6. The first >> 3 was for bytes to bits, and the next >> 3 was for bits to 1/8 fractional bits. However, for several years now, urandom reads no longer touch entropy accounting, and so this check serves no purpose. The current flow is: urandom_read_nowarn()-->get_random_bytes_user()-->chacha20_block() Of course, we don't want that size_t to be truncated when adding it into the ssize_t. But we arrive at urandom_read_nowarn() in the first place either via ordinary fops, which limits reads to MAX_RW_COUNT, or via getrandom() which limits reads to INT_MAX. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai Acked-by: Xie XiuQi --- drivers/char/random.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 357fefa23b96..88f55921757f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1286,9 +1286,8 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) { - int ret; + ssize_t ret; - nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> 6); ret = get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); trace_urandom_read(nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count); return ret; -- GitLab