From d3a09104018cf2ad5973dfa8a9c138ef9f5015a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 15:07:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow If the stack overflows into a guard page and the ORC unwinder should work well: by construction, there can't be any meaningful data in the guard page because no writes to the guard page will have succeeded. But there is a bug that prevents unwinding from working correctly: if the starting register state has RSP pointing into a stack guard page, the ORC unwinder bails out immediately. Instead of bailing out immediately check whether the next page up is a valid check page and if so analyze that. As a result the ORC unwinder will start the unwind. Tested by intentionally overflowing the task stack. The result is an accurate call trace instead of a trace consisting purely of '?' entries. There are a few other bugs that are triggered if the unwinder encounters a stack overflow after the first step, but they are outside the scope of this fix. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Boris Ostrovsky Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: David Laight Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Eduardo Valentin Cc: Greg KH Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Juergen Gross Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Will Deacon Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150604.991389777@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c index a3f973b2c97a..ff8e1132b2ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c @@ -553,8 +553,18 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state *state, struct task_struct *task, } if (get_stack_info((unsigned long *)state->sp, state->task, - &state->stack_info, &state->stack_mask)) - return; + &state->stack_info, &state->stack_mask)) { + /* + * We weren't on a valid stack. It's possible that + * we overflowed a valid stack into a guard page. + * See if the next page up is valid so that we can + * generate some kind of backtrace if this happens. + */ + void *next_page = (void *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)state->sp); + if (get_stack_info(next_page, state->task, &state->stack_info, + &state->stack_mask)) + return; + } /* * The caller can provide the address of the first frame directly -- GitLab