KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Flush link stack on guest exit to host kernel
commit af2e8c68b9c5403f77096969c516f742f5bb29e0 upstream. On some systems that are vulnerable to Spectre v2, it is up to software to flush the link stack (return address stack), in order to protect against Spectre-RSB. When exiting from a guest we do some house keeping and then potentially exit to C code which is several stack frames deep in the host kernel. We will then execute a series of returns without preceeding calls, opening up the possiblity that the guest could have poisoned the link stack, and direct speculative execution of the host to a gadget of some sort. To prevent this we add a flush of the link stack on exit from a guest. Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [dja: straightforward backport to v4.19] Signed-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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