diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4b34847208cc9690284e9e7c7b6f9a960cfbead3..a3230de656e445a1cf1a0a33ccd866b43fa01647 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3204,24 +3204,20 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
 
 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
-	int rc = 0;
-	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
+	rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
-	/*
-	 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
-	 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check.  This is such a likely attempt
-	 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
-	 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
-	 */
 	if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
+		u32 sid = current_sid();
 		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
 				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
-		if (rc)
-			return rc;
 	}
 
-	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
-	return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,