* The target name is the name of the network permission (see below). The naming * convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention. * Also, an asterisk * may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to * signify a wildcard match. For example: "foo.*" and "*" signify a wildcard * match, while "*foo" and "a*b" do not. *
* The following table lists all the possible NetPermission target names, * and for each provides a description of what the permission allows * and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission. * *
| Permission Target Name | *What the Permission Allows | *Risks of Allowing this Permission | *
|---|---|---|
| allowHttpTrace | *The ability to use the HTTP TRACE method in HttpURLConnection. | *Malicious code using HTTP TRACE could get access to security sensitive * information in the HTTP headers (such as cookies) that it might not * otherwise have access to. | *
| getCookieHandler | *The ability to get the cookie handler that processes highly * security sensitive cookie information for an Http session. | *Malicious code can get a cookie handler to obtain access to * highly security sensitive cookie information. Some web servers * use cookies to save user private information such as access * control information, or to track user browsing habit. | *
| getNetworkInformation | *The ability to retrieve all information about local network interfaces. | *Malicious code can read information about network hardware such as * MAC addresses, which could be used to construct local IPv6 addresses. | *
| getProxySelector | *The ability to get the proxy selector used to make decisions * on which proxies to use when making network connections. | *Malicious code can get a ProxySelector to discover proxy * hosts and ports on internal networks, which could then become * targets for attack. | *
| getResponseCache | *The ability to get the response cache that provides * access to a local response cache. | *Malicious code getting access to the local response cache * could access security sensitive information. | *
| requestPasswordAuthentication | *The ability * to ask the authenticator registered with the system for * a password | *Malicious code may steal this password. | *
| setCookieHandler | *The ability to set the cookie handler that processes highly * security sensitive cookie information for an Http session. | *Malicious code can set a cookie handler to obtain access to * highly security sensitive cookie information. Some web servers * use cookies to save user private information such as access * control information, or to track user browsing habit. | *
| setDefaultAuthenticator | *The ability to set the * way authentication information is retrieved when * a proxy or HTTP server asks for authentication | *Malicious * code can set an authenticator that monitors and steals user * authentication input as it retrieves the input from the user. | *
| setProxySelector | *The ability to set the proxy selector used to make decisions * on which proxies to use when making network connections. | *Malicious code can set a ProxySelector that directs network * traffic to an arbitrary network host. | *
| setResponseCache | *The ability to set the response cache that provides access to * a local response cache. | *Malicious code getting access to the local response cache * could access security sensitive information, or create false * entries in the response cache. | *
| specifyStreamHandler | *The ability * to specify a stream handler when constructing a URL | *Malicious code may create a URL with resources that it would normally not have access to (like file:/foo/fum/), specifying a stream handler that gets the actual bytes from someplace it does have access to. Thus it might be able to trick the system into creating a ProtectionDomain/CodeSource for a class even though that class really didn't come from that location. | *
| setSocketImpl | *The ability to create a sub-class of Socket or ServerSocket with a * user specified SocketImpl. | *Malicious user-defined SocketImpls can change the behavior of * Socket and ServerSocket in surprising ways, by virtue of their * ability to access the protected fields of SocketImpl. | *