diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index f8dfc2269d85634aa61ebb19a761e986ea0bbc93..ae58bd3f875f9c92c9599bacebbab85ebdf2c800 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -116,6 +116,15 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr)
 		attr->ia_atime = now;
 	if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET))
 		attr->ia_mtime = now;
+	if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
+		attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
+		ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
+		error = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
+		if (error > 0)
+			error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+	}
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_SUID) {
 		attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_SUID;
 		if (mode & S_ISUID) {
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index 1d72f993b66ec1511ca9756250474f5b9dd953d4..819545d216706be7447392a482328b37d4d3cb5c 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct iattr *iap,
 
 	/* Revoke setuid/setgid bit on chown/chgrp */
 	if ((iap->ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && iap->ia_uid != inode->i_uid)
-		iap->ia_valid |= ATTR_KILL_SUID;
+		iap->ia_valid |= ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
 	if ((iap->ia_valid & ATTR_GID) && iap->ia_gid != inode->i_gid)
 		iap->ia_valid |= ATTR_KILL_SGID;
 
@@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ nfsd_vfs_read(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct file *file,
 static void kill_suid(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct iattr	ia;
-	ia.ia_valid = ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID;
+	ia.ia_valid = ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
 
 	mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
 	notify_change(dentry, &ia);
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index cdbb94a9efc20ceb3c07c52419b73b124859f7e6..75385144df7da2fe10e8158a27322ec473a96d37 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -658,7 +658,8 @@ static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group)
 		newattrs.ia_gid = group;
 	}
 	if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
-		newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID;
+		newattrs.ia_valid |=
+			ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	error = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
diff --git a/fs/splice.c b/fs/splice.c
index 59a941d404d9c60b46a83ced4472ee915a7fe93c..6bdcb6107bc3c55b58199537e2eb5537133cd460 100644
--- a/fs/splice.c
+++ b/fs/splice.c
@@ -824,13 +824,18 @@ generic_file_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
 {
 	struct address_space *mapping = out->f_mapping;
 	struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
+	int killsuid, killpriv;
 	ssize_t ret;
-	int err;
+	int err = 0;
 
-	err = should_remove_suid(out->f_path.dentry);
-	if (unlikely(err)) {
+	killpriv = security_inode_need_killpriv(out->f_path.dentry);
+	killsuid = should_remove_suid(out->f_path.dentry);
+	if (unlikely(killsuid || killpriv)) {
 		mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-		err = __remove_suid(out->f_path.dentry, err);
+		if (killpriv)
+			err = security_inode_killpriv(out->f_path.dentry);
+		if (!err && killsuid)
+			err = __remove_suid(out->f_path.dentry, killsuid);
 		mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
index 3a6512f8ec94023e3fc41dd0e2b050c7944271e1..b7fc55ec8d480d71dcda61a249962ce846f2f22d 100644
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ struct linux_binprm{
 	int sh_bang;
 	struct file * file;
 	int e_uid, e_gid;
-	kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective;
+	kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted;
+	bool cap_effective;
 	void *security;
 	int argc, envc;
 	char * filename;	/* Name of binary as seen by procps */
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 2dfa58555934c28dd8bd3c4e27b56ec79ada5b28..8961e7fb755c34bc4f1ea346fbb83854286bc932 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 /*
  * This is <linux/capability.h>
  *
- * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com>
+ * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
  * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
  * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
  *
  * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
  *
- * ftp://linux.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.2/
- */ 
+ * ftp://linux.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
+ */
 
 #ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
 #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
@@ -28,23 +28,41 @@ struct task_struct;
    following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user
    library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
    etc.. */
- 
+
 #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION  0x19980330
 
 typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
 	__u32 version;
 	int pid;
 } __user *cap_user_header_t;
- 
+
 typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
         __u32 effective;
         __u32 permitted;
         __u32 inheritable;
 } __user *cap_user_data_t;
-  
-#ifdef __KERNEL__
 
-#include <asm/current.h>
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
+#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
+
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ (3*sizeof(__le32))
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK	0xFF000000
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_1	0x01000000
+
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION	VFS_CAP_REVISION_1
+
+#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK	~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
+#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE	0x000001
+
+struct vfs_cap_data {
+	__u32 magic_etc;  /* Little endian */
+	struct {
+		__u32 permitted;    /* Little endian */
+		__u32 inheritable;  /* Little endian */
+	} data[1];
+};
+
+#ifdef __KERNEL__
 
 /* #define STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS */
 
@@ -59,7 +77,7 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
 typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
 
 #endif
-  
+
 #define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (2*sizeof(__u32))
 #define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE     (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
 
@@ -67,7 +85,7 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
 
 
 /**
- ** POSIX-draft defined capabilities. 
+ ** POSIX-draft defined capabilities.
  **/
 
 /* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this
@@ -87,7 +105,7 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
    defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
 
 #define CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH  2
-    
+
 /* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
    file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
    is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. */
@@ -257,7 +275,7 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
 /* Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem */
 /* Modify data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling
    resources) */
-/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so 
+/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so
    you can override using fsuid too */
 /* Override size restrictions on IPC message queues */
 /* Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock */
@@ -289,8 +307,10 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
 
 #define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL    30
 
+#define CAP_SETFCAP	     31
+
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
-/* 
+/*
  * Bounding set
  */
 extern kernel_cap_t cap_bset;
@@ -298,7 +318,7 @@ extern kernel_cap_t cap_bset;
 /*
  * Internal kernel functions only
  */
- 
+
 #ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS
 
 #define to_cap_t(x) { x }
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 365586a4c4de9526a48c9f716debc367a95612dd..e3fc5dbb22460ad7d265f5fb47d8839ea4fe32f5 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ typedef void (dio_iodone_t)(struct kiocb *iocb, loff_t offset,
 #define ATTR_KILL_SUID	2048
 #define ATTR_KILL_SGID	4096
 #define ATTR_FILE	8192
+#define ATTR_KILL_PRIV	16384
 
 /*
  * This is the Inode Attributes structure, used for notify_change().  It
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a300a3f2fe68f366653f8f1c031661fe454b7a26..df591d289ec98e18aec72af323c2cb941c560236 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -51,8 +51,14 @@ extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
 extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
+extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
 extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
+extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
+extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
+extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
+extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
 extern int cap_syslog (int type);
 extern int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
 
@@ -413,6 +419,18 @@ struct request_sock;
  *	is specified by @buffer_size.  @buffer may be NULL to request
  *	the size of the buffer required.
  *	Returns number of bytes used/required on success.
+ * @inode_need_killpriv:
+ *	Called when an inode has been changed.
+ *	@dentry is the dentry being changed.
+ *	Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation.
+ *	Return 0 if inode_killpriv does not need to be called.
+ *	Return >0 if inode_killpriv does need to be called.
+ * @inode_killpriv:
+ *	The setuid bit is being removed.  Remove similar security labels.
+ *	Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held.
+ *	@dentry is the dentry being changed.
+ *	Return 0 on success.  If error is returned, then the operation
+ *	causing setuid bit removal is failed.
  *
  * Security hooks for file operations
  *
@@ -1239,6 +1257,8 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
 	int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry);
 	int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
+	int (*inode_need_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*inode_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
 	const char *(*inode_xattr_getsuffix) (void);
   	int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
   	int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
@@ -1496,6 +1516,8 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
+int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
+int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void);
 int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
@@ -1891,6 +1913,16 @@ static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 	return cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 }
 
+static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return cap_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return cap_inode_killpriv(dentry);
+}
+
 static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix (void)
 {
 	return NULL ;
@@ -2035,12 +2067,12 @@ static inline int security_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info)
 
 static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
-	return 0;
+	return cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
-	return 0;
+	return cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p)
@@ -2058,7 +2090,7 @@ static inline int security_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p,
 					      int policy,
 					      struct sched_param *lp)
 {
-	return 0;
+	return cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_getscheduler (struct task_struct *p)
@@ -2075,7 +2107,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
 				      struct siginfo *info, int sig,
 				      u32 secid)
 {
-	return 0;
+	return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c
index 4fb1546bbad6abd95dd33f5281c88517540631fb..79f24a969cb4dfef1de95045bb5e9ced44e6243c 100644
--- a/mm/filemap.c
+++ b/mm/filemap.c
@@ -1627,12 +1627,18 @@ int __remove_suid(struct dentry *dentry, int kill)
 
 int remove_suid(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	int kill = should_remove_suid(dentry);
+	int killsuid = should_remove_suid(dentry);
+	int killpriv = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
+	int error = 0;
 
-	if (unlikely(kill))
-		return __remove_suid(dentry, kill);
+	if (killpriv < 0)
+		return killpriv;
+	if (killpriv)
+		error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
+	if (!error && killsuid)
+		error = __remove_suid(dentry, killsuid);
 
-	return 0;
+	return error;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(remove_suid);
 
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index a94ee94cf491384e85b461e350b22205a68849b7..8086e61058e373e68054dd166be2e942f4db2e4c 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -80,6 +80,16 @@ config SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
 	  This enables the "default" Linux capabilities functionality.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.
 
+config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+	bool "File POSIX Capabilities (EXPERIMENTAL)"
+	depends on (SECURITY=n || SECURITY_CAPABILITIES!=n) && EXPERIMENTAL
+	default n
+	help
+	  This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give
+	  binaries a subset of root's powers without using setuid 0.
+
+	  If in doubt, answer N.
+
 config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 	bool "Root Plug Support"
 	depends on USB=y && SECURITY
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index fda6a14cb24dd2573cc8bdafe736661f2da37f31..9e99f36a8b5c1f023533c0fab0ee0530e021075a 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -37,7 +37,13 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
 
 	.inode_setxattr =		cap_inode_setxattr,
 	.inode_removexattr =		cap_inode_removexattr,
+	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
+	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 
+	.task_kill =			cap_task_kill,
+	.task_setscheduler =		cap_task_setscheduler,
+	.task_setioprio =		cap_task_setioprio,
+	.task_setnice =			cap_task_setnice,
 	.task_post_setuid =		cap_task_post_setuid,
 	.task_reparent_to_init =	cap_task_reparent_to_init,
 
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 0f8a2ce3f3a6f09f9abc3e8885b24e2503b0e5c4..afca6dd4ae6900d2c05c230c8119f2558c739e93 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
 
 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
@@ -108,14 +109,130 @@ void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 	target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
 }
 
+static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	cap_clear(bprm->cap_inheritable);
+	cap_clear(bprm->cap_permitted);
+	bprm->cap_effective = false;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+
+int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	int error;
+
+	if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
+	       return 0;
+
+	error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
+	if (error <= 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+
+	if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
+	       return 0;
+
+	return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
+}
+
+static inline int cap_from_disk(__le32 *caps, struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+				int size)
+{
+	__u32 magic_etc;
+
+	if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps[0]);
+
+	switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) {
+	case VFS_CAP_REVISION:
+		if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+			bprm->cap_effective = true;
+		else
+			bprm->cap_effective = false;
+		bprm->cap_permitted = to_cap_t( le32_to_cpu(caps[1]) );
+		bprm->cap_inheritable = to_cap_t( le32_to_cpu(caps[2]) );
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	int rc = 0;
+	__le32 v1caps[XATTR_CAPS_SZ];
+	struct inode *inode;
+
+	if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) {
+		bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
+	inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &v1caps,
+							XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
+	if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+		/* no data, that's ok */
+		rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = cap_from_disk(v1caps, bprm, rc);
+	if (rc)
+		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
+			__FUNCTION__, rc, bprm->filename);
+
+out:
+	dput(dentry);
+	if (rc)
+		bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#else
+int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	/* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
+	int ret;
 
-	/* We don't have VFS support for capabilities yet */
-	cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
-	cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
-	cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
+	ret = get_file_caps(bprm);
+	if (ret)
+		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_file_caps returned %d for %s\n",
+			__FUNCTION__, ret, bprm->filename);
 
 	/*  To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
 	 *  executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
@@ -131,9 +248,10 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
 		}
 		if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
-			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
+			bprm->cap_effective = true;
 	}
-	return 0;
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
@@ -149,6 +267,7 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 	if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
 	    !cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) {
 		set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+		current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 
 		if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
 			if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
@@ -170,8 +289,8 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 	 * capability rules */
 	if (!is_init(current)) {
 		current->cap_permitted = new_permitted;
-		current->cap_effective =
-		    cap_intersect (new_permitted, bprm->cap_effective);
+		current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_effective ?
+				new_permitted : 0;
 	}
 
 	/* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
@@ -181,11 +300,15 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 
 int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	/* If/when this module is enhanced to incorporate capability
-	   bits on files, the test below should be extended to also perform a 
-	   test between the old and new capability sets.  For now,
-	   it simply preserves the legacy decision algorithm used by
-	   the old userland. */
+	if (current->uid != 0) {
+		if (bprm->cap_effective)
+			return 1;
+		if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_permitted))
+			return 1;
+		if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_inheritable))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
 	return (current->euid != current->uid ||
 		current->egid != current->gid);
 }
@@ -193,7 +316,11 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
 		       size_t size, int flags)
 {
-	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
+			return -EPERM;
+		return 0;
+	} else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
 	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
@@ -202,7 +329,11 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
 
 int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 {
-	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
+			return -EPERM;
+		return 0;
+	} else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
 	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
@@ -299,6 +430,83 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+/*
+ * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
+ * task_setnice, assumes that
+ *   . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
+ *   . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
+ *   	then those actions should be allowed
+ * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
+ * yet with increased caps.
+ * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
+ */
+static inline int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
+	    !__capable(current, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
+			   struct sched_param *lp)
+{
+	return cap_safe_nice(p);
+}
+
+int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	return cap_safe_nice(p);
+}
+
+int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	return cap_safe_nice(p);
+}
+
+int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+				int sig, u32 secid)
+{
+	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (secid)
+		/*
+		 * Signal sent as a particular user.
+		 * Capabilities are ignored.  May be wrong, but it's the
+		 * only thing we can do at the moment.
+		 * Used only by usb drivers?
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
+		return 0;
+	if (capable(CAP_KILL))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+#else
+int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
+			   struct sched_param *lp)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+				int sig, u32 secid)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
 {
 	p->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
@@ -336,6 +544,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_secureexec);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_inode_setxattr);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_inode_removexattr);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_post_setuid);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_kill);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_setscheduler);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_setioprio);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_setnice);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_reparent_to_init);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_syslog);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_vm_enough_memory);
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 4129dcf3daec095b1e8fe074957ce6f0d970a105..c77dec822385315a60c1ca6e00a34d374a13add7 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -376,6 +376,16 @@ static int dummy_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int dummy_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int dummy_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -1022,6 +1032,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_need_killpriv);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_killpriv);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_xattr_getsuffix);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5b1c034815a814dd8e355aa89aeb8252a51876a1..2e1b35dd2550b6cfd70980e438fbf434c421aefb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -518,6 +518,16 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 	return security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 }
 
+int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return security_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
+}
+
+int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return security_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
+}
+
 const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
 {
 	return security_ops->inode_xattr_getsuffix();
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 83a535b7bc605340d4c00cfffd6b4f42e5daa046..221def6a0b1d99e6e80b267fd112dfbca7a9e450 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2297,6 +2297,25 @@ static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 	return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
 }
 
+static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+		     sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
+		if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
+			if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
+				return -EPERM;
+		} else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+			/* A different attribute in the security namespace.
+			   Restrict to administrator. */
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
+	   ordinary setattr permission. */
+	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+}
+
 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
@@ -2307,19 +2326,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value
 	u32 newsid;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
-		if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
-			     sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
-		    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
-			/* A different attribute in the security namespace.
-			   Restrict to administrator. */
-			return -EPERM;
-		}
-
-		/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
-		   ordinary setattr permission. */
-		return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
-	}
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
+		return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
 
 	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
@@ -2393,20 +2401,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
 
 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 {
-	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
-		if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
-			     sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
-		    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
-			/* A different attribute in the security namespace.
-			   Restrict to administrator. */
-			return -EPERM;
-		}
-
-		/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
-		   ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
-		   permission for removexattr. */
-		return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
-	}
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
+		return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
 
 	/* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
 	   You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
@@ -2464,6 +2460,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
 	return len;
 }
 
+static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
+}
+
 /* file security operations */
 
 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -2882,6 +2888,12 @@ static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 
 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
 	return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
 }
 
@@ -2911,6 +2923,12 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim
 
 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
 {
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
 	return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
 }
 
@@ -4830,6 +4848,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
 	.inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
 	.inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
+	.inode_need_killpriv =		selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
+	.inode_killpriv =		selinux_inode_killpriv,
 
 	.file_permission =		selinux_file_permission,
 	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,