diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index fcaf9c961265c8ac6c78c9a8734f7cf3a0c6ae1b..7de069afb382e4d3f43febb087ac21979b28d087 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_MCE \ | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_PCIDE \ | X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE \ - | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_VMXE)) + | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_VMXE | X86_CR4_SMAP)) #define CR8_RESERVED_BITS (~(unsigned long)X86_CR8_TPR) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index bea60671ef8a8c17227e4c4124c0f52a7c8c6f63..f47a104a749cd9d55c046c5752881ed553669d31 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, const u32 kvm_supported_word9_x86_features = F(FSGSBASE) | F(BMI1) | F(HLE) | F(AVX2) | F(SMEP) | F(BMI2) | F(ERMS) | f_invpcid | F(RTM) | f_mpx | F(RDSEED) | - F(ADX); + F(ADX) | F(SMAP); /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */ get_cpu(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index a2a1bb7ed8c1b32677db62d4f5bf4303cd1cb9b2..eeecbed26ac7ce6097fd6669435d73b221f047b2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -48,6 +48,14 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_smep(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)); } +static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_smap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; + + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0); + return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SMAP)); +} + static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_fsgsbase(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c index f5704d9e5ddcd980bc20fd421b3763ae5c5922b0..813d31038b93bf8d7232db9435e2ee0e59996118 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c @@ -3601,20 +3601,27 @@ static void reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, } } -static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, +void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept) { unsigned bit, byte, pfec; u8 map; - bool fault, x, w, u, wf, uf, ff, smep; + bool fault, x, w, u, wf, uf, ff, smapf, cr4_smap, cr4_smep, smap = 0; - smep = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP); + cr4_smep = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP); + cr4_smap = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP); for (byte = 0; byte < ARRAY_SIZE(mmu->permissions); ++byte) { pfec = byte << 1; map = 0; wf = pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK; uf = pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK; ff = pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK; + /* + * PFERR_RSVD_MASK bit is set in PFEC if the access is not + * subject to SMAP restrictions, and cleared otherwise. The + * bit is only meaningful if the SMAP bit is set in CR4. + */ + smapf = !(pfec & PFERR_RSVD_MASK); for (bit = 0; bit < 8; ++bit) { x = bit & ACC_EXEC_MASK; w = bit & ACC_WRITE_MASK; @@ -3626,12 +3633,33 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, /* Allow supervisor writes if !cr0.wp */ w |= !is_write_protection(vcpu) && !uf; /* Disallow supervisor fetches of user code if cr4.smep */ - x &= !(smep && u && !uf); + x &= !(cr4_smep && u && !uf); + + /* + * SMAP:kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode + * mappings should fault. A fault is considered + * as a SMAP violation if all of the following + * conditions are ture: + * - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4 + * - An user page is accessed + * - Page fault in kernel mode + * - if CPL = 3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC is clear + * + * Here, we cover the first three conditions. + * The fourth is computed dynamically in + * permission_fault() and is in smapf. + * + * Also, SMAP does not affect instruction + * fetches, add the !ff check here to make it + * clearer. + */ + smap = cr4_smap && u && !uf && !ff; } else /* Not really needed: no U/S accesses on ept */ u = 1; - fault = (ff && !x) || (uf && !u) || (wf && !w); + fault = (ff && !x) || (uf && !u) || (wf && !w) || + (smapf && smap); map |= fault << bit; } mmu->permissions[byte] = map; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h index 292615274358ee33a1afeb1eef159901ae6f164e..3842e70bdb7cf92f916acabcb5480b8b93367a60 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h @@ -44,11 +44,17 @@ #define PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL 2 #define PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL 1 -#define PFERR_PRESENT_MASK (1U << 0) -#define PFERR_WRITE_MASK (1U << 1) -#define PFERR_USER_MASK (1U << 2) -#define PFERR_RSVD_MASK (1U << 3) -#define PFERR_FETCH_MASK (1U << 4) +#define PFERR_PRESENT_BIT 0 +#define PFERR_WRITE_BIT 1 +#define PFERR_USER_BIT 2 +#define PFERR_RSVD_BIT 3 +#define PFERR_FETCH_BIT 4 + +#define PFERR_PRESENT_MASK (1U << PFERR_PRESENT_BIT) +#define PFERR_WRITE_MASK (1U << PFERR_WRITE_BIT) +#define PFERR_USER_MASK (1U << PFERR_USER_BIT) +#define PFERR_RSVD_MASK (1U << PFERR_RSVD_BIT) +#define PFERR_FETCH_MASK (1U << PFERR_FETCH_BIT) int kvm_mmu_get_spte_hierarchy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 sptes[4]); void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_mask); @@ -73,6 +79,8 @@ int handle_mmio_page_fault_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct); void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context); void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context, bool execonly); +void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, + bool ept); static inline unsigned int kvm_mmu_available_pages(struct kvm *kvm) { @@ -110,10 +118,30 @@ static inline bool is_write_protection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * Will a fault with a given page-fault error code (pfec) cause a permission * fault with the given access (in ACC_* format)? */ -static inline bool permission_fault(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, unsigned pte_access, - unsigned pfec) +static inline bool permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, + unsigned pte_access, unsigned pfec) { - return (mmu->permissions[pfec >> 1] >> pte_access) & 1; + int cpl = kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu); + unsigned long rflags = kvm_x86_ops->get_rflags(vcpu); + + /* + * If CPL < 3, SMAP prevention are disabled if EFLAGS.AC = 1. + * + * If CPL = 3, SMAP applies to all supervisor-mode data accesses + * (these are implicit supervisor accesses) regardless of the value + * of EFLAGS.AC. + * + * This computes (cpl < 3) && (rflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC), leaving + * the result in X86_EFLAGS_AC. We then insert it in place of + * the PFERR_RSVD_MASK bit; this bit will always be zero in pfec, + * but it will be one in index if SMAP checks are being overridden. + * It is important to keep this branchless. + */ + unsigned long smap = (cpl - 3) & (rflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC); + int index = (pfec >> 1) + + (smap >> (X86_EFLAGS_AC_BIT - PFERR_RSVD_BIT + 1)); + + return (mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access) & 1; } void kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages(struct kvm *kvm); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h index b1e6c1bf68d3bec7b13ebfd8c6e8f518b87a1d9c..123efd3ec29f2e9e3bdadffe48c0beb0650222ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker, walker->ptes[walker->level - 1] = pte; } while (!is_last_gpte(mmu, walker->level, pte)); - if (unlikely(permission_fault(mmu, pte_access, access))) { + if (unlikely(permission_fault(vcpu, mmu, pte_access, access))) { errcode |= PFERR_PRESENT_MASK; goto error; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index 1320e0f8e61174d9a5c1da8d17e455f4a839cb1a..1f68c5831924d15dd741032cde2fafc46aae50ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -3484,13 +3484,14 @@ static int vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4) hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE; hw_cr4 |= X86_CR4_PSE; /* - * SMEP is disabled if CPU is in non-paging mode in - * hardware. However KVM always uses paging mode to + * SMEP/SMAP is disabled if CPU is in non-paging mode + * in hardware. However KVM always uses paging mode to * emulate guest non-paging mode with TDP. - * To emulate this behavior, SMEP needs to be manually - * disabled when guest switches to non-paging mode. + * To emulate this behavior, SMEP/SMAP needs to be + * manually disabled when guest switches to non-paging + * mode. */ - hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_SMEP; + hw_cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP); } else if (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)) { hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 9d1b5cd4d34cc6f585b7f18a1ac2c5ba266c9b28..8b8fc0b792baeddf76a1b0ee3dac3a6a9b5cd0de 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -652,6 +652,9 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4) if (!guest_cpuid_has_smep(vcpu) && (cr4 & X86_CR4_SMEP)) return 1; + if (!guest_cpuid_has_smap(vcpu) && (cr4 & X86_CR4_SMAP)) + return 1; + if (!guest_cpuid_has_fsgsbase(vcpu) && (cr4 & X86_CR4_FSGSBASE)) return 1; @@ -680,6 +683,9 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4) (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE))) kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu); + if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_SMAP) + update_permission_bitmask(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, false); + if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE) kvm_update_cpuid(vcpu); @@ -1117,7 +1123,6 @@ static inline u64 get_kernel_ns(void) { struct timespec ts; - WARN_ON(preemptible()); ktime_get_ts(&ts); monotonic_to_bootbased(&ts); return timespec_to_ns(&ts); @@ -4164,7 +4169,8 @@ static int vcpu_mmio_gva_to_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva, | (write ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0); if (vcpu_match_mmio_gva(vcpu, gva) - && !permission_fault(vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, vcpu->arch.access, access)) { + && !permission_fault(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, + vcpu->arch.access, access)) { *gpa = vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn << PAGE_SHIFT | (gva & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)); trace_vcpu_match_mmio(gva, *gpa, write, false); diff --git a/virt/kvm/ioapic.c b/virt/kvm/ioapic.c index d4b601547f1f13c8f336b2352b46d087bb94e7d6..2458a1dc2ba9f2a84491eca30542b3b247482f27 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/ioapic.c +++ b/virt/kvm/ioapic.c @@ -97,6 +97,14 @@ static void rtc_irq_eoi_tracking_reset(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic) bitmap_zero(ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map, KVM_MAX_VCPUS); } +static void kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_all(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic); + +static void rtc_status_pending_eoi_check_valid(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic) +{ + if (WARN_ON(ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi < 0)) + kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_all(ioapic); +} + static void __rtc_irq_eoi_tracking_restore_one(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { bool new_val, old_val; @@ -120,9 +128,8 @@ static void __rtc_irq_eoi_tracking_restore_one(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } else { __clear_bit(vcpu->vcpu_id, ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map); ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi--; + rtc_status_pending_eoi_check_valid(ioapic); } - - WARN_ON(ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi < 0); } void kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_one(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -149,10 +156,10 @@ static void kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_all(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic) static void rtc_irq_eoi(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - if (test_and_clear_bit(vcpu->vcpu_id, ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map)) + if (test_and_clear_bit(vcpu->vcpu_id, ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map)) { --ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi; - - WARN_ON(ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi < 0); + rtc_status_pending_eoi_check_valid(ioapic); + } } static bool rtc_irq_check_coalesced(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic) @@ -353,10 +360,16 @@ static int ioapic_service(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, int irq, bool line_status) ioapic->irr &= ~(1 << irq); if (irq == RTC_GSI && line_status) { + /* + * pending_eoi cannot ever become negative (see + * rtc_status_pending_eoi_check_valid) and the caller + * ensures that it is only called if it is >= zero, namely + * if rtc_irq_check_coalesced returns false). + */ BUG_ON(ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi != 0); ret = kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(ioapic->kvm, NULL, &irqe, ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map); - ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi = ret; + ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi = (ret < 0 ? 0 : ret); } else ret = kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(ioapic->kvm, NULL, &irqe, NULL);