From 5e36cf8edb5812e378b57511263d1a0a9172eeb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 11:51:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] configfs: fix a deadlock in configfs_symlink() commit 351e5d869e5ac10cb40c78b5f2d7dfc816ad4587 upstream. Configfs abuses symlink(2). Unlike the normal filesystems, it wants the target resolved at symlink(2) time, like link(2) would've done. The problem is that ->symlink() is called with the parent directory locked exclusive, so resolving the target inside the ->symlink() is easily deadlocked. Short of really ugly games in sys_symlink() itself, all we can do is to unlock the parent before resolving the target and relock it after. However, that invalidates the checks done by the caller of ->symlink(), so we have to * check that dentry is still where it used to be (it couldn't have been moved, but it could've been unhashed) * recheck that it's still negative (somebody else might've successfully created a symlink with the same name while we were looking the target up) * recheck the permissions on the parent directory. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/configfs/symlink.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/configfs/symlink.c b/fs/configfs/symlink.c index a5c54af861f7..1996643bb654 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/symlink.c +++ b/fs/configfs/symlink.c @@ -157,11 +157,42 @@ int configfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *symna !type->ct_item_ops->allow_link) goto out_put; + /* + * This is really sick. What they wanted was a hybrid of + * link(2) and symlink(2) - they wanted the target resolved + * at syscall time (as link(2) would've done), be a directory + * (which link(2) would've refused to do) *AND* be a deep + * fucking magic, making the target busy from rmdir POV. + * symlink(2) is nothing of that sort, and the locking it + * gets matches the normal symlink(2) semantics. Without + * attempts to resolve the target (which might very well + * not even exist yet) done prior to locking the parent + * directory. This perversion, OTOH, needs to resolve + * the target, which would lead to obvious deadlocks if + * attempted with any directories locked. + * + * Unfortunately, that garbage is userland ABI and we should've + * said "no" back in 2005. Too late now, so we get to + * play very ugly games with locking. + * + * Try *ANYTHING* of that sort in new code, and you will + * really regret it. Just ask yourself - what could a BOFH + * do to me and do I want to find it out first-hand? + * + * AV, a thoroughly annoyed bastard. + */ + inode_unlock(dir); ret = get_target(symname, &path, &target_item, dentry->d_sb); + inode_lock(dir); if (ret) goto out_put; - ret = type->ct_item_ops->allow_link(parent_item, target_item); + if (dentry->d_inode || d_unhashed(dentry)) + ret = -EEXIST; + else + ret = inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC); + if (!ret) + ret = type->ct_item_ops->allow_link(parent_item, target_item); if (!ret) { mutex_lock(&configfs_symlink_mutex); ret = create_link(parent_item, target_item, dentry); -- GitLab