提交 de9296a4 编写于 作者: X xuelei

6914943: Implement final TLS renegotiation fix

Summary: RFC 5746 implementation
Reviewed-by: wetmore, weijun
上级 696bbff9
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2007, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ final class Alerts {
static final byte alert_insufficient_security = 71;
static final byte alert_internal_error = 80;
static final byte alert_user_canceled = 90;
static final byte alert_no_negotiation = 100;
static final byte alert_no_renegotiation = 100;
// from RFC 3546 (TLS Extensions)
static final byte alert_unsupported_extension = 110;
......@@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ final class Alerts {
return "internal_error";
case alert_user_canceled:
return "user_canceled";
case alert_no_negotiation:
return "no_negotiation";
case alert_no_renegotiation:
return "no_renegotiation";
case alert_unsupported_extension:
return "unsupported_extension";
case alert_certificate_unobtainable:
......@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ final class Alerts {
case alert_protocol_version:
case alert_internal_error:
case alert_user_canceled:
case alert_no_negotiation:
case alert_no_renegotiation:
default:
e = new SSLException(reason);
break;
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ final class CipherSuite implements Comparable {
macAlg = M_SHA;
} else if (name.endsWith("_NULL")) {
macAlg = M_NULL;
} else if (name.endsWith("_SCSV")) {
macAlg = M_NULL;
} else {
throw new IllegalArgumentException
("Unknown MAC algorithm for ciphersuite " + name);
......@@ -160,6 +162,10 @@ final class CipherSuite implements Comparable {
return allowed && keyExchange.isAvailable() && cipher.isAvailable();
}
boolean isNegotiable() {
return this != C_SCSV && isAvailable();
}
/**
* Compares CipherSuites based on their priority. Has the effect of
* sorting CipherSuites when put in a sorted collection, which is
......@@ -268,7 +274,10 @@ final class CipherSuite implements Comparable {
// Kerberos cipher suites
K_KRB5 ("KRB5", true),
K_KRB5_EXPORT("KRB5_EXPORT", true);
K_KRB5_EXPORT("KRB5_EXPORT", true),
// renegotiation protection request signaling cipher suite
K_SCSV ("SCSV", true);
// name of the key exchange algorithm, e.g. DHE_DSS
final String name;
......@@ -352,7 +361,8 @@ final class CipherSuite implements Comparable {
this.exportable = true;
}
BulkCipher(String transformation, int keySize, int ivSize, boolean allowed) {
BulkCipher(String transformation, int keySize,
int ivSize, boolean allowed) {
this.transformation = transformation;
this.algorithm = transformation.split("/")[0];
this.description = this.algorithm + "/" + (keySize << 3);
......@@ -370,7 +380,8 @@ final class CipherSuite implements Comparable {
*
* @exception NoSuchAlgorithmException if anything goes wrong
*/
CipherBox newCipher(ProtocolVersion version, SecretKey key, IvParameterSpec iv,
CipherBox newCipher(ProtocolVersion version,
SecretKey key, IvParameterSpec iv,
boolean encrypt) throws NoSuchAlgorithmException {
return CipherBox.newCipherBox(version, this, key, iv, encrypt);
}
......@@ -408,7 +419,8 @@ final class CipherSuite implements Comparable {
try {
SecretKey key = new SecretKeySpec
(new byte[cipher.expandedKeySize], cipher.algorithm);
IvParameterSpec iv = new IvParameterSpec(new byte[cipher.ivSize]);
IvParameterSpec iv =
new IvParameterSpec(new byte[cipher.ivSize]);
cipher.newCipher(ProtocolVersion.DEFAULT, key, iv, true);
b = Boolean.TRUE;
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
......@@ -460,18 +472,28 @@ final class CipherSuite implements Comparable {
}
// export strength ciphers
final static BulkCipher B_NULL = new BulkCipher("NULL", 0, 0, 0, true);
final static BulkCipher B_RC4_40 = new BulkCipher(CIPHER_RC4, 5, 16, 0, true);
final static BulkCipher B_RC2_40 = new BulkCipher("RC2", 5, 16, 8, false);
final static BulkCipher B_DES_40 = new BulkCipher(CIPHER_DES, 5, 8, 8, true);
final static BulkCipher B_NULL =
new BulkCipher("NULL", 0, 0, 0, true);
final static BulkCipher B_RC4_40 =
new BulkCipher(CIPHER_RC4, 5, 16, 0, true);
final static BulkCipher B_RC2_40 =
new BulkCipher("RC2", 5, 16, 8, false);
final static BulkCipher B_DES_40 =
new BulkCipher(CIPHER_DES, 5, 8, 8, true);
// domestic strength ciphers
final static BulkCipher B_RC4_128 = new BulkCipher(CIPHER_RC4, 16, 0, true);
final static BulkCipher B_DES = new BulkCipher(CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, true);
final static BulkCipher B_3DES = new BulkCipher(CIPHER_3DES, 24, 8, true);
final static BulkCipher B_IDEA = new BulkCipher("IDEA", 16, 8, false);
final static BulkCipher B_AES_128 = new BulkCipher(CIPHER_AES, 16, 16, true);
final static BulkCipher B_AES_256 = new BulkCipher(CIPHER_AES, 32, 16, true);
final static BulkCipher B_RC4_128 =
new BulkCipher(CIPHER_RC4, 16, 0, true);
final static BulkCipher B_DES =
new BulkCipher(CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, true);
final static BulkCipher B_3DES =
new BulkCipher(CIPHER_3DES, 24, 8, true);
final static BulkCipher B_IDEA =
new BulkCipher("IDEA", 16, 8, false);
final static BulkCipher B_AES_128 =
new BulkCipher(CIPHER_AES, 16, 16, true);
final static BulkCipher B_AES_256 =
new BulkCipher(CIPHER_AES, 32, 16, true);
// MACs
final static MacAlg M_NULL = new MacAlg("NULL", 0);
......@@ -487,93 +509,159 @@ final class CipherSuite implements Comparable {
// N: ciphersuites only allowed if we are not in FIPS mode
final boolean N = (SunJSSE.isFIPS() == false);
add("SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", 0x0000, 1, K_NULL, B_NULL, F);
add("SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL",
0x0000, 1, K_NULL, B_NULL, F);
// Definition of the CipherSuites that are enabled by default.
// They are listed in preference order, most preferred first.
int p = DEFAULT_SUITES_PRIORITY * 2;
add("SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", 0x0004, --p, K_RSA, B_RC4_128, N);
add("SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", 0x0005, --p, K_RSA, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", 0x002f, --p, K_RSA, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", 0x0035, --p, K_RSA, B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", 0xC002, --p, K_ECDH_ECDSA, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", 0xC004, --p, K_ECDH_ECDSA, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", 0xC005, --p, K_ECDH_ECDSA, B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", 0xC00C, --p, K_ECDH_RSA, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", 0xC00E, --p, K_ECDH_RSA, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", 0xC00F, --p, K_ECDH_RSA, B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", 0xC007, --p, K_ECDHE_ECDSA,B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", 0xC009, --p, K_ECDHE_ECDSA,B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", 0xC00A, --p, K_ECDHE_ECDSA,B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", 0xC011, --p, K_ECDHE_RSA, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", 0xC013, --p, K_ECDHE_RSA, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", 0xC014, --p, K_ECDHE_RSA, B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", 0x0033, --p, K_DHE_RSA, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", 0x0039, --p, K_DHE_RSA, B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", 0x0032, --p, K_DHE_DSS, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", 0x0038, --p, K_DHE_DSS, B_AES_256, T);
add("SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", 0x000a, --p, K_RSA, B_3DES, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", 0xC003, --p, K_ECDH_ECDSA, B_3DES, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", 0xC00D, --p, K_ECDH_RSA, B_3DES, T);
add("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", 0xC008, --p, K_ECDHE_ECDSA,B_3DES, T);
add("TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", 0xC012, --p, K_ECDHE_RSA, B_3DES, T);
add("SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", 0x0016, --p, K_DHE_RSA, B_3DES, T);
add("SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", 0x0013, --p, K_DHE_DSS, B_3DES, N);
add("SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", 0x0009, --p, K_RSA, B_DES, N);
add("SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", 0x0015, --p, K_DHE_RSA, B_DES, N);
add("SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", 0x0012, --p, K_DHE_DSS, B_DES, N);
add("SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5", 0x0003, --p, K_RSA_EXPORT, B_RC4_40, N);
add("SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA", 0x0008, --p, K_RSA_EXPORT, B_DES_40, N);
add("SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA", 0x0014, --p, K_DHE_RSA, B_DES_40, N);
add("SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA", 0x0011, --p, K_DHE_DSS, B_DES_40, N);
add("SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5",
0x0004, --p, K_RSA, B_RC4_128, N);
add("SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA",
0x0005, --p, K_RSA, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
0x002f, --p, K_RSA, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
0x0035, --p, K_RSA, B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA",
0xC002, --p, K_ECDH_ECDSA, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
0xC004, --p, K_ECDH_ECDSA, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
0xC005, --p, K_ECDH_ECDSA, B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA",
0xC00C, --p, K_ECDH_RSA, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
0xC00E, --p, K_ECDH_RSA, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
0xC00F, --p, K_ECDH_RSA, B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA",
0xC007, --p, K_ECDHE_ECDSA,B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
0xC009, --p, K_ECDHE_ECDSA,B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
0xC00A, --p, K_ECDHE_ECDSA,B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA",
0xC011, --p, K_ECDHE_RSA, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
0xC013, --p, K_ECDHE_RSA, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
0xC014, --p, K_ECDHE_RSA, B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
0x0033, --p, K_DHE_RSA, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
0x0039, --p, K_DHE_RSA, B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
0x0032, --p, K_DHE_DSS, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
0x0038, --p, K_DHE_DSS, B_AES_256, T);
add("SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
0x000a, --p, K_RSA, B_3DES, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
0xC003, --p, K_ECDH_ECDSA, B_3DES, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
0xC00D, --p, K_ECDH_RSA, B_3DES, T);
add("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
0xC008, --p, K_ECDHE_ECDSA,B_3DES, T);
add("TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
0xC012, --p, K_ECDHE_RSA, B_3DES, T);
add("SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
0x0016, --p, K_DHE_RSA, B_3DES, T);
add("SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
0x0013, --p, K_DHE_DSS, B_3DES, N);
add("SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA",
0x0009, --p, K_RSA, B_DES, N);
add("SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA",
0x0015, --p, K_DHE_RSA, B_DES, N);
add("SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA",
0x0012, --p, K_DHE_DSS, B_DES, N);
add("SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5",
0x0003, --p, K_RSA_EXPORT, B_RC4_40, N);
add("SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
0x0008, --p, K_RSA_EXPORT, B_DES_40, N);
add("SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
0x0014, --p, K_DHE_RSA, B_DES_40, N);
add("SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
0x0011, --p, K_DHE_DSS, B_DES_40, N);
// Renegotiation protection request Signalling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV)
add("TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV",
0x00ff, --p, K_SCSV, B_NULL, T);
// Definition of the CipherSuites that are supported but not enabled
// by default.
// They are listed in preference order, preferred first.
p = DEFAULT_SUITES_PRIORITY;
// Anonymous key exchange and the NULL ciphers
add("SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", 0x0001, --p, K_RSA, B_NULL, N);
add("SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", 0x0002, --p, K_RSA, B_NULL, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", 0xC001, --p, K_ECDH_ECDSA, B_NULL, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", 0xC00B, --p, K_ECDH_RSA, B_NULL, N);
add("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", 0xC006, --p, K_ECDHE_ECDSA,B_NULL, N);
add("TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", 0xC010, --p, K_ECDHE_RSA, B_NULL, N);
add("SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", 0x0018, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", 0x0034, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_AES_128, N);
add("TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", 0x003a, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_AES_256, N);
add("SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", 0x001b, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_3DES, N);
add("SSL_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", 0x001a, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_DES, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", 0xC016, --p, K_ECDH_ANON, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", 0xC018, --p, K_ECDH_ANON, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", 0xC019, --p, K_ECDH_ANON, B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", 0xC017, --p, K_ECDH_ANON, B_3DES, T);
add("SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5", 0x0017, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_RC4_40, N);
add("SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA", 0x0019, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_DES_40, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA", 0xC015, --p, K_ECDH_ANON, B_NULL, N);
// Supported Kerberos ciphersuites from RFC2712
add("TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", 0x0020, --p, K_KRB5, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", 0x0024, --p, K_KRB5, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", 0x001f, --p, K_KRB5, B_3DES, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5", 0x0023, --p, K_KRB5, B_3DES, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", 0x001e, --p, K_KRB5, B_DES, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5", 0x0022, --p, K_KRB5, B_DES, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA", 0x0028, --p, K_KRB5_EXPORT, B_RC4_40, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5", 0x002b, --p, K_KRB5_EXPORT, B_RC4_40, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA", 0x0026, --p, K_KRB5_EXPORT, B_DES_40, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5", 0x0029, --p, K_KRB5_EXPORT, B_DES_40, N);
// Anonymous key exchange and the NULL ciphers
add("SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5",
0x0001, --p, K_RSA, B_NULL, N);
add("SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA",
0x0002, --p, K_RSA, B_NULL, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA",
0xC001, --p, K_ECDH_ECDSA, B_NULL, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA",
0xC00B, --p, K_ECDH_RSA, B_NULL, N);
add("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA",
0xC006, --p, K_ECDHE_ECDSA,B_NULL, N);
add("TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA",
0xC010, --p, K_ECDHE_RSA, B_NULL, N);
add("SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5",
0x0018, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
0x0034, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_AES_128, N);
add("TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
0x003a, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_AES_256, N);
add("SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
0x001b, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_3DES, N);
add("SSL_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA",
0x001a, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_DES, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA",
0xC016, --p, K_ECDH_ANON, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
0xC018, --p, K_ECDH_ANON, B_AES_128, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
0xC019, --p, K_ECDH_ANON, B_AES_256, T);
add("TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
0xC017, --p, K_ECDH_ANON, B_3DES, T);
add("SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5",
0x0017, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_RC4_40, N);
add("SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
0x0019, --p, K_DH_ANON, B_DES_40, N);
add("TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA",
0xC015, --p, K_ECDH_ANON, B_NULL, N);
// Supported Kerberos ciphersuites from RFC2712
add("TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA",
0x0020, --p, K_KRB5, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5",
0x0024, --p, K_KRB5, B_RC4_128, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
0x001f, --p, K_KRB5, B_3DES, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5",
0x0023, --p, K_KRB5, B_3DES, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA",
0x001e, --p, K_KRB5, B_DES, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5",
0x0022, --p, K_KRB5, B_DES, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA",
0x0028, --p, K_KRB5_EXPORT, B_RC4_40, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5",
0x002b, --p, K_KRB5_EXPORT, B_RC4_40, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA",
0x0026, --p, K_KRB5_EXPORT, B_DES_40, N);
add("TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5",
0x0029, --p, K_KRB5_EXPORT, B_DES_40, N);
// Register the names of a few additional CipherSuites.
// Makes them show up as names instead of numbers in
......@@ -618,4 +706,6 @@ add("TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5", 0x0029, --p, K_KRB5_EXPORT, B_DES_4
// ciphersuite SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL
final static CipherSuite C_NULL = CipherSuite.valueOf(0, 0);
// ciphersuite TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
final static CipherSuite C_SCSV = CipherSuite.valueOf(0x00, 0xff);
}
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002, 2007, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -51,8 +51,9 @@ final class CipherSuiteList {
// null if not yet checked.
private volatile Boolean containsEC;
// for use by buildAvailableCache() only
private CipherSuiteList(Collection<CipherSuite> cipherSuites) {
// for use by buildAvailableCache() and
// Handshaker.getKickstartMessage() only
CipherSuiteList(Collection<CipherSuite> cipherSuites) {
this.cipherSuites = cipherSuites;
}
......@@ -221,15 +222,18 @@ final class CipherSuiteList {
// SortedSet automatically arranges ciphersuites in default
// preference order
Set<CipherSuite> cipherSuites = new TreeSet<CipherSuite>();
Collection<CipherSuite> allowedCipherSuites = CipherSuite.allowedCipherSuites();
Collection<CipherSuite> allowedCipherSuites =
CipherSuite.allowedCipherSuites();
for (CipherSuite c : allowedCipherSuites) {
if ((c.allowed == false) || (c.priority < minPriority)) {
continue;
}
if (c.isAvailable()) {
cipherSuites.add(c);
}
}
return new CipherSuiteList(cipherSuites);
}
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -94,16 +94,24 @@ final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
*/
ClientHandshaker(SSLSocketImpl socket, SSLContextImpl context,
ProtocolList enabledProtocols,
ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion) {
super(socket, context, enabledProtocols, true, true);
this.activeProtocolVersion = activeProtocolVersion;
ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion,
boolean isInitialHandshake, boolean secureRenegotiation,
byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) {
super(socket, context, enabledProtocols, true, true,
activeProtocolVersion, isInitialHandshake, secureRenegotiation,
clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
}
ClientHandshaker(SSLEngineImpl engine, SSLContextImpl context,
ProtocolList enabledProtocols,
ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion) {
super(engine, context, enabledProtocols, true, true);
this.activeProtocolVersion = activeProtocolVersion;
ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion,
boolean isInitialHandshake, boolean secureRenegotiation,
byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) {
super(engine, context, enabledProtocols, true, true,
activeProtocolVersion, isInitialHandshake, secureRenegotiation,
clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
}
/*
......@@ -279,10 +287,11 @@ final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
// sent the "client hello" but the server's not seen it.
//
if (state < HandshakeMessage.ht_client_hello) {
if (!renegotiable) { // renegotiation is not allowed.
if (!secureRenegotiation && !allowUnsafeRenegotiation) {
// renegotiation is not allowed.
if (activeProtocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS10.v) {
// response with a no_negotiation warning,
warningSE(Alerts.alert_no_negotiation);
// response with a no_renegotiation warning,
warningSE(Alerts.alert_no_renegotiation);
// invalidate the handshake so that the caller can
// dispose this object.
......@@ -293,26 +302,24 @@ final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
// and the next handshake message will become incomplete.
//
// However, according to SSL/TLS specifications, no more
// handshake message could immediately follow ClientHello
// or HelloRequest. But in case of any improper messages,
// we'd better check to ensure there is no remaining bytes
// in the handshake input stream.
if (input.available() > 0) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_unexpected_message,
"HelloRequest followed by an unexpected " +
"handshake message");
}
// handshake message should immediately follow ClientHello
// or HelloRequest. So just let it be.
} else {
// For SSLv3, send the handshake_failure fatal error.
// Note that SSLv3 does not define a no_negotiation alert
// like TLSv1. However we cannot ignore the message
// Note that SSLv3 does not define a no_renegotiation
// alert like TLSv1. However we cannot ignore the message
// simply, otherwise the other side was waiting for a
// response that would never come.
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"renegotiation is not allowed");
"Renegotiation is not allowed");
}
} else {
if (!secureRenegotiation) {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
System.out.println(
"Warning: continue with insecure renegotiation");
}
}
kickstart();
}
}
......@@ -347,6 +354,68 @@ final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
// Handshake streams
setVersion(mesgVersion);
// check the "renegotiation_info" extension
RenegotiationInfoExtension serverHelloRI = (RenegotiationInfoExtension)
mesg.extensions.get(ExtensionType.EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO);
if (serverHelloRI != null) {
if (isInitialHandshake) {
// verify the length of the "renegotiated_connection" field
if (!serverHelloRI.isEmpty()) {
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"The renegotiation_info field is not empty");
}
secureRenegotiation = true;
} else {
// For a legacy renegotiation, the client MUST verify that
// it does not contain the "renegotiation_info" extension.
if (!secureRenegotiation) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Unexpected renegotiation indication extension");
}
// verify the client_verify_data and server_verify_data values
byte[] verifyData =
new byte[clientVerifyData.length + serverVerifyData.length];
System.arraycopy(clientVerifyData, 0, verifyData,
0, clientVerifyData.length);
System.arraycopy(serverVerifyData, 0, verifyData,
clientVerifyData.length, serverVerifyData.length);
if (!Arrays.equals(verifyData,
serverHelloRI.getRenegotiatedConnection())) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Incorrect verify data in ServerHello " +
"renegotiation_info message");
}
}
} else {
// no renegotiation indication extension
if (isInitialHandshake) {
if (!allowLegacyHelloMessages) {
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Failed to negotiate the use of secure renegotiation");
}
secureRenegotiation = false;
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
System.out.println("Warning: No renegotiation " +
"indication extension in ServerHello");
}
} else {
// For a secure renegotiation, the client must abort the
// handshake if no "renegotiation_info" extension is present.
if (secureRenegotiation) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"No renegotiation indication extension");
}
// we have already allowed unsafe renegotation before request
// the renegotiation.
}
}
//
// Save server nonce, we always use it to compute connection
// keys and it's also used to create the master secret if we're
......@@ -354,10 +423,11 @@ final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
//
svr_random = mesg.svr_random;
if (isEnabled(mesg.cipherSuite) == false) {
if (isNegotiable(mesg.cipherSuite) == false) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_illegal_parameter,
"Server selected disabled ciphersuite " + cipherSuite);
"Server selected improper ciphersuite " + cipherSuite);
}
setCipherSuite(mesg.cipherSuite);
if (mesg.compression_method != 0) {
......@@ -452,7 +522,8 @@ final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
for (HelloExtension ext : mesg.extensions.list()) {
ExtensionType type = ext.type;
if ((type != ExtensionType.EXT_ELLIPTIC_CURVES)
&& (type != ExtensionType.EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS)) {
&& (type != ExtensionType.EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS)
&& (type != ExtensionType.EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO)) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_unsupported_extension,
"Server sent an unsupported extension: " + type);
}
......@@ -868,6 +939,13 @@ final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
// NOTREACHED
}
/*
* save server verify data for secure renegotiation
*/
if (secureRenegotiation) {
serverVerifyData = mesg.getVerifyData();
}
/*
* OK, it verified. If we're doing the fast handshake, add that
* "Finished" message to the hash of handshake messages, then send
......@@ -920,6 +998,13 @@ final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
*/
sendChangeCipherSpec(mesg, finishedTag);
/*
* save client verify data for secure renegotiation
*/
if (secureRenegotiation) {
clientVerifyData = mesg.getVerifyData();
}
/*
* Update state machine so server MUST send 'finished' next.
* (In "long" handshake case; in short case, we're responding
......@@ -933,11 +1018,14 @@ final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
* Returns a ClientHello message to kickstart renegotiations
*/
HandshakeMessage getKickstartMessage() throws SSLException {
ClientHello mesg = new ClientHello(sslContext.getSecureRandom(),
protocolVersion);
maxProtocolVersion = protocolVersion;
// session ID of the ClientHello message
SessionId sessionId = SSLSessionImpl.nullSession.getSessionId();
// a list of cipher suites sent by the client
CipherSuiteList cipherSuites = enabledCipherSuites;
clnt_random = mesg.clnt_random;
// set the max protocol version this client is supporting.
maxProtocolVersion = protocolVersion;
//
// Try to resume an existing session. This might be mandatory,
......@@ -962,9 +1050,9 @@ final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
if (session != null) {
CipherSuite sessionSuite = session.getSuite();
ProtocolVersion sessionVersion = session.getProtocolVersion();
if (isEnabled(sessionSuite) == false) {
if (isNegotiable(sessionSuite) == false) {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) {
System.out.println("%% can't resume, cipher disabled");
System.out.println("%% can't resume, unavailable cipher");
}
session = null;
}
......@@ -984,9 +1072,8 @@ final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
+ " from port " + getLocalPortSE());
}
}
mesg.sessionId = session.getSessionId();
mesg.protocolVersion = sessionVersion;
sessionId = session.getSessionId();
maxProtocolVersion = sessionVersion;
// Update SSL version number in underlying SSL socket and
......@@ -995,33 +1082,78 @@ final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
setVersion(sessionVersion);
}
//
// don't say much beyond the obvious if we _must_ resume.
//
/*
* Force use of the previous session ciphersuite, and
* add the SCSV if enabled.
*/
if (!enableNewSession) {
if (session == null) {
throw new SSLException(
"Can't reuse existing SSL client session");
}
mesg.setCipherSuites(new CipherSuiteList(sessionSuite));
return mesg;
Collection<CipherSuite> cipherList =
new ArrayList<CipherSuite>(2);
cipherList.add(sessionSuite);
if (!secureRenegotiation &&
cipherSuites.contains(CipherSuite.C_SCSV)) {
cipherList.add(CipherSuite.C_SCSV);
} // otherwise, renegotiation_info extension will be used
cipherSuites = new CipherSuiteList(cipherList);
}
}
if (session == null) {
if (enableNewSession) {
mesg.sessionId = SSLSessionImpl.nullSession.getSessionId();
} else {
throw new SSLException("No existing session to resume.");
if (session == null && !enableNewSession) {
throw new SSLException("No existing session to resume");
}
// exclude SCSV for secure renegotiation
if (secureRenegotiation && cipherSuites.contains(CipherSuite.C_SCSV)) {
Collection<CipherSuite> cipherList =
new ArrayList<CipherSuite>(cipherSuites.size() - 1);
for (CipherSuite suite : cipherSuites.collection()) {
if (suite != CipherSuite.C_SCSV) {
cipherList.add(suite);
}
}
//
// All we have left to do is fill out the cipher suites.
// (If this changes, change the 'return' above!)
//
mesg.setCipherSuites(enabledCipherSuites);
cipherSuites = new CipherSuiteList(cipherList);
}
// make sure there is a negotiable cipher suite.
boolean negotiable = false;
for (CipherSuite suite : cipherSuites.collection()) {
if (isNegotiable(suite)) {
negotiable = true;
break;
}
}
if (!negotiable) {
throw new SSLException("No negotiable cipher suite");
}
// create the ClientHello message
ClientHello clientHelloMessage = new ClientHello(
sslContext.getSecureRandom(), maxProtocolVersion,
sessionId, cipherSuites);
// reset the client random cookie
clnt_random = clientHelloMessage.clnt_random;
/*
* need to set the renegotiation_info extension for:
* 1: secure renegotiation
* 2: initial handshake and no SCSV in the ClientHello
* 3: insecure renegotiation and no SCSV in the ClientHello
*/
if (secureRenegotiation ||
!cipherSuites.contains(CipherSuite.C_SCSV)) {
clientHelloMessage.addRenegotiationInfoExtension(clientVerifyData);
}
return mesg;
return clientHelloMessage;
}
/*
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -172,9 +172,7 @@ public abstract class HandshakeMessage {
* Server can ask the client to initiate a new handshake, e.g. to change
* session parameters after a connection has been (re)established.
*/
static final
class HelloRequest extends HandshakeMessage
{
static final class HelloRequest extends HandshakeMessage {
int messageType() { return ht_hello_request; }
HelloRequest() { }
......@@ -210,10 +208,7 @@ class HelloRequest extends HandshakeMessage
* Until we know how to parse it, we will just read what we know
* about, and let our caller handle the jumps over unknown data.
*/
static final
class ClientHello extends HandshakeMessage
{
int messageType() { return ht_client_hello; }
static final class ClientHello extends HandshakeMessage {
ProtocolVersion protocolVersion;
RandomCookie clnt_random;
......@@ -225,27 +220,48 @@ class ClientHello extends HandshakeMessage
private final static byte[] NULL_COMPRESSION = new byte[] {0};
ClientHello(SecureRandom generator, ProtocolVersion protocolVersion) {
ClientHello(SecureRandom generator, ProtocolVersion protocolVersion,
SessionId sessionId, CipherSuiteList cipherSuites) {
this.protocolVersion = protocolVersion;
this.sessionId = sessionId;
this.cipherSuites = cipherSuites;
if (cipherSuites.containsEC()) {
extensions.add(SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.DEFAULT);
extensions.add(SupportedEllipticPointFormatsExtension.DEFAULT);
}
clnt_random = new RandomCookie(generator);
compression_methods = NULL_COMPRESSION;
// sessionId, cipher_suites TBS later
}
ClientHello(HandshakeInStream s, int messageLength) throws IOException {
protocolVersion = ProtocolVersion.valueOf(s.getInt8(), s.getInt8());
clnt_random = new RandomCookie(s);
sessionId = new SessionId(s.getBytes8());
cipherSuites = new CipherSuiteList(s);
compression_methods = s.getBytes8();
if (messageLength() != messageLength) {
extensions = new HelloExtensions(s);
}
}
CipherSuiteList getCipherSuites() {
return cipherSuites;
}
// Set the ciphersuites.
// This method may only be called once.
void setCipherSuites(CipherSuiteList cipherSuites) {
this.cipherSuites = cipherSuites;
if (cipherSuites.containsEC()) {
extensions.add(SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.DEFAULT);
extensions.add(SupportedEllipticPointFormatsExtension.DEFAULT);
}
// add renegotiation_info extension
void addRenegotiationInfoExtension(byte[] clientVerifyData) {
HelloExtension renegotiationInfo = new RenegotiationInfoExtension(
clientVerifyData, new byte[0]);
extensions.add(renegotiationInfo);
}
@Override
int messageType() { return ht_client_hello; }
@Override
int messageLength() {
/*
* Add fixed size parts of each field...
......@@ -258,17 +274,7 @@ class ClientHello extends HandshakeMessage
+ extensions.length();
}
ClientHello(HandshakeInStream s, int messageLength) throws IOException {
protocolVersion = ProtocolVersion.valueOf(s.getInt8(), s.getInt8());
clnt_random = new RandomCookie(s);
sessionId = new SessionId(s.getBytes8());
cipherSuites = new CipherSuiteList(s);
compression_methods = s.getBytes8();
if (messageLength() != messageLength) {
extensions = new HelloExtensions(s);
}
}
@Override
void send(HandshakeOutStream s) throws IOException {
s.putInt8(protocolVersion.major);
s.putInt8(protocolVersion.minor);
......@@ -279,6 +285,7 @@ class ClientHello extends HandshakeMessage
extensions.send(s);
}
@Override
void print(PrintStream s) throws IOException {
s.println("*** ClientHello, " + protocolVersion);
......@@ -315,7 +322,6 @@ class ServerHello extends HandshakeMessage
CipherSuite cipherSuite;
byte compression_method;
HelloExtensions extensions = new HelloExtensions();
int extensionLength;
ServerHello() {
// empty
......@@ -1425,8 +1431,6 @@ static final class CertificateVerify extends HandshakeMessage {
*/
static final class Finished extends HandshakeMessage {
int messageType() { return ht_finished; }
// constant for a Finished message sent by the client
final static int CLIENT = 1;
......@@ -1542,14 +1546,25 @@ static final class Finished extends HandshakeMessage {
CertificateVerify.updateDigest(md, pad1, pad2, masterSecret);
}
// get the verify_data of the finished message
byte[] getVerifyData() {
return verifyData;
}
@Override
int messageType() { return ht_finished; }
@Override
int messageLength() {
return verifyData.length;
}
@Override
void send(HandshakeOutStream out) throws IOException {
out.write(verifyData);
}
@Override
void print(PrintStream s) throws IOException {
s.println("*** Finished");
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("verbose")) {
......@@ -1557,7 +1572,6 @@ static final class Finished extends HandshakeMessage {
s.println("***");
}
}
}
//
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -66,6 +66,14 @@ abstract class Handshaker {
// the currently active protocol version during a renegotiation
ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion;
// security parameters for secure renegotiation.
boolean secureRenegotiation;
byte[] clientVerifyData;
byte[] serverVerifyData;
// is it an initial negotiation or a renegotiation?
boolean isInitialHandshake;
// list of enabled protocols
ProtocolList enabledProtocols;
......@@ -128,31 +136,66 @@ abstract class Handshaker {
static final Debug debug = Debug.getInstance("ssl");
// By default, disable the unsafe legacy session renegotiation
static final boolean renegotiable = Debug.getBooleanProperty(
static final boolean allowUnsafeRenegotiation = Debug.getBooleanProperty(
"sun.security.ssl.allowUnsafeRenegotiation", false);
// For maximum interoperability and backward compatibility, RFC 5746
// allows server (or client) to accept ClientHello (or ServerHello)
// message without the secure renegotiation_info extension or SCSV.
//
// For maximum security, RFC 5746 also allows server (or client) to
// reject such message with a fatal "handshake_failure" alert.
//
// By default, allow such legacy hello messages.
static final boolean allowLegacyHelloMessages = Debug.getBooleanProperty(
"sun.security.ssl.allowLegacyHelloMessages", true);
// need to dispose the object when it is invalidated
boolean invalidated;
Handshaker(SSLSocketImpl c, SSLContextImpl context,
ProtocolList enabledProtocols, boolean needCertVerify,
boolean isClient) {
boolean isClient, ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion,
boolean isInitialHandshake, boolean secureRenegotiation,
byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) {
this.conn = c;
init(context, enabledProtocols, needCertVerify, isClient);
init(context, enabledProtocols, needCertVerify, isClient,
activeProtocolVersion, isInitialHandshake, secureRenegotiation,
clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
}
Handshaker(SSLEngineImpl engine, SSLContextImpl context,
ProtocolList enabledProtocols, boolean needCertVerify,
boolean isClient) {
boolean isClient, ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion,
boolean isInitialHandshake, boolean secureRenegotiation,
byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) {
this.engine = engine;
init(context, enabledProtocols, needCertVerify, isClient);
init(context, enabledProtocols, needCertVerify, isClient,
activeProtocolVersion, isInitialHandshake, secureRenegotiation,
clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
}
private void init(SSLContextImpl context, ProtocolList enabledProtocols,
boolean needCertVerify, boolean isClient) {
boolean needCertVerify, boolean isClient,
ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion,
boolean isInitialHandshake, boolean secureRenegotiation,
byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
System.out.println(
"Allow unsafe renegotiation: " + allowUnsafeRenegotiation +
"\nAllow legacy hello messages: " + allowLegacyHelloMessages +
"\nIs initial handshake: " + isInitialHandshake +
"\nIs secure renegotiation: " + secureRenegotiation);
}
this.sslContext = context;
this.isClient = isClient;
this.activeProtocolVersion = activeProtocolVersion;
this.isInitialHandshake = isInitialHandshake;
this.secureRenegotiation = secureRenegotiation;
this.clientVerifyData = clientVerifyData;
this.serverVerifyData = serverVerifyData;
enableNewSession = true;
invalidated = false;
......@@ -353,8 +396,8 @@ abstract class Handshaker {
* changed due to change in JCE providers since it was enabled).
* Does not check if the required server certificates are available.
*/
boolean isEnabled(CipherSuite s) {
return enabledCipherSuites.contains(s) && s.isAvailable();
boolean isNegotiable(CipherSuite s) {
return enabledCipherSuites.contains(s) && s.isNegotiable();
}
/**
......@@ -458,6 +501,27 @@ abstract class Handshaker {
return session;
}
/*
* Returns true if renegotiation is in use for this connection.
*/
boolean isSecureRenegotiation() {
return secureRenegotiation;
}
/*
* Returns the verify_data from the Finished message sent by the client.
*/
byte[] getClientVerifyData() {
return clientVerifyData;
}
/*
* Returns the verify_data from the Finished message sent by the server.
*/
byte[] getServerVerifyData() {
return serverVerifyData;
}
/*
* This routine is fed SSL handshake records when they become available,
* and processes messages found therein.
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 2006, 2008, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2006, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -81,7 +81,10 @@ final class HelloExtensions {
} else if (extType == ExtensionType.EXT_ELLIPTIC_CURVES) {
extension = new SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension(s, extlen);
} else if (extType == ExtensionType.EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS) {
extension = new SupportedEllipticPointFormatsExtension(s, extlen);
extension =
new SupportedEllipticPointFormatsExtension(s, extlen);
} else if (extType == ExtensionType.EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO) {
extension = new RenegotiationInfoExtension(s, extlen);
} else {
extension = new UnknownExtension(s, extlen, extType);
}
......@@ -89,7 +92,8 @@ final class HelloExtensions {
len -= extlen + 4;
}
if (len != 0) {
throw new SSLProtocolException("Error parsing extensions: extra data");
throw new SSLProtocolException(
"Error parsing extensions: extra data");
}
}
......@@ -162,7 +166,8 @@ final class ExtensionType {
return name;
}
static List<ExtensionType> knownExtensions = new ArrayList<ExtensionType>(8);
static List<ExtensionType> knownExtensions =
new ArrayList<ExtensionType>(9);
static ExtensionType get(int id) {
for (ExtensionType ext : knownExtensions) {
......@@ -180,17 +185,44 @@ final class ExtensionType {
}
// extensions defined in RFC 3546
final static ExtensionType EXT_SERVER_NAME = e( 0, "server_name");
final static ExtensionType EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH = e( 1, "max_fragment_length");
final static ExtensionType EXT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_URL = e( 2, "client_certificate_url");
final static ExtensionType EXT_TRUSTED_CA_KEYS = e( 3, "trusted_ca_keys");
final static ExtensionType EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC = e( 4, "truncated_hmac");
final static ExtensionType EXT_STATUS_REQUEST = e( 5, "status_request");
final static ExtensionType EXT_SERVER_NAME =
e(0x0000, "server_name"); // IANA registry value: 0
final static ExtensionType EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH =
e(0x0001, "max_fragment_length"); // IANA registry value: 1
final static ExtensionType EXT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_URL =
e(0x0002, "client_certificate_url"); // IANA registry value: 2
final static ExtensionType EXT_TRUSTED_CA_KEYS =
e(0x0003, "trusted_ca_keys"); // IANA registry value: 3
final static ExtensionType EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC =
e(0x0004, "truncated_hmac"); // IANA registry value: 4
final static ExtensionType EXT_STATUS_REQUEST =
e(0x0005, "status_request"); // IANA registry value: 5
// extensions defined in RFC 4681
final static ExtensionType EXT_USER_MAPPING =
e(0x0006, "user_mapping"); // IANA registry value: 6
// extensions defined in RFC 5081
final static ExtensionType EXT_CERT_TYPE =
e(0x0009, "cert_type"); // IANA registry value: 9
// extensions defined in RFC 4492 (ECC)
final static ExtensionType EXT_ELLIPTIC_CURVES = e(10, "elliptic_curves");
final static ExtensionType EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS = e(11, "ec_point_formats");
final static ExtensionType EXT_ELLIPTIC_CURVES =
e(0x000A, "elliptic_curves"); // IANA registry value: 10
final static ExtensionType EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS =
e(0x000B, "ec_point_formats"); // IANA registry value: 11
// extensions defined in RFC 5054
final static ExtensionType EXT_SRP =
e(0x000C, "srp"); // IANA registry value: 12
// extensions defined in RFC 5246
final static ExtensionType EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS =
e(0x000D, "signature_algorithms"); // IANA registry value: 13
// extensions defined in RFC 5746
final static ExtensionType EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO =
e(0xff01, "renegotiation_info"); // IANA registry value: 65281
}
abstract class HelloExtension {
......@@ -238,9 +270,11 @@ final class UnknownExtension extends HelloExtension {
}
}
// Support for the server_name extension is incomplete. Parsing is implemented
// so that we get nicer debug output, but we neither send it nor do we do
// act on it if we receive it.
/*
* Support for the server_name extension is incomplete. Parsing is implemented
* so that we get nicer debug output, but we neither send it nor do we do
* act on it if we receive it.
*/
final class ServerNameExtension extends HelloExtension {
final static int NAME_HOST_NAME = 0;
......@@ -268,9 +302,9 @@ final class ServerNameExtension extends HelloExtension {
final String hostname;
ServerName(HandshakeInStream s) throws IOException {
length = s.getInt16();
type = s.getInt8();
data = s.getBytes16();
length = s.getInt16(); // ServerNameList length
type = s.getInt8(); // NameType
data = s.getBytes16(); // HostName (length read in getBytes16)
if (type == NAME_HOST_NAME) {
hostname = new String(data, "UTF8");
} else {
......@@ -549,3 +583,85 @@ final class SupportedEllipticPointFormatsExtension extends HelloExtension {
return "Extension " + type + ", formats: " + list;
}
}
/*
* For secure renegotiation, RFC5746 defines a new TLS extension,
* "renegotiation_info" (with extension type 0xff01), which contains a
* cryptographic binding to the enclosing TLS connection (if any) for
* which the renegotiation is being performed. The "extension data"
* field of this extension contains a "RenegotiationInfo" structure:
*
* struct {
* opaque renegotiated_connection<0..255>;
* } RenegotiationInfo;
*/
final class RenegotiationInfoExtension extends HelloExtension {
private final byte[] renegotiated_connection;
RenegotiationInfoExtension(byte[] clientVerifyData,
byte[] serverVerifyData) {
super(ExtensionType.EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO);
if (clientVerifyData.length != 0) {
renegotiated_connection =
new byte[clientVerifyData.length + serverVerifyData.length];
System.arraycopy(clientVerifyData, 0, renegotiated_connection,
0, clientVerifyData.length);
if (serverVerifyData.length != 0) {
System.arraycopy(serverVerifyData, 0, renegotiated_connection,
clientVerifyData.length, serverVerifyData.length);
}
} else {
// ignore both the client and server verify data.
renegotiated_connection = new byte[0];
}
}
RenegotiationInfoExtension(HandshakeInStream s, int len)
throws IOException {
super(ExtensionType.EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO);
// check the extension length
if (len < 1) {
throw new SSLProtocolException("Invalid " + type + " extension");
}
int renegoInfoDataLen = s.getInt8();
if (renegoInfoDataLen + 1 != len) { // + 1 = the byte we just read
throw new SSLProtocolException("Invalid " + type + " extension");
}
renegotiated_connection = new byte[renegoInfoDataLen];
if (renegoInfoDataLen != 0) {
s.read(renegotiated_connection, 0, renegoInfoDataLen);
}
}
// Length of the encoded extension, including the type and length fields
int length() {
return 5 + renegotiated_connection.length;
}
void send(HandshakeOutStream s) throws IOException {
s.putInt16(type.id);
s.putInt16(renegotiated_connection.length + 1);
s.putBytes8(renegotiated_connection);
}
boolean isEmpty() {
return renegotiated_connection.length == 0;
}
byte[] getRenegotiatedConnection() {
return renegotiated_connection;
}
public String toString() {
return "Extension " + type + ", renegotiated_connection: " +
(renegotiated_connection.length == 0 ? "<empty>" :
Debug.toString(renegotiated_connection));
}
}
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2008, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -343,6 +343,9 @@ class OutputRecord extends ByteArrayOutputStream implements Record {
* example, Netscape Commerce 1.0 servers. The V3 message is in the
* header and the bytes passed as parameter. This routine translates
* the V3 message into an equivalent V2 one.
*
* Note that the translation will strip off all hello extensions as
* SSL V2.0 does not support hello extension.
*/
private void V3toV2ClientHello(byte v3Msg []) throws SSLException {
int v3SessionIdLenOffset = 2 + 32; // version + nonce
......@@ -361,12 +364,21 @@ class OutputRecord extends ByteArrayOutputStream implements Record {
int v3CipherSpecOffset = v3CipherSpecLenOffset + 2; // skip length
int v2CipherSpecLen = 0;
count = 11;
boolean containsRenegoInfoSCSV = false;
for (int i = 0; i < cipherSpecs; i++) {
byte byte1, byte2;
byte1 = v3Msg[v3CipherSpecOffset++];
byte2 = v3Msg[v3CipherSpecOffset++];
v2CipherSpecLen += V3toV2CipherSuite(byte1, byte2);
if (!containsRenegoInfoSCSV &&
byte1 == (byte)0x00 && byte2 == (byte)0xFF) {
containsRenegoInfoSCSV = true;
}
}
if (!containsRenegoInfoSCSV) {
v2CipherSpecLen += V3toV2CipherSuite((byte)0x00, (byte)0xFF);
}
/*
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -275,6 +275,12 @@ final public class SSLEngineImpl extends SSLEngine {
private CipherBox readCipher, writeCipher;
// NOTE: compression state would be saved here
/*
* security parameters for secure renegotiation.
*/
private boolean secureRenegotiation;
private byte[] clientVerifyData;
private byte[] serverVerifyData;
/*
* READ ME * READ ME * READ ME * READ ME * READ ME * READ ME *
......@@ -356,6 +362,11 @@ final public class SSLEngineImpl extends SSLEngine {
writeCipher = CipherBox.NULL;
writeMAC = MAC.NULL;
// default security parameters for secure renegotiation
secureRenegotiation = false;
clientVerifyData = new byte[0];
serverVerifyData = new byte[0];
enabledCipherSuites = CipherSuiteList.getDefault();
enabledProtocols = ProtocolList.getDefault();
......@@ -435,10 +446,13 @@ final public class SSLEngineImpl extends SSLEngine {
if (roleIsServer) {
handshaker = new ServerHandshaker(this, sslContext,
enabledProtocols, doClientAuth,
connectionState == cs_RENEGOTIATE, protocolVersion);
protocolVersion, connectionState == cs_HANDSHAKE,
secureRenegotiation, clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
} else {
handshaker = new ClientHandshaker(this, sslContext,
enabledProtocols, protocolVersion);
enabledProtocols,
protocolVersion, connectionState == cs_HANDSHAKE,
secureRenegotiation, clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
}
handshaker.enabledCipherSuites = enabledCipherSuites;
handshaker.setEnableSessionCreation(enableSessionCreation);
......@@ -640,8 +654,16 @@ final public class SSLEngineImpl extends SSLEngine {
break;
case cs_DATA:
if (!Handshaker.renegotiable) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException("renegotiation is not allowed");
if (!secureRenegotiation && !Handshaker.allowUnsafeRenegotiation) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException(
"Insecure renegotiation is not allowed");
}
if (!secureRenegotiation) {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
System.out.println(
"Warning: Using insecure renegotiation");
}
}
// initialize the handshaker, move to cs_RENEGOTIATE
......@@ -978,6 +1000,12 @@ final public class SSLEngineImpl extends SSLEngine {
connectionState = cs_DATA;
}
} else if (handshaker.isDone()) {
// reset the parameters for secure renegotiation.
secureRenegotiation =
handshaker.isSecureRenegotiation();
clientVerifyData = handshaker.getClientVerifyData();
serverVerifyData = handshaker.getServerVerifyData();
sess = handshaker.getSession();
if (!writer.hasOutboundData()) {
hsStatus = HandshakeStatus.FINISHED;
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2008, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -307,8 +307,9 @@ class SSLServerSocketImpl extends SSLServerSocket
try {
ServerHandshaker handshaker = tmp.getServerHandshaker();
for (Iterator t = enabledCipherSuites.iterator(); t.hasNext(); ) {
CipherSuite suite = (CipherSuite)t.next();
for (Iterator<CipherSuite> t = enabledCipherSuites.iterator();
t.hasNext();) {
CipherSuite suite = t.next();
if (handshaker.trySetCipherSuite(suite)) {
checkedEnabled = true;
return;
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -275,9 +275,9 @@ final public class SSLSocketImpl extends BaseSSLSocketImpl {
* This is necessary so that processing of close_notify alerts
* from the peer are handled properly.
*/
private Object handshakeLock;
ReentrantLock writeLock;
private Object readLock;
final private Object handshakeLock = new Object();
final ReentrantLock writeLock = new ReentrantLock();
final private Object readLock = new Object();
private InputRecord inrec;
......@@ -288,6 +288,13 @@ final public class SSLSocketImpl extends BaseSSLSocketImpl {
private CipherBox readCipher, writeCipher;
// NOTE: compression state would be saved here
/*
* security parameters for secure renegotiation.
*/
private boolean secureRenegotiation;
private byte[] clientVerifyData;
private byte[] serverVerifyData;
/*
* The authentication context holds all information used to establish
* who this end of the connection is (certificate chains, private keys,
......@@ -528,11 +535,13 @@ final public class SSLSocketImpl extends BaseSSLSocketImpl {
writeCipher = CipherBox.NULL;
writeMAC = MAC.NULL;
// initial security parameters for secure renegotiation
secureRenegotiation = false;
clientVerifyData = new byte[0];
serverVerifyData = new byte[0];
enabledCipherSuites = CipherSuiteList.getDefault();
enabledProtocols = ProtocolList.getDefault();
handshakeLock = new Object();
writeLock = new ReentrantLock();
readLock = new Object();
inrec = null;
// save the acc
......@@ -914,6 +923,12 @@ final public class SSLSocketImpl extends BaseSSLSocketImpl {
connectionState = cs_DATA;
}
} else if (handshaker.isDone()) {
// reset the parameters for secure renegotiation.
secureRenegotiation =
handshaker.isSecureRenegotiation();
clientVerifyData = handshaker.getClientVerifyData();
serverVerifyData = handshaker.getServerVerifyData();
sess = handshaker.getSession();
handshaker = null;
connectionState = cs_DATA;
......@@ -1092,10 +1107,13 @@ final public class SSLSocketImpl extends BaseSSLSocketImpl {
if (roleIsServer) {
handshaker = new ServerHandshaker(this, sslContext,
enabledProtocols, doClientAuth,
connectionState == cs_RENEGOTIATE, protocolVersion);
protocolVersion, connectionState == cs_HANDSHAKE,
secureRenegotiation, clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
} else {
handshaker = new ClientHandshaker(this, sslContext,
enabledProtocols, protocolVersion);
enabledProtocols,
protocolVersion, connectionState == cs_HANDSHAKE,
secureRenegotiation, clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
}
handshaker.enabledCipherSuites = enabledCipherSuites;
handshaker.setEnableSessionCreation(enableSessionCreation);
......@@ -1200,8 +1218,16 @@ final public class SSLSocketImpl extends BaseSSLSocketImpl {
break;
case cs_DATA:
if (!Handshaker.renegotiable) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException("renegotiation is not allowed");
if (!secureRenegotiation && !Handshaker.allowUnsafeRenegotiation) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException(
"Insecure renegotiation is not allowed");
}
if (!secureRenegotiation) {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
System.out.println(
"Warning: Using insecure renegotiation");
}
}
// initialize the handshaker, move to cs_RENEGOTIATE
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -69,9 +69,6 @@ final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker {
// flag to check for clientCertificateVerify message
private boolean needClientVerify = false;
// indicate a renegotiation handshaking
private boolean isRenegotiation = false;
/*
* For exportable ciphersuites using non-exportable key sizes, we use
* ephemeral RSA keys. We could also do anonymous RSA in the same way
......@@ -100,13 +97,15 @@ final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker {
*/
ServerHandshaker(SSLSocketImpl socket, SSLContextImpl context,
ProtocolList enabledProtocols, byte clientAuth,
boolean isRenegotiation, ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion) {
ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion, boolean isInitialHandshake,
boolean secureRenegotiation,
byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) {
super(socket, context, enabledProtocols,
(clientAuth != SSLEngineImpl.clauth_none), false);
(clientAuth != SSLEngineImpl.clauth_none), false,
activeProtocolVersion, isInitialHandshake, secureRenegotiation,
clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
doClientAuth = clientAuth;
this.isRenegotiation = isRenegotiation;
this.activeProtocolVersion = activeProtocolVersion;
}
/*
......@@ -114,13 +113,15 @@ final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker {
*/
ServerHandshaker(SSLEngineImpl engine, SSLContextImpl context,
ProtocolList enabledProtocols, byte clientAuth,
boolean isRenegotiation, ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion) {
ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion,
boolean isInitialHandshake, boolean secureRenegotiation,
byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) {
super(engine, context, enabledProtocols,
(clientAuth != SSLEngineImpl.clauth_none), false);
(clientAuth != SSLEngineImpl.clauth_none), false,
activeProtocolVersion, isInitialHandshake, secureRenegotiation,
clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
doClientAuth = clientAuth;
this.isRenegotiation = isRenegotiation;
this.activeProtocolVersion = activeProtocolVersion;
}
/*
......@@ -269,11 +270,86 @@ final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker {
mesg.print(System.out);
}
// if it is a renegotiation request and renegotiation is not allowed
if (isRenegotiation && !renegotiable) {
// Does the message include security renegotiation indication?
boolean renegotiationIndicated = false;
// check the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
CipherSuiteList cipherSuites = mesg.getCipherSuites();
if (cipherSuites.contains(CipherSuite.C_SCSV)) {
renegotiationIndicated = true;
if (isInitialHandshake) {
secureRenegotiation = true;
} else {
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert
if (secureRenegotiation) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"The SCSV is present in a secure renegotiation");
} else {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"The SCSV is present in a insecure renegotiation");
}
}
}
// check the "renegotiation_info" extension
RenegotiationInfoExtension clientHelloRI = (RenegotiationInfoExtension)
mesg.extensions.get(ExtensionType.EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO);
if (clientHelloRI != null) {
renegotiationIndicated = true;
if (isInitialHandshake) {
// verify the length of the "renegotiated_connection" field
if (!clientHelloRI.isEmpty()) {
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"The renegotiation_info field is not empty");
}
secureRenegotiation = true;
} else {
if (!secureRenegotiation) {
// unexpected RI extension for insecure renegotiation,
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"The renegotiation_info is present in a insecure " +
"renegotiation");
}
// verify the client_verify_data value
if (!Arrays.equals(clientVerifyData,
clientHelloRI.getRenegotiatedConnection())) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Incorrect verify data in ClientHello " +
"renegotiation_info message");
}
}
} else if (!isInitialHandshake && secureRenegotiation) {
// if the connection's "secure_renegotiation" flag is set to TRUE
// and the "renegotiation_info" extension is not present, abort
// the handshake.
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Inconsistent secure renegotiation indication");
}
// if there is no security renegotiation indication or the previous
// handshake is insecure.
if (!renegotiationIndicated || !secureRenegotiation) {
if (isInitialHandshake) {
if (!allowLegacyHelloMessages) {
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Failed to negotiate the use of secure renegotiation");
}
// continue with legacy ClientHello
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
System.out.println("Warning: No renegotiation " +
"indication in ClientHello, allow legacy ClientHello");
}
} else if (!allowUnsafeRenegotiation) {
// abort the handshake
if (activeProtocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS10.v) {
// response with a no_negotiation warning,
warningSE(Alerts.alert_no_negotiation);
// response with a no_renegotiation warning,
warningSE(Alerts.alert_no_renegotiation);
// invalidate the handshake so that the caller can
// dispose this object.
......@@ -292,18 +368,24 @@ final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_unexpected_message,
"ClientHello followed by an unexpected " +
"handshake message");
}
return;
} else {
// For SSLv3, send the handshake_failure fatal error.
// Note that SSLv3 does not define a no_negotiation alert
// like TLSv1. However we cannot ignore the message
// Note that SSLv3 does not define a no_renegotiation
// alert like TLSv1. However we cannot ignore the message
// simply, otherwise the other side was waiting for a
// response that would never come.
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"renegotiation is not allowed");
"Renegotiation is not allowed");
}
} else { // !isInitialHandshake && allowUnsafeRenegotiation
// continue with unsafe renegotiation.
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
System.out.println(
"Warning: continue with insecure renegotiation");
}
}
}
......@@ -454,7 +536,7 @@ final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker {
// verify that the ciphersuite from the cached session
// is in the list of client requested ciphersuites and
// we have it enabled
if ((isEnabled(suite) == false) ||
if ((isNegotiable(suite) == false) ||
(mesg.getCipherSuites().contains(suite) == false)) {
resumingSession = false;
} else {
......@@ -484,8 +566,8 @@ final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker {
if (!enableNewSession) {
throw new SSLException("Client did not resume a session");
}
supportedCurves = (SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension)mesg.extensions.get
(ExtensionType.EXT_ELLIPTIC_CURVES);
supportedCurves = (SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension)
mesg.extensions.get(ExtensionType.EXT_ELLIPTIC_CURVES);
chooseCipherSuite(mesg);
session = new SSLSessionImpl(protocolVersion, cipherSuite,
sslContext.getSecureRandom(),
......@@ -498,6 +580,21 @@ final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker {
m1.sessionId = session.getSessionId();
m1.compression_method = session.getCompression();
if (secureRenegotiation) {
// For ServerHellos that are initial handshakes, then the
// "renegotiated_connection" field in "renegotiation_info"
// extension is of zero length.
//
// For ServerHellos that are renegotiating, this field contains
// the concatenation of client_verify_data and server_verify_data.
//
// Note that for initial handshakes, both the clientVerifyData
// variable and serverVerifyData variable are of zero length.
HelloExtension serverHelloRI = new RenegotiationInfoExtension(
clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
m1.extensions.add(serverHelloRI);
}
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
m1.print(System.out);
System.out.println("Cipher suite: " + session.getSuite());
......@@ -686,11 +783,13 @@ final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker {
*/
private void chooseCipherSuite(ClientHello mesg) throws IOException {
for (CipherSuite suite : mesg.getCipherSuites().collection()) {
if (isEnabled(suite) == false) {
if (isNegotiable(suite) == false) {
continue;
}
if (doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_required) {
if ((suite.keyExchange == K_DH_ANON) || (suite.keyExchange == K_ECDH_ANON)) {
if ((suite.keyExchange == K_DH_ANON) ||
(suite.keyExchange == K_ECDH_ANON)) {
continue;
}
}
......@@ -728,7 +827,7 @@ final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker {
return true;
}
if (suite.isAvailable() == false) {
if (suite.isNegotiable() == false) {
return false;
}
......@@ -1135,6 +1234,13 @@ final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker {
// NOTREACHED
}
/*
* save client verify data for secure renegotiation
*/
if (secureRenegotiation) {
clientVerifyData = mesg.getVerifyData();
}
/*
* OK, it verified. If we're doing the full handshake, add that
* "Finished" message to the hash of handshake messages, then send
......@@ -1184,6 +1290,13 @@ final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker {
*/
sendChangeCipherSpec(mesg, finishedTag);
/*
* save server verify data for secure renegotiation
*/
if (secureRenegotiation) {
serverVerifyData = mesg.getVerifyData();
}
/*
* Update state machine so client MUST send 'finished' next
* The update should only take place if it is not in the fast
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002, 2005, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -114,10 +114,11 @@ public class CipherTest {
}
boolean isEnabled() {
// return cipherSuite.equals("SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5") &&
// (clientAuth != null);
// return cipherSuite.indexOf("_RSA_") != -1;
// return cipherSuite.indexOf("DH_anon") != -1;
// ignore SCSV
if (cipherSuite.equals("TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV")) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002, 2006, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -114,12 +114,11 @@ public class CipherTest {
}
boolean isEnabled() {
// if (true) return cipherSuite.contains("_ECDH_");
// return cipherSuite.equals("SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5") &&
// (clientAuth != null);
// return cipherSuite.indexOf("_RSA_") != -1;
// return cipherSuite.indexOf("DH_anon") != -1;
// return cipherSuite.contains("ECDSA") == false;
// ignore SCSV
if (cipherSuite.equals("TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV")) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
* @test
* @bug 4403428
* @summary Invalidating JSSE session on server causes SSLProtocolException
* @ignore incompatible with disabled unsafe renegotiation (6898739), please
* reenable when safe renegotiation is implemented.
* @author Brad Wetmore
*/
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@
* @bug 4280338
* @summary "Unsupported SSL message version" SSLProtocolException
* w/SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5
* @ignore incompatible with disabled unsafe renegotiation (6898739), please
* reenable when safe renegotiation is implemented.
*
* @author Ram Marti
* @author Brad Wetmore
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
* @test
* @bug 4948079
* @summary SSLEngineResult needs updating [none yet]
* @ignore incompatible with disabled unsafe renegotiation (6898739), please
* reenable when safe renegotiation is implemented.
*
* This is a simple hack to test a bunch of conditions and check
* their return codes.
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@
* @bug 4495742
* @summary Add non-blocking SSL/TLS functionality, usable with any
* I/O abstraction
* @ignore incompatible with disabled unsafe renegotiation (6898739), please
* reenable when safe renegotiation is implemented.
*
* This is a bit hacky, meant to test various conditions. The main
* thing I wanted to do with this was to do buffer reads/writes
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
* @test
* @bug 4495742
* @summary Demonstrate SSLEngine switch from no client auth to client auth.
* @ignore incompatible with disabled unsafe renegotiation (6898739), please
* reenable when safe renegotiation is implemented.
*
* @author Brad R. Wetmore
*/
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2005, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -119,6 +119,15 @@ public class TestAllSuites {
return;
}
/*
* Don't run the SCSV suite
*/
if (suite.equals("TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV")) {
System.out.println("Ignoring SCSV suite");
return;
}
if (!suite.contains("DH_anon")) {
ssle2.setNeedClientAuth(true);
}
......
......@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ public class CheckCipherSuites {
"SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
"SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
"SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
"TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV",
};
private final static String[] ENABLED_UNLIMITED = {
......@@ -101,6 +103,8 @@ public class CheckCipherSuites {
"SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
"SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
"SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
"TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV",
};
// supported ciphersuites using default JCE policy jurisdiction files
......@@ -133,6 +137,7 @@ public class CheckCipherSuites {
"SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
"SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
"SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
"TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV",
"SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5",
"SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA",
......@@ -160,6 +165,7 @@ public class CheckCipherSuites {
"TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5",
"TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA",
"TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5",
};
// supported ciphersuites using unlimited JCE policy jurisdiction files
......@@ -199,6 +205,7 @@ public class CheckCipherSuites {
"SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
"SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
"SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA",
"TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV",
"SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5",
"SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA",
......@@ -228,6 +235,7 @@ public class CheckCipherSuites {
"TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5",
"TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA",
"TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5",
};
private static void showSuites(String[] suites) {
......
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002, 2005, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
......@@ -115,10 +115,11 @@ public class CipherTest {
}
boolean isEnabled() {
// return cipherSuite.equals("SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5") &&
// (clientAuth != null);
// return cipherSuite.indexOf("_RSA_") != -1;
// return cipherSuite.indexOf("DH_anon") != -1;
// ignore SCSV
if (cipherSuite.equals("TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV")) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
......
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