From 5f550a8e2a43f04dcc0570f79e805cfee16f3adb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Linton Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 15:35:40 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control mainline inclusion from linux-next commit de19055564c8f8f9d366f8db3395836da0b2176c category: feature bugzilla: 11011 CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------- For a while Arm64 has been capable of force enabling or disabling the kpti mitigations. Lets make sure the documentation reflects that. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo Reviewed-by: Yang Yingliang Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index b06777562d47..b43fbaa919a9 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1963,6 +1963,12 @@ Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y, the default is off. + kpti= [ARM64] Control page table isolation of user + and kernel address spaces. + Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation. + 0: force disabled + 1: force enabled + kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs. Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP) -- GitLab