Prior to xdragon platform 20181230 release (e.g. 0930 release),
vring_use_dma_api() is required to return 'true' unconditionally.

Introduce a new kernel boot parameter called "vring_force_dma_api" to
control the behavior, boot xdragon host with "vring_force_dma_api"
command line to make ENI hotplug work, so that normal ECS hosts keep the
original behavior.
Reviewed-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NEryu Guan <eguan@linux.alibaba.com>

commit 5b5e4d623ec8a34689df98e42d038a3b594d2ff9 upstream.

Swap storage is restricted to max_swapfile_size (~16TB on x86_64) whenever
the system is deemed affected by L1TF vulnerability. Even though the limit
is quite high for most deployments it seems to be too restrictive for
deployments which are willing to live with the mitigation disabled.

We have a customer to deploy 8x 6,4TB PCIe/NVMe SSD swap devices which is
clearly out of the limit.

Drop the swap restriction when l1tf=off is specified. It also doesn't make
much sense to warn about too much memory for the l1tf mitigation when it is
forcefully disabled by the administrator.

[ tglx: Folded the documentation delta change ]

Fixes: 377eeaa8 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2")
Signed-off-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181113184910.26697-1-mhocko@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 55a974021ec952ee460dc31ca08722158639de72 upstream

Provide the possibility to enable IBPB always in combination with 'prctl'
and 'seccomp'.

Add the extra command line options and rework the IBPB selection to
evaluate the command instead of the mode selected by the STIPB switch case.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.144047038@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 6b3e64c237c072797a9ec918654a60e3a46488e2 upstream

If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected
on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which
restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl.

SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it
makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as
well.

The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works:
    
   Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor
   prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical
   processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes
   (or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core.

Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task
running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on
different hyper-threads from being attacked.

While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between
the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that
STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of
course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no
requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that
direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel
clarifies the whole mechanism.

IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot
mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same
logical processor.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.051663132@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7cc765a67d8e04ef7d772425ca5a2a1e2b894c15 upstream

Now that all prerequisites are in place:

 - Add the prctl command line option

 - Default the 'auto' mode to 'prctl'

 - When SMT state changes, update the static key which controls the
   conditional STIBP evaluation on context switch.

 - At init update the static key which controls the conditional IBPB
   evaluation on context switch.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.958421388@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit fa1202ef224391b6f5b26cdd44cc50495e8fab54 upstream

Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation
mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user=

The initial options are:

    -  on:   Unconditionally enabled
    - off:   Unconditionally disabled
    -auto:   Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now)

When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this
implies that the application to application control follows that state even
if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied.
Originally-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 544b03da39e2d7b4961d3163976ed4bfb1fac509 upstream.

At the request of the reporter, the Linux kernel security team offers to
postpone the publishing of a fix for up to 5 business days from the date
of a report.

While it is generally undesirable to keep a fix private after it has
been developed, this short window is intended to allow distributions to
package the fix into their kernel builds and permits early inclusion of
the security team in the case of a co-ordinated disclosure with other
parties. Unfortunately, discussions with major Linux distributions and
cloud providers has revealed that 5 business days is not sufficient to
achieve either of these two goals.

As an example, cloud providers need to roll out KVM security fixes to a
global fleet of hosts with sufficient early ramp-up and monitoring. An
end-to-end timeline of less than two weeks dramatically cuts into the
amount of early validation and increases the chance of guest-visible
regressions.

The consequence of this timeline mismatch is that security issues are
commonly fixed without the involvement of the Linux kernel security team
and are instead analysed and addressed by an ad-hoc group of developers
across companies contributing to Linux. In some cases, mainline (and
therefore the official stable kernels) can be left to languish for
extended periods of time. This undermines the Linux kernel security
process and puts upstream developers in a difficult position should they
find themselves involved with an undisclosed security problem that they
are unable to report due to restrictions from their employer.

To accommodate the needs of these users of the Linux kernel and
encourage them to engage with the Linux security team when security
issues are first uncovered, extend the maximum period for which fixes
may be delayed to 7 calendar days, or 14 calendar days in exceptional
cases, where the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts specifically
need to be accommodated. This brings parity with the linux-distros@
maximum embargo period of 14 calendar days.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Amit Shah <aams@amazon.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Co-developed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Co-developed-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 14fdc2c5318ae420e68496975f48dc1dbef52649 upstream.

The Linux kernel security team has been accused of rejecting the idea of
security embargoes. This is incorrect, and could dissuade people from
reporting security issues to us under the false assumption that the
issue would leak prematurely.

Clarify the handling of embargoed information in our process
documentation.
Co-developed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 781f0766cc41a9dd2e5d118ef4b1d5d89430257b upstream.

Devices connected under Terminus Technology Inc. Hub (1a40:0101) may
fail to work after the system resumes from suspend:
[  206.063325] usb 3-2.4: reset full-speed USB device number 4 using xhci_hcd
[  206.143691] usb 3-2.4: device descriptor read/64, error -32
[  206.351671] usb 3-2.4: device descriptor read/64, error -32

Info for this hub:
T:  Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#=  2 Spd=480 MxCh= 4
D:  Ver= 2.00 Cls=09(hub  ) Sub=00 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs=  1
P:  Vendor=1a40 ProdID=0101 Rev=01.11
S:  Product=USB 2.0 Hub
C:  #Ifs= 1 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=100mA
I:  If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=09(hub  ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=hub

Some expirements indicate that the USB devices connected to the hub are
innocent, it's the hub itself is to blame. The hub needs extra delay
time after it resets its port.

Hence wait for extra delay, if the device is connected to this quirky
hub.
Signed-off-by: NKai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: NAlan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit d2266bbfa9e3e32e3b642965088ca461bd24a94f ]

The "pciserial" earlyprintk variant helps much on many modern x86
platforms, but unfortunately there are still some platforms with PCI
UART devices which have the wrong PCI class code. In that case, the
current class code check does not allow for them to be used for logging.

Add a sub-option "force" which overrides the class code check and thus
the use of such device can be enforced.

 [ bp: massage formulations. ]
Suggested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: NFeng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Stuart R . Anderson" <stuart.r.anderson@intel.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thymo van Beers <thymovanbeers@gmail.com>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002164921.25833-1-feng.tang@intel.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Scrubbing pages on initial balloon down can take some time, especially
in nested virtualization case (nested EPT is slow). When HVM/PVH guest is
started with memory= significantly lower than maxmem=, all the extra
pages will be scrubbed before returning to Xen. But since most of them
weren't used at all at that point, Xen needs to populate them first
(from populate-on-demand pool). In nested virt case (Xen inside KVM)
this slows down the guest boot by 15-30s with just 1.5GB needed to be
returned to Xen.

Add runtime parameter to enable/disable it, to allow initially disabling
scrubbing, then enable it back during boot (for example in initramfs).
Such usage relies on assumption that a) most pages ballooned out during
initial boot weren't used at all, and b) even if they were, very few
secrets are in the guest at that time (before any serious userspace
kicks in).
Convert CONFIG_XEN_SCRUB_PAGES to CONFIG_XEN_SCRUB_PAGES_DEFAULT (also
enabled by default), controlling default value for the new runtime
switch.
Signed-off-by: NMarek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

Instead of forcing a distro or other system builder to choose
at build time whether the CPU is trusted for CRNG seeding via
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU, provide a boot-time parameter for end users to
control the choice. The CONFIG will set the default state instead.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

For some workloads an intervention from the OOM killer can be painful.
Killing a random task can bring the workload into an inconsistent state.

Historically, there are two common solutions for this
problem:
1) enabling panic_on_oom,
2) using a userspace daemon to monitor OOMs and kill
   all outstanding processes.

Both approaches have their downsides: rebooting on each OOM is an obvious
waste of capacity, and handling all in userspace is tricky and requires a
userspace agent, which will monitor all cgroups for OOMs.

In most cases an in-kernel after-OOM cleaning-up mechanism can eliminate
the necessity of enabling panic_on_oom.  Also, it can simplify the cgroup
management for userspace applications.

This commit introduces a new knob for cgroup v2 memory controller:
memory.oom.group.  The knob determines whether the cgroup should be
treated as an indivisible workload by the OOM killer.  If set, all tasks
belonging to the cgroup or to its descendants (if the memory cgroup is not
a leaf cgroup) are killed together or not at all.

To determine which cgroup has to be killed, we do traverse the cgroup
hierarchy from the victim task's cgroup up to the OOMing cgroup (or root)
and looking for the highest-level cgroup with memory.oom.group set.

Tasks with the OOM protection (oom_score_adj set to -1000) are treated as
an exception and are never killed.

This patch doesn't change the OOM victim selection algorithm.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180802003201.817-4-guro@fb.comSigned-off-by: NRoman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The Kconfig text for CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING doesn't mention that it has to
be enabled explicitly.  This updates the documentation for that and adds a
note about CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING to the "page_poison" command line docs.
While here, change description of CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO too, as it's
not "random" data, but rather the fixed debugging value that would be used
when not zeroing.  Additionally removes a stray "bool" in the Kconfig.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180725223832.GA43733@beastSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add a flag which causes page-types to use the kernels's idle page
tracking to mark pages idle.  As the tool already prints the idle flag
if set, subsequent runs will show which pages have been accessed since
last run.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: simplify mark_page_idle()]
[chansen3@cisco.com: reorganize mark_page_idle() logic, add docs]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180706172237.21691-1-chansen3@cisco.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180612153223.13174-1-chansen3@cisco.comSigned-off-by: NChristian Hansen <chansen3@cisco.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add a new flag that will read kpagecount for each PFN and print out the
number of times the page is mapped along with the flags in the listing
view.

This information is useful in understanding and optimizing memory usage.
Identifying pages which are not shared allows us to focus on adjusting
the memory layout or access patterns for the sole owning process.
Knowing the number of processes that share a page tells us how many
other times we must make the same adjustments or how many processes to
potentially disable.

Truncated sample output:

  voffset map-cnt offset  len     flags
  561a3591e       1       15fe8   1       ___U_lA____Ma_b___________________________
  561a3591f       1       2b103   1       ___U_lA____Ma_b___________________________
  561a36ca4       1       2cc78   1       ___U_lA____Ma_b___________________________
  7f588bb4e       14      2273c   1       __RU_lA____M______________________________

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[chansen3@cisco.com: add documentation, tweak whitespace]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180705181204.5529-1-chansen3@cisco.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180612153205.12879-1-chansen3@cisco.comSigned-off-by: NChristian Hansen <chansen3@cisco.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

To support peer-to-peer traffic on a segment of the PCI hierarchy, we must
disable the ACS redirect bits for select PCI bridges.  The bridges must be
selected before the devices are discovered by the kernel and the IOMMU
groups created.  Therefore, add a kernel command line parameter to specify
devices which must have their ACS bits disabled.

The new parameter takes a list of devices separated by a semicolon.  Each
device specified will have its ACS redirect bits disabled.  This is
similar to the existing 'resource_alignment' parameter.

The ACS Request P2P Request Redirect, P2P Completion Redirect and P2P
Egress Control bits are disabled, which is sufficient to always allow
passing P2P traffic uninterrupted.  The bits are set after the kernel
(optionally) enables the ACS bits itself.  It is also done regardless of
whether the kernel or platform firmware sets the bits.

If the user tries to disable the ACS redirect for a device without the ACS
capability, print a warning to dmesg.
Signed-off-by: NLogan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
[bhelgaas: reorder to add the generic code first and move the
device-specific quirk to subsequent patches]
Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NStephen Bates <sbates@raithlin.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NChristian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>

When specifying PCI devices on the kernel command line using a
bus/device/function address, bus numbers can change when adding or
replacing a device, changing motherboard firmware, or applying kernel
parameters like "pci=assign-buses".  When bus numbers change, it's likely
the command line tweak will be applied to the wrong device.

Therefore, it is useful to be able to specify devices with a base bus
number and the path of devfns needed to get to it, similar to the "device
scope" structure in the Intel VT-d spec, Section 8.3.1.

Thus, we add an option to specify devices in the following format:

  [<domain>:]<bus>:<device>.<func>[/<device>.<func>]*

The path can be any segment within the PCI hierarchy of any length and
determined through the use of 'lspci -t'.  When specified this way, it is
less likely that a renumbered bus will result in a valid device
specification and the tweak won't be applied to the wrong device.
Signed-off-by: NLogan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
[bhelgaas: use "device" instead of "slot" in documentation since that's the
usual language in the PCI specs]
Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NStephen Bates <sbates@raithlin.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NChristian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>

Separate out the code to match a PCI device with a string (typically
originating from a kernel parameter) from the
pci_specified_resource_alignment() function into its own helper function.

While we are at it, this change fixes the kernel style of the function
(fixing a number of long lines and extra parentheses).

Additionally, make the analogous change to the kernel parameter
documentation: Separate the description of how to specify a PCI device
into its own section at the head of the "pci=" parameter.

This patch should have no functional alterations.
Signed-off-by: NLogan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
[bhelgaas: use "device" instead of "slot" in documentation since that's the
usual language in the PCI specs]
Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NStephen Bates <sbates@raithlin.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NChristian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>

Currently only supported on powerpc.
Signed-off-by: NDiana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

When nested virtualization is in use, VMENTER operations from the nested
hypervisor into the nested guest will always be processed by the bare metal
hypervisor, and KVM's "conditional cache flushes" mode in particular does a
flush on nested vmentry.  Therefore, include the "skip L1D flush on
vmentry" bit in KVM's suggested ARCH_CAPABILITIES setting.

Add the relevant Documentation.
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Dave reported, that it's not confirmed that Yonah processors are
unaffected. Remove them from the list.
Reported-by: Nave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Currently, avg_lat is calculated by accumulating the mean of every
window in a long running cumulative average. As time goes on, the metric
becomes less and less useful due to the accumulated history.

This patch reuses the same calculation done in load averages to make the
avg_lat metric more lively. Unlike load averages, the avg only advances
when a window elapses (due to an io). Idle periods extend the most
recent window. Bucketing is used to limit the history of avg_lat by
binding it to the window size. So, the window range for 1/exp (decay
rate) is [1 min, 2.5 min) when windows elapse immediately.

The current sample window size is exposed in the debug info to enable
calculation of the window range.
Signed-off-by: NDennis Zhou <dennisszhou@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

This allows the default behavior to be controlled by a kernel config
option instead of changing the commandline for the kernel to include
"iommu.passthrough=on" or "iommu=pt" on machines where this is desired.

Likewise, for machines where this config option is enabled, it can be
disabled at boot time with "iommu.passthrough=off" or "iommu=nopt".

Also corrected iommu=pt documentation for IA-64, since it has no code that
parses iommu= at all.
Signed-off-by: NOlof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>

Also mention that the traditional devices provide glyph values whereas
/dev/vcsu* is unicode based.
Suggested-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: NNicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Fix spelling and other typos
Signed-off-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Currently, the notsc kernel parameter disables the use of the TSC by
sched_clock(). However, this parameter does not prevent the kernel from
accessing tsc in other places.

The only rationale to boot with notsc is to avoid timing discrepancies on
multi-socket systems where TSC are not properly synchronized, and thus
exclude TSC from being used for time keeping. But that prevents using TSC
as sched_clock() as well, which is not necessary as the core sched_clock()
implementation can handle non synchronized TSC based sched clocks just
fine.

However, there is another method to solve the above problem: booting with
tsc=unstable parameter. This parameter allows sched_clock() to use TSC and
just excludes it from timekeeping.

So there is no real reason to keep notsc, but for compatibility reasons the
parameter has to stay. Make it behave like 'tsc=unstable' instead.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: NPavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NDou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: steven.sistare@oracle.com
Cc: daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk
Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com
Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org
Cc: sboyd@codeaurora.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: prarit@redhat.com
Cc: feng.tang@intel.com
Cc: pmladek@suse.com
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180719205545.16512-12-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com

Add tracking of REQ_OP_DISCARD ios to the per-cgroup io.stat.  Two
fields, dbytes and dios, to respectively count the total bytes and
number of discards are added.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Newell <newella@fb.com>
Cc: Michael Callahan <michaelcallahan@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be
available.  Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case
resulting in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being printed.  This
makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult.  We can relax the
requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging.
This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel
behaviour the same.

If new command line option debug_boot_weak_hash is enabled use
cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.
Reviewed-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: NTobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

Add documentation for the L1TF vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms:

  - Explain the problem and risks
  - Document the mitigation mechanisms
  - Document the command line controls
  - Document the sysfs files
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.287429944@linutronix.de

Introduce the 'l1tf=' kernel command line option to allow for boot-time
switching of mitigation that is used on processors affected by L1TF.

The possible values are:

  full
	Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF vulnerability. Disables
	SMT and enables all mitigations in the hypervisors. SMT control via
	/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control is still possible after boot.
	Hypervisors will issue a warning when the first VM is started in
	a potentially insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
	disabled.

  full,force
	Same as 'full', but disables SMT control. Implies the 'nosmt=force'
	command line option. sysfs control of SMT and the hypervisor flush
	control is disabled.

  flush
	Leaves SMT enabled and enables the conditional hypervisor mitigation.
	Hypervisors will issue a warning when the first VM is started in a
	potentially insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
	disabled.

  flush,nosmt
	Disables SMT and enables the conditional hypervisor mitigation. SMT
	control via /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control is still possible
	after boot. If SMT is reenabled or flushing disabled at runtime
	hypervisors will issue a warning.

  flush,nowarn
	Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when
	a VM is started in a potentially insecure configuration.

  off
	Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any warnings.

Default is 'flush'.

Let KVM adhere to these semantics, which means:

  - 'lt1f=full,force'	: Performe L1D flushes. No runtime control
    			  possible.

  - 'l1tf=full'
  - 'l1tf-flush'
  - 'l1tf=flush,nosmt'	: Perform L1D flushes and warn on VM start if
			  SMT has been runtime enabled or L1D flushing
			  has been run-time enabled
			  
  - 'l1tf=flush,nowarn'	: Perform L1D flushes and no warnings are emitted.
  
  - 'l1tf=off'		: L1D flushes are not performed and no warnings
			  are emitted.

KVM can always override the L1D flushing behavior using its 'vmentry_l1d_flush'
module parameter except when lt1f=full,force is set.

This makes KVM's private 'nosmt' option redundant, and as it is a bit
non-systematic anyway (this is something to control globally, not on
hypervisor level), remove that option.

Add the missing Documentation entry for the l1tf vulnerability sysfs file
while at it.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.202758176@linutronix.de

Some RCU bugs have been sensitive to the frequency of CPU-hotplug
operations, which have been gradually increased over time.  But this
frequency is now at the one-second lower limit that can be specified using
the rcutorture.onoff_interval kernel parameter.  This commit therefore
changes the units of rcutorture.onoff_interval from seconds to jiffies,
and also sets the value specified for this kernel parameter in the TREE03
rcutorture scenario to 200, which is 200 milliseconds for HZ=1000.
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Document the support for spec_store_bypass_disable that was added for
powerpc in commit a048a07d ("powerpc/64s: Add support for a store
forwarding barrier at kernel entry/exit").
Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>

This parameter introduced several years ago in the XHCI host controller
driver was somehow left undocumented. Add a few lines in the kernel
parameters text.
Signed-off-by: NLaurentiu Tudor <laurentiu.tudor@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>

Deferred probe will currently wait forever on dependent devices to probe,
but sometimes a driver will never exist. It's also not always critical for
a driver to exist. Platforms can rely on default configuration from the
bootloader or reset defaults for things such as pinctrl and power domains.
This is often the case with initial platform support until various drivers
get enabled. There's at least 2 scenarios where deferred probe can render
a platform broken. Both involve using a DT which has more devices and
dependencies than the kernel supports. The 1st case is a driver may be
disabled in the kernel config. The 2nd case is the kernel version may
simply not have the dependent driver. This can happen if using a newer DT
(provided by firmware perhaps) with a stable kernel version. Deferred
probe issues can be difficult to debug especially if the console has
dependencies or userspace fails to boot to a shell.

There are also cases like IOMMUs where only built-in drivers are
supported, so deferring probe after initcalls is not needed. The IOMMU
subsystem implemented its own mechanism to handle this using OF_DECLARE
linker sections.

This commit adds makes ending deferred probe conditional on initcalls
being completed or a debug timeout. Subsystems or drivers may opt-in by
calling driver_deferred_probe_check_init_done() instead of
unconditionally returning -EPROBE_DEFER. They may use additional
information from DT or kernel's config to decide whether to continue to
defer probe or not.

The timeout mechanism is intended for debug purposes and WARNs loudly.
The remaining deferred probe pending list will also be dumped after the
timeout. Not that this timeout won't work for the console which needs
to be enabled before userspace starts. However, if the console's
dependencies are resolved, then the kernel log will be printed (as
opposed to no output).

Cc: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NRob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

A basic documentation to describe the interface, statistics, and
behavior of io.latency.
Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

This parameter introduced several years ago in the XHCI host controller
driver was somehow left undocumented. Add a few lines in the kernel
parameters text.
Signed-off-by: NLaurentiu Tudor <laurentiu.tudor@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Add a mitigation mode parameter "vmentry_l1d_flush" for CVE-2018-3620, aka
L1 terminal fault. The valid arguments are:

 - "always" 	L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
 - "cond"	Conditional L1D cache flush, explained below
 - "never"	Disable the L1D cache flush mitigation

"cond" is trying to avoid L1D cache flushes on VMENTER if the code executed
between VMEXIT and VMENTER is considered safe, i.e. is not bringing any
interesting information into L1D which might exploited.

[ tglx: Split out from a larger patch ]
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

If the L1TF CPU bug is present we allow the KVM module to be loaded as the
major of users that use Linux and KVM have trusted guests and do not want a
broken setup.

Cloud vendors are the ones that are uncomfortable with CVE 2018-3620 and as
such they are the ones that should set nosmt to one.

Setting 'nosmt' means that the system administrator also needs to disable
SMT (Hyper-threading) in the BIOS, or via the 'nosmt' command line
parameter, or via the /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control. See commit
05736e4a ("cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT").

Other mitigations are to use task affinity, cpu sets, interrupt binding,
etc - anything to make sure that _only_ the same guests vCPUs are running
on sibling threads.
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Enabling HARDENED_USERCOPY may cause measurable regressions in networking
performance: up to 8% under UDP flood.

I ran a small packet UDP flood using pktgen vs. a host b2b connected. On
the receiver side the UDP packets are processed by a simple user space
process that just reads and drops them:

https://github.com/netoptimizer/network-testing/blob/master/src/udp_sink.c

Not very useful from a functional PoV, but it helps to pin-point
bottlenecks in the networking stack.

When running a kernel with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y, I see a 5-8%
regression in the receive tput, compared to the same kernel without this
option enabled.

With CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y, perf shows ~6% of CPU time spent
cumulatively in __check_object_size (~4%) and __virt_addr_valid (~2%).

The call-chain is:

__GI___libc_recvfrom
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
do_syscall_64
__x64_sys_recvfrom
__sys_recvfrom
inet_recvmsg
udp_recvmsg
__check_object_size

udp_recvmsg() actually calls copy_to_iter() (inlined) and the latters
calls check_copy_size() (again, inlined).

A generic distro may want to enable HARDENED_USERCOPY in their default
kernel config, but at the same time, such distro may want to be able to
avoid the performance penalties in with the default configuration and
disable the stricter check on a per-boot basis.

This change adds a boot parameter that conditionally disables
HARDENED_USERCOPY via "hardened_usercopy=off".
Signed-off-by: NChris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>